


MIGRATION WATCH

PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARDS MIGRATION





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Commissioned by Migration Watch UK

Fieldwork conducted by JL Partners

Fieldwork date: 17th November 2025

Sample: 1,520 adults, United Kingdom, nationally representative

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Contents

| | |
|---|----|
| Introduction | 2 |
| Key Findings | 2 |
| Methodology | 3 |
| Limitations | 4 |
| National Overview | 5 |
| Net Migration Levels | 6 |
| Impact on Policy Areas | 7 |
| Crime and Personal Safety | 8 |
| Housing Affordability | 9 |
| Housing Availability | 10 |
| National Culture | 11 |
| Public Transport and Roads | 12 |
| Education and the School System | 13 |
| The National Health Service (NHS) | 14 |
| The Condition of the High Street | 15 |
| Results Summary by Positivity | 16 |
| Demographic Change | 17 |
| Patterns Across Demographic Groups | 18 |
| Demographic Change | 23 |
| Conclusion | 29 |
| Annexes | 30 |
| Net Migration Levels | 31 |
| Crime and Personal Safety | 32 |
| Housing Affordability | 33 |
| Housing Availability | 34 |
| National Culture | 35 |
| Public Transport and Roads | 36 |
| The School System | 37 |
| The National Health Service (NHS) | 38 |
| The Condition of the High Street | 39 |
| Demographic Change | 40 |

1. Introduction

Migration Watch UK is an independent, non-partisan think tank that monitors and analyses immigration to the United Kingdom. It publishes research on the scale and consequences of migration and advocates for reductions in net migration to sustainable levels. In pursuit of that remit, Migration Watch UK commissioned **JL Partners** to conduct a nationally representative poll examining public attitudes toward net migration levels, the perceived impact of migration across a range of policy areas, and views on long-term demographic change.

1.1 Key Findings

- 61 per cent said net migration between 2019 and 2024 was too high, including 38 per cent who chose “far too high”, the single largest response category. Eight per cent said the level was too low. The breadth of this view extends well beyond the groups most typically associated with concern about migration levels.
- Majorities of Labour voters, graduates, and respondents across every region of the United Kingdom judged recent levels too high. No demographic group produced a majority saying levels were too low.
- Across all eight policy areas tested, negative assessments outweighed positive ones. There was no area of public life in which the public believed migration had, on balance, been beneficial.
- Housing was the area of sharpest concern: 57 per cent said migration had reduced the availability of homes (net score minus 42 percentage points) and 49 per cent said it had made housing less affordable (net minus 34). Even on the NHS, where public awareness of migrants’ contribution as health service staff is highest, 50 per cent still rated migration’s net impact as negative against 22 per cent who rated it positively.
- 49 per cent of respondents viewed the projection that the White British population will fall below 50 per cent of the UK

total by the 2060s negatively, with 33 per cent selecting "very negative". That figure is the highest single response intensity recorded anywhere in the poll, exceeding concern about housing availability (25 per cent) and crime (24 per cent).

The purpose of commissioning this polling was to generate robust, independently conducted evidence of where British public opinion stands on migration that can inform Migration Watch UK's research, communications, and policy engagement. Migration Watch UK's long-standing position is that net migration to the UK has reached levels that are unsustainable and contrary to the public interest. The findings of this poll are directly relevant to that position and are discussed in that context in the conclusion of this report.

The report is structured as follows: a national overview of headline findings ([Section 2](#)); a synthesis of variation across demographic groups ([Section 3](#)); a focused examination of attitudes toward demographic change ([Section 4](#)); and a conclusion ([Section 5](#)). Full demographic crossbreaks are presented in [Annex A](#).

1.2 Methodology

Fieldwork was conducted online on 17 November 2025. The sample of 1,520 adults was drawn from Great Britain and weighted to be nationally representative by age, gender, region, education, ethnicity, and past vote, in line with standard industry practice.

Respondents were presented with factual information before answering questions on net migration levels, including the official figure of **2,925,000 net migration between 2019 and 2024**. They were then asked to assess the impact of migration on a series of policy areas and to give their views on long-term demographic projections. Responses to policy-area and demographic-change questions were collected on a five-point scale: very positive, somewhat positive, neither positive nor negative, somewhat negative, very negative. The sample size of 1,520 yields a margin of error of approximately ± 2.5 percentage points at the 95% confidence level for topline figures. Subgroup estimates carry wider margins and should be interpreted accordingly.

1.3 Limitations

Several methodological considerations bear on the interpretation of these findings and are noted here in the interest of transparency.

1. Respondents were presented with the net migration figure of 2,925,000 before being asked whether that level was too high or too low. The provision of a specific number is likely to have influenced responses: large figures can anchor perceptions of scale regardless of prior knowledge. Results on the net migration question should therefore be read as reflecting attitudes when respondents are aware of this figure, not necessarily pre-existing views in the abstract.
2. The policy-area questions ask respondents how they believe migration has affected areas such as housing, schools, or public safety. These responses measure perception, not measured or evidenced impact. The two may correlate, but they are not equivalent. No causal inference about the actual effect of migration on any policy outcome should be drawn from these data.
3. A proportion of respondents in every question selected the midpoint response (neither positive nor negative). This report treats neutral responses as neutral – reflecting uncertainty, indifference, or genuinely mixed views – and does not interpret them as latent agreement with either a positive or negative position.
4. The question on demographic change presented respondents with a specific projection: that the White British population would fall below 50% by the early 2060s. This number stems from **a peer-reviewed report** produced by Professor Matt Goodwin ^[1] for the Centre for Heterodox Social Science. Responses reflect reactions to this framing and should be interpreted accordingly.
5. Where findings are reported by demographic subgroup, sub-samples are smaller and differences between groups should be treated with appropriate caution, particularly where figures approach the margin of error.

1 *Demographic Change and the Future of the United Kingdom: 2022-2122*



<https://www.heterodoxcentre.com/wp-content/uploads/3-CHSS-Goodwin.pdf>
[nationalpopulationprojections/2024based](https://www.heterodoxcentre.com/wp-content/uploads/3-CHSS-nationalpopulationprojections/2024based)


2. National Overview

This section presents and interprets the topline national findings across all poll questions. The charts show the full distribution of responses; the commentary below explains what those distributions reveal: where the results are distinctive, what the shape of opinion implies beyond the headline figures, and how the questions relate to one another.

21 Net Migration Levels

Net migration to the UK (meaning, the number of people who migrated to the UK minus the number of people who left) was 2,950,000 between 2019 and 2024. Do you think this level of net migration was:

| | | |
|---|------------------------|------------|
|  | Far Too High | 38% |
|  | Too High | 23% |
|  | About The Right Amount | 22% |
|  | Too Low | 5% |
|  | Far Too Low | 3% |
|  | Don't Know | 9% |



Based on a representative sample of 1,520 UK adults, polled on the 17th November 2025. Polling conducted by JL Partners.

A clear majority of respondents believe net migration levels have been too high.

When respondents were shown the figure of 2,925,000 net migration between 2019 and 2024, 61% said this level was too high, including 38% who selected “far too high.” A further 22% said the level was about right, while 8% said it was too low. Those who think migration has been too high outnumber those who think it has been too low by a significant margin. The share selecting “far too high” is the single largest response category in this question.

The 9% 'don't know' figure is notable in the context of a question where a specific factual number was provided. It suggests that, for a meaningful minority, even exposure to the headline figure was insufficient to produce a directional judgement — either because the number lacked context, because respondents found the question politically uncomfortable, or because they were genuinely uncertain about what level would be appropriate.

Overall, the distribution of responses indicates that a majority view current migration levels as excessive, with a substantial proportion expressing this view strongly. That pattern indicates that, for a large share of the respondents, net migration has been dramatically high.

2.2 Impact on Policy Areas

Respondents were asked to rate the impact of migration on eight areas of public life:

1. Crime & Personal Safety
2. Housing Affordability
3. Housing Availability
4. National Culture
5. Public Transport & Roads
6. The School System
7. The NHS
8. The High Street

Across the polling, there is no policy area where the public, on balance, believes migration has been beneficial.

However, the variation across the strength of migration's impact on these policy areas is substantial. For example, the net perceived impact ranges from -13% on public transport to -42% on housing availability, a 29-point spread. This shows that the public does not perceive migration as having the same negative consequences at the same intensity across all policy areas.

A large neutral response does not simply represent the absence of a view: it may reflect that the causal link between migration and a given outcome is less salient or less legible in everyday experience. The 51% neutral figure on public transport is not surprising.


Migration's effect on roads and buses (if there is one) is less personally tangible visible than its effect on housing or school places, and the relatively high neutral figures on the school system (37%) and national culture (35%) point to genuine ambivalence or uncertainty in those domains, not merely apathy.

Crime and Personal Safety

Do you think the following have been affected negatively or positively by mass migration?:

Crime and Personal Safety

| | |
|--|------------|
| ■ Very Negatively | 24% |
| ■ Somewhat Negatively | 29% |
| ■ Neither Positively or Negatively | 32% |
| ■ Somewhat Positively | 10% |
| ■ Very Positively | 5% |



Based on a representative sample of 1,520 UK adults, polled on the 17th November 2025. Polling conducted by JL Partners.

A majority of respondents associate migration with a negative impact on crime and personal safety.

In total, 53% of respondents said migration had a negative effect on crime and personal safety, including 24% who said the impact had been “very negative.” By comparison, 15% said the impact had been positive, while 32% said it had been neither positive nor negative.






Negative responses therefore outnumber positive ones by more than three to one. The share selecting “very negative” (24%) is also notably larger than the share selecting “very positive” (5%).


There is clearly a perception amongst respondents that mass migration has had a negative impact on crime and personal safety; the share selecting positive responses is the joint lowest across the survey (-38% net).

Housing Affordability

Do you think the following have been affected negatively or positively by mass migration?:

The Cost of Housing

| | | |
|---|----------------------------------|------------|
|  | Very Negatively | 19% |
|  | Somewhat Negatively | 30% |
|  | Neither Positively or Negatively | 34% |
|  | Somewhat Positively | 10% |
|  | Very Positively | 5% |



Based on a representative sample of 1,520 UK adults, polled on the 17th November 2025. Polling conducted by JL Partners.

A plurality of respondents believe migration has made housing less affordable.

Overall, 49% of respondents said migration had made housing less affordable, including 19% who described the impact as “very negative.” By contrast, 15% said migration had made housing more affordable, while 36% said it had had no effect.






The largest single category is “somewhat negative” (30%), suggesting that many respondents perceive housing costs as the product of multiple pressures, such as land use policy, planning constraints, interest rates, investor behaviour, of which migration is one contributor among several.


Neutral responses account for over a third of the sample, indicating that while many respondents see an effect, a substantial group either do not perceive a clear impact or are uncertain.

Housing Availability

Do you think the following have been affected negatively or positively by mass migration?:

The Availability of Housing

| | | |
|---|----------------------------------|------------|
|  | Very Negatively | 25% |
|  | Somewhat Negatively | 32% |
|  | Neither Positively or Negatively | 29% |
|  | Somewhat Positively | 10% |
|  | Very Positively | 5% |



Based on a representative sample of 1,520 UK adults, polled on the 17th November 2025. Polling conducted by JL Partners.

A clear majority of respondents believe migration has reduced housing availability.

Housing availability is the area where negative sentiment is at its clear strongest. A combined 57% of respondents said migration had reduced the availability of housing, including 25% who selected “very negative.” In contrast, 15% said migration had improved availability, while 29% said it had made no difference.


The neutral group is smaller here than in several other questions, suggesting that the perceived link between population growth from migration and competition for housing is both legible and widely accepted.

National Culture

Do you think the following have been affected negatively or positively by mass migration?:

National Culture

| | |
|--|------------|
| ■ Very Negatively | 20% |
| ■ Somewhat Negatively | 23% |
| ■ Neither Positively or Negatively | 35% |
| ■ Somewhat Positively | 15% |
| ■ Very Positively | 7% |



Based on a representative sample of 1,520 UK adults, polled on the 17th November 2025. Polling conducted by JL Partners.

Views on the impact of migration on national culture are mixed, but more negative than positive.






National culture is the one of most complex result in the policy -area series. It produces the joint-highest combined positive response (22%), the widest gap between 'very positive' (7%) and 'very negative' (20%), and the most pronounced demographic variation of any policy area.


The combined negative figure of 43% shows real concern over migration's impact on national culture, but national culture is one of the few policy areas where a significant minority (22%) actively believes migration has been beneficial, while 35% said it had been neither positive nor negative.

Public Transport and Roads

Do you think the following have been affected negatively or positively by mass migration?:

The Condition of Public Transport and Public Roads

| | | |
|---|----------------------------------|------------|
|  | Very Negatively | 12% |
|  | Somewhat Negatively | 19% |
|  | Neither Positively or Negatively | 51% |
|  | Somewhat Positively | 15% |
|  | Very Positively | 8% |



Based on a representative sample of 1,520 UK adults, polled on the 17th November 2025. Polling conducted by JL Partners.

Most respondents do not see a clear impact of migration on public transport and roads, though negative views are more common than positive ones.

A majority of respondents (51%) said migration had neither a positive nor negative effect on public transport and roads. Among those who expressed a clear view, 31% said the impact had been negative, including 12% who selected “very negative,” while 18% said it had been positive.






The balance is clearly negative, though both are smaller than the neutral group. The relatively low share of “very negative” responses, compared with other policy areas, suggests that strongly held views are less common on this issue.


Overall, the data indicates that public transport is not seen as a primary area of impact, with most respondents either perceiving no clear effect or holding relatively moderate views.

Education and the School System

Do you think the following have been affected negatively or positively by mass migration?:

The School System

| | | |
|---|----------------------------------|------------|
|  | Very Negatively | 16% |
|  | Somewhat Negatively | 28% |
|  | Neither Positively or Negatively | 37% |
|  | Somewhat Positively | 13% |
|  | Very Positively | 6% |



Based on a representative sample of 1,520 UK adults, polled on the 17th November 2025. Polling conducted by JL Partners.

More respondents believe migration has had a negative impact on the school system than a positive one, though views are mixed.

In total, 44% of respondents said migration had a negative impact on schools, including 16% who described the impact as “very negative.” By comparison, 19% said the impact had been positive, while 37% said it had been neither positive nor negative.

The 44% combined negative and 37% neutral figures suggest a public that is concerned but not as settled in that concern as it is in other policy areas. This may reflect an awareness that migration increases school enrolments whilst acknowledging some migrant communities perform strongly educationally.


Overall, the results point to a negative-leaning but mixed distribution of opinion.

The National Health Service (NHS)

Do you think the following have been affected negatively or positively by mass migration?:

The National Health Service (NHS)

| | |
|--|------------|
| Very Negatively | 23% |
| Somewhat Negatively | 27% |
| Neither Positively or Negatively | 29% |
| Somewhat Positively | 14% |
| Very Positively | 8% |



Based on a representative sample of 1,520 UK adults, polled on the 17th November 2025. Polling conducted by JL Partners.

Respondents' views on the impact of migration on the NHS are the most polarised in the polling.

The NHS result is the most polarised in the policy-area series. It produces the highest combined positive response of any question (22%, comprising 8% very positive and 14% somewhat positive), yet still yields a net negative figure of -28 and the second-smallest neutral group (29%) after housing availability. These features describe a public that holds genuine views in both directions.

The 22% who see a net positive should not be dismissed. It likely reflects widespread public awareness that the NHS is heavily staffed by migrant workers and a genuine appreciation of that contribution.


Yet the majority view is still negative: 50% combined negative, including 23% very negative. The smaller neutral group (29%) reinforces this: on the NHS, most respondents have a view, and that view is more likely to be negative than positive.

The Condition of the High Street

Do you think the following have been affected negatively or positively by mass migration?:

The Condition of the High Street

| | |
|--|------------|
| ■ Very Negatively | 16% |
| ■ Somewhat Negatively | 24% |
| ■ Neither Positively or Negatively | 43% |
| ■ Somewhat Positively | 11% |
| ■ Very Positively | 6% |



Based on a representative sample of 1,520 UK adults, polled on the 17th November 2025. Polling conducted by JL Partners.


A plurality of respondents feel migration has had a neutral impact on the high street.

The high street result is distinctive within the policy-area series for the dominance of its neutral response. With 43% choosing 'neither positive nor negative', the high street produces the second-highest neutral figure after public transport (51%), and the combined negative figure of 40% is the lowest of any policy area. This suggests that for a large share of the public, migration's relationship to the condition of local high streets is either not legible, not salient, or not clearly directional.

The decline of the high street is a widely discussed phenomenon in Britain. Yet it is attributed to online retail, business rates, changing consumer habits, and out-of-town retail development rather than migration. Despite this, 40% nonetheless rated the impact of migration negatively.

Results Summary by Positivity

Do you think the following have been affected negatively or positively by mass migration?:




Based on a representative sample of 1,520 UK adults, polled on the 17th November 2025. Polling conducted by JL Partners, on behalf of Migration Watch UK.

2.3 Demographic Change

A recent study projected that people who identify as White British, White English, White Welsh, or White Scottish will fall below half of the UK population by the early 2060s. Do you think this change would be:

| | |
|---|------------|
| ■ Very negative for the UK | 33% |
| ■ Somewhat negative for the UK | 16% |
| ■ Neither positive or negative for the UK | 28% |
| ■ Somewhat positive for the UK | 10% |
| ■ Very positive for the UK | 6% |
| ■ Don't Know | 6% |



Based on a representative sample of 1,520 UK adults, polled on the 17th November 2025. Polling conducted by JL Partners.

Respondents were presented with a projection that people identifying as White British, White English, White Welsh, or White Scottish would fall below 50% of the UK population by the early 2060s, and asked how they viewed this prospect.

A large share of respondents view long-term demographic change extremely negatively.

In total, 49% said they viewed this change negatively, including 33% who selected “very negative.” By comparison, 16% said they viewed the change positively, while 28% said they felt neither positive nor negative. The share selecting “very negative” (33%) is the highest recorded across all questions in the poll. Respondents who hold negative views on this question tend to hold them at the strongest available intensity.

The neutral group (28%) is smaller than in several other policy areas, indicating that more respondents express a clear view. At the same time, the gap between “very negative” (33%) and “very positive” (6%) suggests a higher level of strongly held opinion than elsewhere in the dataset. Overall, the results show that attitudes towards demographic change are both more negative and more strongly felt than views on most other issues covered in the polling. This topic will be explored in more depth in [Section 4](#).

3. Patterns Across Demographic Groups

This section synthesises the key patterns emerging from the demographic crossbreaks across all poll questions. The aim is to identify where opinion varies most significantly, which groups diverge from the national picture, and whether those patterns are consistent across topics or specific to particular questions. Full crossbreak data are in [Annex A](#).

The overarching finding is one of breadth: negative assessments of migration levels and effects are the majority or plurality position across almost all demographic categories and almost all questions. The more useful question is therefore not whether negative views exist across groups but where opinion is most divided, which demographic dimensions produce the largest variation, and whether patterns hold consistently across different subject areas or break down on specific questions.

3.1 Age

Older respondents are more likely to hold negative views, while younger respondents are more likely to be neutral or moderately positive.

Age is the most consistently powerful predictor of attitudes across the entire poll. On every question tested, older respondents are more negative about migration and its consequences than younger ones.

On net migration levels, this is most stark: 16% of 18–24 year olds chose 'far too high', rising to 43% among 45–54 year olds and 60% among 65–74 year olds. The youngest cohorts are not enthusiastically pro-migration, substantial proportions still judged levels too high, but their pattern differs materially from every older group. Among 18–34 year olds, 'about the right amount' and 'too low' together account for a much larger share than in any older cohort, and 'don't know' is higher.

The same gradient is visible on every policy area question, though its steepness varies. On housing availability, 41% of 18–24 year olds gave a combined negative response versus 76% of those

aged 75 and over. On crime and personal safety, 41% of 18–24 year olds were combined negative, versus 75% of those aged 75 and over. On national culture, which shows the widest range of opinion generally, 29% of 18–24 year olds were combined negative, versus 61% of those aged 75 and over. Even on public transport (the question with the most neutral overall distribution) the pattern persists: younger adults show noticeably higher positive responses and lower negative ones than those aged 55 and over.

The school system question is a partial exception to the strict age gradient: the 25–34 cohort shows a higher combined positive figure (41%) than 18–24 year olds (30%), possibly reflecting more recent direct experience of the school system. Nevertheless, negative sentiment still increases from the mid-30s onward.

3.2 Geography

Negative views are consistent across regions, with the exception of London which is more balanced.

Geography produces a single, consistent outlier: London. Across every question in the poll without exception, London produces either the least negative or the most positive distribution of any region. This holds on net migration levels (25% 'far too high' in London versus 47% in the South West and 50% in Wales), on all policy-area questions, and on demographic change (35% combined negative in London versus 56% in Yorkshire and the Humber and 59% in the South West).

Outside London, regional variation is present but considerably smaller. Wales and the South West are consistently among the most negative regions across most questions. Scotland and Northern Ireland tend to sit close to or slightly below the national average on most measures. The North East shows higher positive responses on some questions — particularly crime — than might be expected from its socioeconomic profile, though it remains net negative throughout.

Even in London, there are more negative responses than combined positive ones on housing availability (42% versus 27%), crime (40% versus 23%), and the school system (34% versus 28%). London is less negative than the rest of the country, but it is not a pro-migration outlier in any strong sense. It is better characterised as considerably more divided and more neutral.

3.3 Gender

Gender has little impact on responses.

Gender differences are small and largely within the margin of error across the poll. On net migration levels, men showed 40% 'far too high' versus 36% for women, with women having a larger 'don't know' share (13% versus approximately 6%). On policy-area questions, both genders produce broadly similar distributions: combined negative responses are within a few percentage points of each other on housing, crime, culture, transport, and schools in every case.

One consistent pattern is that women are modestly more likely to select the neutral response on most questions, while men are slightly more likely to choose the most extreme options in both directions. This produces marginally higher combined negative figures for men on some questions (for example, 45% combined negative for men versus 42% for women on housing affordability) while also producing marginally higher combined positive figures for men on national culture (29% versus 15% for women). Neither difference is large enough to be significant across the polling.

3.4 Education and Income

Higher-income and graduate respondents are more likely to respond neutral or moderately positive, while lower-income and non-graduate groups are more negative.

Educational attainment is associated with more moderate views across most questions, but it does not reverse the direction of opinion. On net migration levels, 61% of graduates chose 'too high' or 'far too high' compared to 62% of non-graduates. A near-

identical headline figure, with the key difference being that non-graduates were more likely to choose the stronger 'far too high' response (42% versus 29%). The graduate–non-graduate divide is therefore one of intensity rather than direction.

This pattern recurs across policy areas. On housing availability, 49% of graduates gave a combined negative response versus 59% of non-graduates. On crime and personal safety, 45% of graduates were combined negative versus 56% of non-graduates. On national culture, graduates showed a noticeably higher combined positive response (32%) than non-graduates (17%), plus a larger neutral group. National culture is the policy area where the education divide is most pronounced. On public transport and schools, the gaps are smaller but consistently in the same direction.

Income broadly tracks education, with lower-income respondents expressing more negative views across most questions. On the net migration question, 61% of those earning up to £28,000 chose 'too high' or 'far too high', compared to 61% of those earning £48,001 or more. The headline figure is similar but lower earners chose 'far too high' more often. On housing availability, the income gradient is visible but not steep: combined negative responses ranged from 59% (up to £28,000) to 52% (£48,001 or more). On national culture, higher earners showed more positive and neutral responses and fewer negative ones than lower earners, mirroring the education pattern.

3.5 Ethnicity

Respondents from minority ethnic backgrounds are more likely to express positive views on migration across the poll, though overall their opinions remain mixed.

Ethnicity produces the largest and most consistent subgroup differences in the poll. BAME respondents are more positive about migration across every question tested, and the gaps are substantial rather than marginal.

On net migration levels, 42% of BAME respondents said levels were 'about the right amount' compared to 17% of White respondents, and only 37% of BAME respondents chose 'too high' or 'far too high' versus 67% of White respondents. On national culture (the question where ethnic differences are most pronounced

among the policy areas) BAME respondents showed 38% combined positive and 22% combined negative, versus 13% combined positive and 48% combined negative among White respondents. On the NHS (where crossbreak data are available in the source material's prose), BAME respondents were similarly more likely to see positive effects.

However, the BAME–White gap should not be read as BAME respondents being uniformly favourable toward migration. On housing availability, BAME respondents showed 35% combined negative: a meaningful minority. On the net migration question, only 9% of BAME respondents chose 'too low' or 'far too low', meaning that even the most favourable demographic group was more likely to accept current levels than to endorse higher ones. On the school system, 18% of BAME respondents were combined negative. The picture is one of considerably more positive assessment among BAME respondents, but not endorsement of unlimited or further increases.

3.6 Political Affiliation and Party Vote

Respondents across party affiliation are more negative about demographic change than positive.

Party vote produces the widest divergence on this question. Reform UK voters showed 74% combined negative with 61% selecting 'very negative'. Conservative voters showed 65% combined negative with 48% 'very negative'. Labour voters were more evenly split: 23% positive, 33% neutral, 37% negative — the most divided major party on any question in the poll. Liberal Democrat voters leaned negative (43% combined negative), while Green voters were roughly balanced (28% positive, 32% negative) with a large neutral group (32%).

Political engagement does not follow a simple linear pattern on this question. Very low attention respondents (0–2) showed relatively high combined positive responses alongside high combined negative, suggesting greater dispersion of opinion. Among the most engaged (8–10), 'very negative' rose to 34% and combined negative to 46%. The relationship between political engagement and attitudes on demographic change is less clear-cut than on the net migration question.

4. Demographic Change

This section deals with one of the most sensitive and politically charged issues in British public debate: the long-term demographic shift in which those identifying as White British, White English, White Welsh or White Scottish are projected to fall below 50% of the UK population by the early 2060s.

The demographic change question differs from the policy-area questions in several respects. It asks about a long-term projection rather than a present-day experience; it is explicitly framed in terms of ethnic composition; and it produced the most intense negative response of any question in the poll. For these reasons it is examined separately here.

The question presented respondents with the projection that people identifying as White British, White English, White Welsh, or White Scottish would fall below 50% of the UK population by the early 2060s, and asked them to rate their view of this prospect on a five-point scale. The full breakdown of responses is on page 26.

4.1 National Results

A large share of respondents view long-term demographic change extremely negatively.


As reported in Section 2.3, 49% viewed this shift negatively and 16% positively, with 28% neutral and 6% saying they don't know. The 'very negative' figure of 33% was the highest recorded in the poll.

The distribution is notably polarised: the 'very negative' category (33%) is substantially larger than 'somewhat negative' (16%), which is unusual across the poll and suggests that respondents who hold negative views on this question tend to hold them strongly. Combined positive responses (16%) are present and non-trivial, but are outnumbered by combined negative responses by roughly three to one.

A recent study projected that people who identify as White British, White English, White Welsh, or White Scottish will fall below half of the UK population by the early 2060s Do you think this change would be:

Based on a sample of 1,520 UK adults polled on the 17th November 2025.

Very positive for the UK Somewhat positive for the UK Neither positive or negative for the UK
 Somewhat negative for the UK Very negative for the UK Don't know



4.2 Age

Respondents become more concerned by demographic change as they get older.

Age variation on this question is steeper than on any other in the poll. Among 18–24 year olds, combined positive responses (29%) exceed combined negative (27%), making this the only question and age group in the entire poll where this occurs. Among 25–34 year olds the same pattern holds (37% positive, 27% negative). From the mid-30s onward the balance reverses sharply, and from age 45 upward negative responses form an outright majority in every cohort.

The youngest two cohorts are distinctive: they are not merely less negative than older groups but welcoming of the projected change, on balance. This makes demographic change the only question in the poll where there is a genuine generational split in the direction of opinion.

4.3 Geography

A majority of respondents across regions view demographic change as negative with the exception of London, Scotland and Northern Ireland, where negative views are still a plurality.

London is again the clearest outlier. With 31% combined positive, 30% neutral, and 35% combined negative, London is the only region where combined positive responses come within striking distance of combined negative ones. This likely reflects the different experience of demographic diversity in a city that has been majority-minority for over a decade, though polling cannot confirm this directly.

In England, outside London, negative responses are a majority in every region. The South West (59% combined negative, 42% very negative) and Yorkshire and the Humber (56% combined negative, 42% very negative) show the strongest negative response of any English regions. Scotland (45% combined negative) and Northern Ireland (45% combined negative) are somewhat less negative than the English average outside London, perhaps due to nationalist respondents. Wales shows 50% combined negative with 40% very negative.

4.4 Ethnicity

On demographic change, the ethnic gap is the largest in the poll, but a sizeable minority of BAME respondents are still concerned.

BAME respondents showed 30% combined positive, 39% neutral, and 24% combined negative (13% somewhat negative; 11% very negative). Whereas White respondents showed 9% combined positive, 26% neutral, and 55% combined negative (17% somewhat negative; 38% very negative). The largest single response among BAME respondents is 'neutral' (39%); among White respondents it is 'very negative' (38%).

However, these differences are partly structural. Because the question asks White and non-White respondents about a projection that describes the relative decline of White British people as a share of the population, they are evaluating the same trend from a different vantage point.

4.5 Education and Income

There are differences between education and income but no group has more positive responses than negative ones.

Graduates showed 24% combined positive, 31% neutral, and 39% combined negative (15% somewhat negative; 24% very negative). Non-graduates showed 12% combined positive, 27% neutral, and 53% combined negative (17% somewhat negative; 36% very negative). Both groups produce negative pluralities, but graduates are twice as likely to hold positive views and ten percentage points less likely to choose 'very negative'. The income pattern mirrors education: the highest-income group (£48,001 or more) showed 24% combined positive and 43% combined negative, compared to 13% combined positive and 51% combined negative for those earning up to £28,000.

4.6 Political Affiliation and Party Vote

Respondents across party affiliation are more negative about demographic change than positive.

Party vote produces the widest divergence on this question. Reform UK voters showed 74% combined negative with 61% selecting 'very negative'. Conservative voters showed 65% combined negative with 48% 'very negative'. Labour voters were more evenly split: 23% positive, 33% neutral, 37% negative – the most divided major party on any question in the poll. Liberal Democrat voters leaned negative (43% combined negative), while Green voters were roughly balanced (28% positive, 32% negative) with a large neutral group (32%).

Political engagement does not follow a simple linear pattern on this question. Very low attention respondents (0–2) showed relatively high combined positive responses alongside high combined negative, suggesting greater dispersion of opinion. Among the most engaged (8–10), 'very negative' rose to 34% and combined negative to 46%. The relationship between political engagement and attitudes on demographic change is less clear-cut than on the net migration question.

4.7 Interpretation

The demographic change results are the most politically significant in the survey, and they reward careful reading rather than selective quotation. Taken as a whole, they reveal three things that matter for how this issue should be understood in public debate.

First, concern about demographic change is both widespread and intensely held. Nearly half the public (49%) viewed the projected shift negatively, and of those, the majority chose 'very negative' rather than 'somewhat negative'. This suggests that concern is not merely marginal but strongly held among a substantial share of respondents. The 33% 'very negative' figure exceeds the equivalent on every other question in the survey, including housing availability—the policy area that generates the strongest negative response on material outcomes. Whatever the explanation, the strength of feeling is real.

Second, the variation in the data is as significant as the headline figure. The 18–34 age groups are the only cohorts in the entire survey where combined positive responses exceed combined negative ones on any question. London is the only region where positive and negative responses come close to parity. Labour voters are almost evenly split. These are not marginal exceptions: they represent substantial portions of the electorate whose view is qualitatively different from the national plurality. A public debate that treats the 49% combined negative figure as the whole story is missing the fact that for a younger, more urban, and more diverse segment of the population, this projected change is either welcome or a matter of indifference.

Third, the results expose a significant gap between the demographic groups most likely to shape long-run political outcomes and those whose views dominate the current polling picture. Older respondents, who are most negative, are also the most likely to vote in the near term. Younger respondents, who are more positive or neutral, will form the majority of the electorate over the period the projection covers. This does not mean the concerns of older respondents should be discounted; it means that attitudes toward demographic change are themselves likely to shift as the population ages through its cohorts, and policy debates framed around the current national distribution may look quite different in twenty years.

For Migration Watch UK, these findings provide clear and robust evidence that concern about the demographic consequences of sustained high migration is not a fringe position. It is held by majorities outside London across every region of Great Britain, by large majorities of Conservative and Reform voters, and by a plurality of the population as a whole. The findings also honestly reflect that this concern is not universal: younger Britons and BAME communities view the same projection through a different lens, and any serious policy engagement with this question will need to reckon with that division rather than paper over it.

5. Conclusion

This polling provides a detailed picture of public attitudes toward migration at a specific point in time, following a period of historically high net migration to the United Kingdom. The findings are directly relevant to the research and policy positions of Migration Watch UK, which has consistently argued that net migration has reached unsustainable levels and that public concern about its consequences has been insufficiently acknowledged in mainstream political debate.

On net migration levels, the poll's most decisive finding is that a clear majority of the British public (61%, including 38% selecting 'far too high') judged the 2019–2024 figure of 2,925,000 to be excessive. This aligns directly with Migration Watch UK's core position that recent migration levels are unsustainably high. Notably, the breadth of this view extends well beyond the groups most typically associated with restrictionist views: majorities of Labour voters, graduates, and respondents in every region of Great Britain, including London, judged recent levels too high, though with varying intensity. No demographic group produced a majority saying levels were too low.

On policy areas, the findings are consistent with Migration Watch UK's argument that high migration places pressure on housing, public services, and the social fabric. Negative assessments outweigh positive ones across all eight policy areas tested. The strongest negative margins are on housing availability (net -42%) and crime and personal safety (net -38%), followed by housing affordability (-34%), the NHS (-28%), schools (-25%), the high street (-23%), national culture (-21%), and public transport (-13%). The NHS result is particularly notable: despite the widely held view that migrant workers are essential to the health service, a majority of the public (50%) still rated migration's net impact on the NHS as negative. This could suggest that the public perceives the demand side of the equation, not just the supply of staff, and concludes the balance is unfavourable.

On demographic change, the poll findings support Migration Watch UK's position that public concern about the long-term demographic trajectory of the United Kingdom is widespread and deeply felt. The 'very negative' figure of 33% on the demographic change question was the highest recorded in the entire poll — exceeding even the intensity of concern about housing availability (25%) and crime (24%). Combined negative responses approached half the sample (49%). While significant variation exists by age, ethnicity, and party vote the overall picture is one of substantial public unease about projected demographic change, consistent with Migration Watch UK's view that these concerns deserve serious engagement rather than dismissal.

Taken together, the findings indicate a public that is broadly sceptical about the consequences of recent migration levels, particularly on housing and public services, and more divided, though still net negative nationally, on cultural and demographic questions. The depth and consistency of negative sentiment on net migration levels and housing availability are the poll's most robust findings. The demographic change results, while notable in their intensity, require more cautious interpretation given the nature of the question framing. These findings provide Migration Watch UK with robust, independently conducted evidence in support of its case for a substantial and sustained reduction in net migration to the United Kingdom.

Annex A: Full Demographic Crossbreaks


This annex (overleaf) presents demographic crossbreak findings for all poll questions. All figures are percentages of respondents within each subgroup. Sub-sample sizes vary; estimates for smaller subgroups carry wider margins of error and should be treated with appropriate caution. A figure where the bar was unlabelled means it falls below approximately 4–5%. The annex follows the order of the main report: net migration levels (A.1), policy areas (A.2–A.9), and demographic change (A.10).

Net Migration Levels

Net migration to the UK (meaning, the number of people who migrated to the UK minus the number of people who left) was 2,925,000 between 2019 and 2024. Do you think this level of net migration was:

Based on a sample of 1,520 UK adults polled on the 17th November 2025.

■ Far too high
 ■ Too high
 ■ About the right amount
 ■ Too low
 ■ Far too low
 ■ Don't know




Crime and Personal Safety

Do you think the following have been affected negatively or positively by mass migration?: Crime and personal safety

Based on a sample of 1,520 UK adults polled on the 17th November 2025.

Very positively Somewhat positively Neither positively nor negatively Somewhat negatively Very negatively




Housing Affordability

Do you think the following have been affected negatively or positively by mass migration?: The cost of housing

Based on a sample of 1,520 UK adults polled on the 17th November 2025.

Very positively Somewhat positively Neither positively nor negatively Somewhat negatively Very negatively




Housing Availability

Do you think the following have been affected negatively or positively by mass migration?: The availability of housing

Based on a sample of 1,520 UK adults polled on the 17th November 2025.

Very positively Somewhat positively Neither positively nor negatively Somewhat negatively Very negatively




National Culture

Do you think the following have been affected negatively or positively by mass migration?: National culture

Based on a sample of 1,520 UK adults polled on the 17th November 2025.

Very positively Somewhat positively Neither positively nor negatively Somewhat negatively Very negatively




Public Transport and Roads

Do you think the following have been affected negatively or positively by mass migration?: The condition of public transportation and public roads

Based on a sample of 1,520 UK adults polled on the 17th November 2025.

■ Very positively
 ■ Somewhat positively
 ■ Neither positively nor negatively
 ■ Somewhat negatively
 ■ Very negatively




The School System

Do you think the following have been affected negatively or positively by mass migration?: The school system

Based on a sample of 1,520 UK adults polled on the 17th November 2025.

Very positively Somewhat positively Neither positively nor negatively Somewhat negatively Very negatively




The National Health Service

Do you think the following have been affected negatively or positively by mass migration?: The National Health Service (NHS)

Based on a sample of 1,520 UK adults polled on the 17th November 2025.

Very positively Somewhat positively Neither positively nor negatively Somewhat negatively Very negatively




The Condition of the High Street

Do you think the following have been affected negatively or positively by mass migration?: The condition of the high street

Based on a sample of 1,520 UK adults polled on the 17th November 2025.

Very positively Somewhat positively Neither positively nor negatively Somewhat negatively Very negatively



Demographic Change

A recent study projected that people who identify as White British, White English, White Welsh, or White Scottish will fall below half of the UK population by the early 2060s Do you think this change would be:

Based on a sample of 1,520 UK adults polled on the 17th November 2025.

■ Very positive for the UK
 ■ Somewhat positive for the UK
 ■ Neither positive or negative for the UK
■ Somewhat negative for the UK
 ■ Very negative for the UK
 ■ Don't know

