1. The population of Scotland has been increasing for the last 20 years and is approaching 5.5 million. Meanwhile the foreign-born share and the proportion of the population made up of other ethnicities have both more than tripled – from about 3% to 10-11% of the total. The impact of immigration is especially marked in the major cities where the percentage of births to non-UK born mothers has reached 36% in Aberdeen and Edinburgh, 32% in Glasgow and 18% in Dundee. Meanwhile, public opinion in Scotland recognises that immigration has benefits but is keen for it to be controlled at sensible and sustainable levels.

Introduction

2. It is sometimes claimed that Scotland needs significant foreign immigration to counter a falling population due to a falling birth rate and an ageing population. The graph below shows that the population of Scotland has remained above five million for the past fifty years and has witnessed notable growth since the early 2000s.Figure 1: Scotland’s population since 1950 (ONS / NRS).Scotland’s population since 1950 (ONS / NRS).ONS / NRSPopulation (millions)195019521954195619581960196219641966196819701972197419761978198019821984198619881990199219941996199820002002200420062008201020122014201620184.64.855.25.45.61957●

 Population (millions): 5.125

3. Since 2000 net migration has added an average of 21,600 a year to the Scottish population. A gross total of 40,000 people leave Scotland every year for other parts of the UK but there is still a net inflow from elsewhere in the country of about 8,000 people per year. Midlothian, Aberdeenshire and East Dunbartonshire have in the past attracted the majority of internal migrants. Net migration from overseas has fluctuated considerably since 2000, and reached 28,000 in 2019 (a joint-record – with 2009 – for a calendar year) as shown in Figure 2 below.

Figure 2: Net migration to Scotland from overseas (ONS, long-term international migration by area or origin within the UK).^[1]Net migration to Scotland from overseas (ONS, long-term international migration by area or origin withinthe UK)Office for National StatisticsOverseas net migration to Scotland200120022003200420052006200720082009201020112012201320142015201620172018201905,00010,00015,00020,00025,00030,0002005●

 Overseas net migration to Scotland: 8,000

Figure 3: Net migration to Scotland from overseas and from elsewhere in UK (ONS Local Area Migration Indicators^[2]).Net migration to Scotland from overseas and from elsewhere in UK (ONS Local AreaMigration Indicators).Office for National StatisticsTotal net migrationOf which: OverseasOf which: From elsewhere in UK2001-022002-032003-042004-052005-062006-072007-082008-092009-102010-112011-122012-132013-142014-152015-162016-172017-182018-19-10,000010,00020,00030,00040,0002002-03●

 Total net migration: 5,600● Of which: Overseas: -1,400● Of which: From elsewhere in UK: 7,000

4. As a result of immigration, the foreign-born population of Scotland has more than trebled from just over 150,000 in 2000 / 2001 to 530,000 in 2019 / 2020 (over half of whom live in Glasgow, Edinburgh, Aberdeen and Dundee). The EU born population rose from 2003 to 2017 but has since flattened out so that the non EU-born population remains slightly larger at 53% of the total. Since 2010, the most notable increases were in Glasgow (where the non-UK born total rose from 63,000 to 103,000 – from 11% to 17% of the total) and Edinburgh (here the non-UK born total increased from 62,000 to 103,000, from 13% to 20% of the total).

Figure 4: Foreign-born population of Scotland – ONS APS (thousands).Foreign-born population of Scotland – ONS APS (thousands).Office for National StatisticsNon-UK born populationOf which: non-EU bornOf which: EU born2000200120022003200420052006200720082009201020112012201320142015201620172018201901002003004005002002●

 Non-UK born population: 171● Of which: non-EU born: 120● Of which: EU born: 51

Table 1: Top five areas of UK witnessing highest relative rise in non-UK born – ONS Annual population Survey

Births to Scottish born mothers

5. Births to Scottish mothers are part of what statisticians call “natural change” – that is the total of births minus the total of deaths in a given year. In 1965, Scotland’s natural change in population was 40,600 but it had fallen to 4,600 by 1975. In more recent years the natural change in Scotland has fluctuated between -7,700 and + 6,000.

Births to non UK born mothers in Scotland

6. Births to non UK born mothers increased from 14% in 2010 to 17.5% in 2019 (that is 8,700 out of 50,000 births).^[3]

7. There were, however, much higher rates in some cities – 36% in Edinburgh and Aberdeen, 32% in Glasgow and 18% in Dundee. Table 2 below shows the ten Scottish local authorities with the largest increases in the share of births to non-UK born mothers between 2010 and 2019. Particularly notable were the changes in Midlothian and Falkirk where the share more than doubled.

Table 2: Change in share of births to foreign-born mothers, 2010-19 (ONS Local area migration statistics).

Demographic change in Scotland

8. Statistics from the Labour Force Survey suggest that the White British population has fallen by 52,300 since 2001 (Figure 4 below).

Figure 5: White British population of Scotland, 2001-20 (ONS / LFS).White British population of Scotland, 2001-20 (ONS / LFS).ONS / LFSWhite British2001201120202,000,0002,500,0003,000,0003,500,0004,000,0004,500,0005,000,0002001●

 White British: 4,835,630

9. Meanwhile, the combination of immigration and higher birth rates for some immigrant groups has more than tripled the share of the population made up of other ethnicities, from 150,000 to just under 610,000 (Figure 5 below).

Figure 6: Share of total population made up of other ethnicities (ONS / LFS).Share of total population made up of other ethnicities (ONS / LFS).ONS / LFSOther ethnic share of Scotland population20012011202002.557.51012.5

Figure 7: Other ethnic population by group. 2001-20 (ONS / LFS).Other ethnic population by group. 2001-20 (ONS / LFS).ONS / LFSOther ethnicitiesOf which: Other WhiteOf which: South AsianOf which: Black / Black BritishOf which: OtherOf which: Mixed / multiple2001201120200200,000400,000600,000800,000

10. As elsewhere in the developed world, Scotland’s population is ageing as a result of improving medical care. However, immigration is not an effective remedy as immigrants also grow older so a continuous and increasing level of net migration would be needed to keep the average age down. It is much more effective to raise the retirement age so that the growing number of healthy, older people can continue to contribute to the economy and society. Incentives to companies to increase productivity can also be helpful. Simply bringing in workers reduces the opportunities for work and training for young Scots and builds up problems for the future.

Asylum and resettlement

11. Since 2014, nearly 3,600 refugees and dependants have been directly resettled to Scotland under the largest of four resettlement schemes that have been in place^[4]. This is 16% of the UK total (21,800) during that period, although Scotland accounts for only 8% of the total UK population. Since 2017, the largest number of resettled people (382, just under 1/5) have gone to Edinburgh.

12. It is also important to note that many resettled refugees and supported asylum claimants are placed in inner city areas which already have strained public services and high unemployment. In 2016, Glasgow was placed second top in a list of 10 UK areas for the number of asylum seekers per head of population – with one per every 189 residents^[5] and the city hosts about 10% of the 30,000 to 40,000 main applicants who claim asylum in the UK each year; 99% of the total of just under 4,000 asylum seekers receiving taxpayer-funded housing or payments in Scotland as of December 2020 were accommodated in Glasgow (the total supported in Scotland increased by nearly 400 since 2017). It is important to note that (44%) of areas in Glasgow City Council are ranked among Scotland’s most deprived.^[6]

Public opinion on immigration

13. Public opinion in Scotland is very clear in stressing the need for more carefully controlled and reduced immigration – similar to the view in the rest of the UK.

• Over the last year, those in Scotland who think that immigration in the last ten years has been too high has risen from 40% to 54% (YouGov, Spring 2021).
• 82% of respondents in Scotland think that government should ensure that employers prioritise getting British workers back to work instead of making it easier to bring in more foreign workers (Deltapoll, May 2020).
• 66% of people surveyed in Scotland thought that the government was wrong to propose allowing employers to hire an unlimited number of overseas workers to fill skilled jobs at pay levels barely above the minimum wage (Deltapoll, May 2020).
• 66% thought that the government was not doing enough to tackle the problem of people illegally crossing the English Channel in small boats from France and Belgium (Deltapoll, May 2020).
• 76% of respondents in Scotland wanted to keep in place an annual cap on work permits issued to foreign workers (Deltapoll, November 2019); the UK government has now scrapped this cap.
• 60% of respondents in Scotland thought that the immigration level experienced over the past five years was a substantial concern for the public (Deltapoll, November 2019).
• 64% of people surveyed in Scotland said projected rapid UK population growth being driven by record levels of immigration was a major concern for the public (Deltapoll, November 2019).
• 60% of respondents in Scotland supported a target of reducing net migration to the UK to less than 100,000 per year (Deltapoll, June 2018).
• 61% of respondents in Scotland support the compliant environment policies aimed at deterring illegal immigration (YouGov, April 2018).^[7]

Alternative policies to mass immigration

14. Scotland’s population issues are real. Although the population is projected to rise by 2.5% by 2043 this would be the lowest growth in the UK (compared to 10.3% for England and 9% for the UK as a whole). Meanwhile, the working age population is projected to fall from 64% to 62% by 2043, and natural change (births minus deaths – already negative at -7,700 people per year) is expected to fall to lower levels than have ever previously been recorded.^[8]

15. However, the implications for population change in Scotland have been stark compared to other parts of the UK (with a 198% change in the foreign-born population since 2001, the highest in the UK compared to any other devolved nation or English region^[9]). Not surprisingly – as they witness the multifarious impacts – the public think immigration has been too high.

16. A falling share of the working age population, and gaps in labour provision, do not automatically make a case for more overseas immigration as there are alternative policy responses. One of those is to attract more workers from the rest of the UK, including those from the Scottish diaspora. By one estimate, the number of people outside Scotland who identify as Scots is around 18 million in the New World alone, including 6 million in the U.S. (not counting an almost equal number of Scots-Irish, meaning descendants of Ulstermen), 5 million in Canada and nearly 2 million in Australia^[10].

17. As the David Hume Institute has noted, members of this diaspora are ‘often wealthy, highly-skilled and suited to many of the roles that Scotland needs to prosper’. It added in a 2019 report, however, Scotland has not successfully cultivated this group of workers, ‘even though many of them are in London – less than 400 miles from the Scottish border’. The institute identified campaigns in Ireland, Australia and New Zealand where emigrants had been encouraged to return.^[11]

18. In addition, given that a gross total of around 40,000 people depart Scotland for other parts of the UK each year (with the peak departure age being in the early 20s) much more needs to be done to entice younger Scots (as well as overseas students who study in Scotland) to remain after graduation. This could be done with a more conducive business environment, more competitive tax rates, more lucrative and attractive job opportunities, higher wages and better working conditions.

Conclusion

19. Despite claims that the Scottish public favour ever higher levels of immigration, the polling outlined above shows that this is simply not true. Scots want controlled immigration at sensible levels but their views have been ignored as the foreign-born population has more than trebled since 2000 – adding over 350,000 people (much more than the population of Aberdeen). The impact has been felt disproportionately in a few areas – especially Glasgow and Edinburgh – where housing, school places and public services witness the most pressure. Parts of major Scottish cities (including some of Scotland’s most deprived areas) have also seen major changes to their populations over the past few decades, especially in particular parts of Glasgow.

20. This happened even as the public remained firmly in favour of controlled numbers. With ‘natural replacement’ having dropped, and an ageing population, the answer cannot be to paper over deep-seated demographic issues by resorting to very high levels of immigration. A more responsible policy would be to do more to encourage a larger portion of the 40,000 people who leave every year for other parts of the UK to stay in Scotland. Policies should be instituted which make it worth the while of young people to stay in the country and start families. This should involve creating an environment that fosters better training, more job opportunities and higher wages. The Scottish Government should also do more to attract those in the huge worldwide Scottish diaspora to return and chip in to contribute to Scotland’s future.

Footnotes

1. ONS, Long-term international migration by Destination within the UK’, November 2020, URL: https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationand… tinationororiginwithintheuktable206
2. ONS, Local area migration indicators, August 2020, URL: https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationand… reamigrationindicatorsunitedkingdom  
3. ONS, Local area migration indicators, August 2020, URL: https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationand… reamigrationindicatorsunitedkingdom  
4. Four resettlement schemes have been in place, under which more than 30,000 people have come to the UK since 2004 – Gateway Protection Programme, Mandate Scheme, Vulnerable Persons Resettlement Scheme and the Vulnerable Children Resettlement Scheme. Home Office resettlement statistics. URL: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_d… /758206/asylum4-sep-2018-tables.ods and URL: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/syste… al-authority-datasets-dec-2020.xlsx
5. BBC News, June 2016, URL: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-glasgow-west-36429041
6. ‘Scotland’s most and least deprived areas’, STV, January 2020, URL: https://news.stv.tv/scotland/revealed-scotlands-most-and-least-deprived-areas?top
7. YouGov, April 2018, URL: https://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/dq… ernalResults_180425_Immigration.pdf
8. National Records of Scotland, Scotland population projections 2018-based, 21 October 2019 (Corrected 2020), URL: https://www.nrscotland.gov.uk/files//statistics/nrs-visual/prog-p… -18/pop-proj-2018-scot-nat-info.pdf
9. ONS Annual Population Survey statistics, 2001/2 to 2019/20.
10. Niall Ferguson, Bloomberg, April 2021, URL: https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-04-18/niall-fergu… -give-scotland-the-canada-treatment
11. The report also highlighted the Irish marketing move by explaining: ‘In the 1990s, Ireland managed to reverse its pattern of net emigration by targeting Irish emigrants and their children. People returning home at Christmas and Easter vacations were welcomed with an invite to ‘give Ireland a second chance’.” David Hume Institute, September 2019. See also BBC News, September 2019.

1.1 The government has promised to introduce an Australian-points based immigration system after Brexit. This paper looks at the Australian system in detail and asks the question of whether it is appropriate for the UK. Importantly, it includes an annual cap on permanent immigration which covers skilled workers:

1. Australia has achieved effective border control as well as accurate recording of arrivals and departures. These are invaluable but have very little to do with their Points Based System (PBS) whose purpose is to promote immigration, not to limit it. 
2. The Australian context could hardly be more different. Many Australians believe that they have a strategic need to grow and have the space to do so. Both major parties favour increased legal migration and their PBS is a means to that end. (Public debate is mainly about how to handle asylum seekers arriving by boat.)
3. The Australian system is, in fact, extremely complex, despite covering less than 60% of skilled work migration and only around 15% of all migrants entering Australia
4. It is intended for job seekers, not employers (who have a different route for recruitment).
5. For the UK a low cap would be needed for each category with all the attendant difficulties.
6. The Australians can afford a high cap as their net immigration rate is, in proportion to their population, three times ours (240,000 per year on a population one third of the UK’s).
7. A Points Based System was introduced in the UK in 2008. In practice, it failed to limit migration. A mechanical, points based test that reduces, even eliminates, human discretion cannot cope with the complexities of immigration to the UK and has already failed once.

2. Migration to Australia

2.1 Migration to Australia is broken down by the Australian Department for Immigration and Citizenship into two distinct categories, permanent and temporary visa types.

Figure one: the different permanent and temporary visa types used in Australia

3. Permanent Migration to Australia

3.1 The Australian Permanent Migration programme has two main components: the Migration Programme and the Humanitarian Programme. The Migration Programme accounts for the overwhelming majority of permanent migration to Australia, representing 90.5% of the total inflow into the country. The Humanitarian Programme accounts for the other 9.5%. Both programs are divided into streams, categories, and visa ‘subclasses.’

3.2 The Migration Program includes the Skilled Stream (work) and the Family Stream. Within the Migration Programme, the Skilled Stream (work) element accounts for 68% of the total, while the Family Stream accounts for the other 32%.

3.3 The Skilled Stream can be broken down into the following components:

38% Employer Sponsored (48,250) , 22% state, territory and regional nominated (28,850) and 6% for distinguished talent and business innovation and investment programme (7,460). The other 34% are Skilled Independent (43,990). The Skilled Independent and State, Territory and Regional nominated are part of the Points Based System (56%).

3.4 Of all permanent migration to Australia, only about 38% of arrivals form part of the Points Based System.

4.Skilled Migration to Australia (Skilled Stream)

For the planning year 2014/15, there are 128,550 places planned for the Skilled Stream. The number of places allocated in each year is calculated on the basis of what the department of Immigration considers Australian needs in that year. The Minister for Immigration is responsible for setting this planning level and he does so on the basis of economic, social, and demographic factors. The Government also consults widely with the State and Territory Governments.^[1]

5.Points Based System

5.1 Points Based Migration governs the Independent Migration stream and regional migration. In order to take the points based test, the applicant must be under 50 years old and be competent in English- with a score of at least six in each of the four components of the IELTS test or an Occupational English Test. Some occupations might require a higher level of English. The applicant must have at least a secondary school equivalent education. The applicant must have worked in their chosen profession in their own country for at least 12 of the 24 months before the application. Having satisfied these conditions, the applicant must then pass the points based test. Applicants are awarded points based on several criteria; Age, English Language Proficiency, Level of Education, Time spent working in Australia previously and time educated in Australia previously. The more desirable the answer provided (e.g. higher than required English proficiency or being even younger than the required under 50), the higher chance of passing the test. The exact scores for the different criteria can be found here: https://www.immi.gov.au/skilled/general-skilled-migration/pdf/points-tested-migration-fact-sheet.pdf

5.2 The applicants must nominate themselves for a skilled occupation from the Skilled Occupation List (SOL). The full list (which consists of 192 professions) includes such professionals as medical, engineering professionals as well as skilled occupations such as electricians and carpenters etc. It can be found here: http://www.immi.gov.au/Work/Pages/skilled-occupations-lists/sol.aspx

5.3 The applicant must submit an ‘expression of interest’ through the online application portal ‘SkillSelect’. If suitable, the applicant will then be invited, via SkillSelect to launch an application, supported by evidence. The applicant will not need to have a face to face interview.

5.4 An applicant must attain a score of 50 points in order to pass the test.

5.5 To receive an invitation, the applicant must also have had their skills assessed as being suitable for their occupation by an assessing authority for their nominated occupation. The applicant must also indicate whether the occupation for which they have applied requires them to be a member of a professional or industry organisation.

5.6 The applicant does not necessarily need to be sponsored by an employer. This route is for those skilled workers wishing to emigrate to Australia. There is another route for those being sponsored by an employer.

All applicants to Australia have to satisfy a set of health requirements. Applicants will be asked to undergo a medical examination, a chest x-ray and an HIV test. The applicant must prove that they (and any dependents) have health insurance before moving to Australia.

6.Skilled Stream Visas broken down in categories and Numbers

6.2.The 128,550 places within the Skilled Stream are divided as follows:

Figure two: Points-based skilled migration (Or Skilled Independent)

Figure three: Permanent Employer Sponsored Programme

Figure four: State specific and Regional Migration (Also Points Based)

Figure five: Business Innovation and Investment Programme

Figure six: Distinguished talent visas

7.Non-PBS Skilled Migration

7.1 People can also migrate to Australia as part of the Permanent Employer Sponsored Programme. Under this stream, migrants do not have to pass the Points Based Test. This means, for example, that there is no required level of English and that the age limit can be exceeded. This category accounts for 38% of the Skilled Stream.

7.2 Skilled work migration is capped at around 130,000 visas a year (not including dependents).   All of this work migration has requirements linked to age, experience, qualification etc so could technically be described as ‘points based’. However Australia officially describes only a subset of permanent work migration as part of their Points Based System. This accounts for 75,000 visas a year with the other visas being for employer sponsored migrants (like our Tier 2 General) or business investor type visas. Thus their Points Based System accounts for around 60% of skilled work migration (60K/130K) or 15% of total immigration (75K/500K).

8. Family Stream

8.1 Family Stream migrants are ‘selected on the basis of their family relationship with their sponsor in Australia.’^[3] There is no test for either skills or language ability.^[4] It consists of four main categories; partner, child, parent and other family members. It is allotted 32% of the Migration Programme’s spaces.

8.2 However, while there is no English Language requirement there are Health and ‘Character’ requirements. The ‘Character’ requirement is essentially that the applicants should not have a criminal record. The health requirement is that applicants take tests for HIV, Hepatitis, and TB. There is no obligation on the applicant to get health insurance. However, the dependents of students are normally required to obtain health insurance.

8.3 In 2012/13 there were 60,185 arrivals under the family stream. These were broken down into the following categories: 47 525 partner visas, 3,850 child visas, 8,925 parent visas and 585 other family visas.^[5]

9. Temporary Migration

9.1 Temporary migration includes the following categories; students, working holiday, temporary work and visitors.

9.2 The numbers coming into the country on temporary visas are substantial; in the year 2013/14 levels are forecast to be as follows:

Figure seven: student migration

Figure eight: Other Temporary (Working holiday, Temporary Work, Visitors, All other Temporary Visas)

9.3 It is worth noting there is movement between permanent and temporary migration. So a temporary migrant such as a student can switch into a permanent category like work.

10. Planning and numbers

10.1 Each year the Australian Department for Immigration sets the desired level of migration for the following year. This applies to levels of permanent migration, rather than temporary, which is not capped. For the year 2014/15, the number of places for the Migration Program is 190,000. The number of places for the Humanitarian Program is 20,000.

10.2 Under the Migration Act 1958, the number of visas is set by the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection. When that number for a class or sub class is reached for the year, no further visas are granted and applicants wait in a queue for visa grant consideration in a following year, subject to places becoming available. Applications are considered in the order of their queue date.

11. Student Migration

11.1 Student Migration to Australia is considered temporary by the Immigration Department. Each country is assigned an assessment level which is based on the calculated immigration risk posed by students from that country studying in each education sector. Each country is awarded a mark from 1-3 indicating how trusted that nationality is considered to be. Assessment Level 1 represents the lowest immigration risk, while Assessment Level 3 the highest.

11.2 There are number of requirements a successful applicant for a student visa must meet – an institution to sponsor him or her, English Language skills (level 6 in all four components of language on IELTS), sufficient maintenance funds, (Main applicants need $18,500 (£10,000) per year, partners need $6,500 (£3,600) a year, the first child $3,700 (£2000) a year and every additional child $2,800 a year. (£2000] The applicant must have Health insurance, pass an interview process, and demonstrate a genuine intent to enter the country for the purposes of study.

12. Immigration Levels

12.1 Immigration to Australia is high. Net Immigration for the current year is forecast to be 246,000.

Figure nine: Net migration to Australia by year

12.2 Proportion of Australians born abroad

• As of 2013, 27.7% of the Australian population was born abroad (6.4 million people).
• The top ten nationalities for people born abroad in Australia were the UK, New Zealand, China, India, Vietnam, Philippines, Italy, South Africa, Malaysia and Germany.

12.3 2013/14 Forecast

Figure ten: total inflow/departures and net migration for 2013/14

13. The UK Points Based System

13.1 It is important to note that a Points Based System has already been attempted in the UK and it has largely failed. It contributed, for example, to the mass abuse of the student visa in the Indian Sub Continent in 2008 which forced a temporary closure of the relevant visa sections. The subsequent introduction of interviews was intended to remedy some of the weaknesses that became apparent.

14. Conclusion

14.1 An attempt at a PBS system in the UK has already been found ineffective as a means of limiting immigration and, in practice, the coalition government have been moving away from it for four years.

14.2 The situation in Australia is quite different. Both the Australian Government and the main opposition party pursue a policy of population growth in part supported by immigration. Though their system includes caps, these can be and are set at high levels. Proportionately to their population, Australia has a level of net migration three times higher than the UK.

14.3 There are also other stark differences. Australia operates a Universal Visa system, which means all non-citizens require a valid visa both to enter Australia and remain. This is markedly different to the UK, where the 500 million citizens of the EU have free movement to and from the UK. Furthermore, while Australia has some low skilled migration routes, most work migration is skilled, whereas a much larger component of economic migration to the UK is low skilled (mainly coming from the EU.)

14.4 The Australian system is highly regarded because the Australians can identify and accurately record those who arrive and depart and they have achieved effective control of their borders. Neither depends on their Points Based System. These are, of course, important objectives for the UK but we face very different geographical and political circumstances.

Footnotes

1. URL: http://migrationblog.immi.gov.au/2013/06/24/determining-australias-migration-program/
2. URL: https://www.immi.gov.au/media/statistics/statistical-info/visa-grants/migrant.htm
3. URL: https://www.immi.gov.au/media/fact-sheets/29overview_family.htm
4. Ibid
5. URL: https://www.immi.gov.au/media/statistics/statistical-info/visa-grants/migrant.htm

1. This paper estimates the contribution of international migration to the increase in the number of households^[1] in the UK since 1992. It uses data from the Labour Force Surveys to estimate the change over time in the proportion of households headed by persons born outside the United Kingdom. It concludes that 65% of UK household growth from 1996 to 2014 was the direct consequence of international migration to the UK. That will have had a significant impact on the demand for housing. Between 2010 and 2014, households headed by persons born in the UK increased by 32,000 per year on average; households headed by persons born outside the UK by 115,000 or 78%. On present trends immigration will continue to be a major factor in housing demand.

Migration and population growth

2. International migration is now the chief driver of population growth in the UK. This is relatively new. In most years until the late 1980s net migration was negative. But from 1991 to 2001 net international migration rose to account directly for 44 percent of the increase in the population of the UK and by 2001-2013 for 56 percent. This figure takes no account of the children of immigrants born in the UK who are an important component of population growth. Population growth arises from net migration and from the excess of births over deaths (that is, the ‘natural increase’ of the population). Figure 1 shows the annual contribution to population growth in England and Wales from net migration, from births and deaths of people born in the UK and from the births and deaths to immigrants born outside the UK, from 1969 to 2012. Net migration has been the dominant component of population growth since about 1997 and the natural increase of the UK- born population of England and Wales has contributed the least^[2].

Figure 1. Contributions to population growth.

Source: data from Office of National Statistics.

Household growth, population growth and migration

3. Growth in the number of households is driven by population growth, changes in the age-structure of the population, social changes including trends in cohabitation, marriage and divorce, and birth and death rates. Market forces, especially the housing market, play an important role. All of these, operating on each other in a circular fashion, influence the number of people living by themselves and in households of different sizes. For most of the 20th century the number of households rose faster than population growth, as average household size fell: in England and Wales from 4.32 persons in 1911 to 2.42 in 1991 (ONS 2011). Family size has declined and the proportion of one-person households has more than doubled since 1961. Households of three people or more have become relatively less frequent.

4. More recently, those social trends have slowed. Since the 1990s average household size has changed little (Holmans 2014, ONS 2011, 2014) and in recent years population growth^[3] has accounted for more and more of the increase in the number of households. From 2001 and 2011 single-person households increased less than expected, more middle and older-age persons lived in multi-person households. More young people continued to live with their parents. Marriage and union formation, and home ownership, have been delayed. Housing shortages, and housing costs, have contributed to these trends. The unusually large number of immigrants in recent years, although now dominating household formation, did not generate a proportionate increase in the number of households. Immigrants have had household formation rates initially lower, at any given age, than that of the population as a whole, because their household size tends to be larger (Holmans 2013). Basic data on household population and households from 1961 to 2011 for England and Wales are given in Table 1 (As noted above, data for England and Wales are often more readily available than for the UK).

Table 1.

Household population and households, England and Wales 1961-2011.

Source: ONS 2012 2011 Census – Population and Household Estimates for England and Wales, March 2011. Data from Figure 9, Number of household residents and households, 1911 – 2011. 16 July 2012.
https://www.gov.uk/government/statistical-data-sets/live-tables-on-household-projections

5. Since the 1990s the increase in the number of households has mostly been due to population growth. From being nearly zero in the 1980s, population growth in England and Wales has greatly increased, mostly through the contributions of international migration, directly through net migration and indirectly through the natural increase of the immigrant population (Figure 1). In the decade up to 2011, the household population grew by 3.96 million or 7.8%, the greatest increase ever (ONS 2012; Figures 1, 9 and 10) and the highest intercensal percentage growth since the 19th century.

6. Government statisticians have not analysed the relative quantitative roles of population growth, migration and of social trends in past and current household formation and there seems to be no prospect of their doing so (ONS reply to Parliamentary Question HL4978, February 2015). However, an academic analysis has shown that population increase alone accounted for 39% of the increase in households in England from 1961-1971, for 43% from 1971-81 and for 68% from 1981- 1991. That specific calculation is not available beyond 1991, but the combination of population increase and changes in age-structure and marital status together accounted for 68% of household growth from 1991 – 2001 and for 97% from 2001 to 2011 (Holmans 2014; table 1, page 3). And the author has commented that the 1990s has seen ‘a new era in household projections: near dominance by the migration assumption in the underlying population projection.’ (Holmans 2014, p.8). If household trends are considered just in one big step from 1971 to 2008 (Schmuecker 2010, p. 10) these important changes are obscured.

7. The powerful influence of international migration on population growth, over one half in most recent years, suggests that a substantial and increasing element of household growth in the UK must come from net migration. In the absence of official estimates on the role of migration in these trends, some light can be thrown on this issue by examining some direct data from the Labour Force Surveys on the relative proportion of new households with heads born within, and outside, the United Kingdom.

Labour Force Surveys

8. The Quarterly Labour Force Surveys (QLFS) and the earlier annual (initially biennial) Labour Force Surveys have been the chief source of regular official data on employment and personal circumstances in the UK since 1973. Held quarterly since 1992, each quarterly sample of 60,000 private households is spread over five successive quarters. Sample numbers of interviews are grossed up to national (UK) population totals by weighting procedures. The population numbers, not the sample numbers, are given in Table 2 below.

9. The QLFS is available in two forms of weighting. One is more suitable for the analysis of individual characteristics. There is also a twice-yearly household dataset, instituted in 1990, more suited to analysis at the level of the household^[4]. The annual April-June household datasets were used in this analysis. The sample size is very large: for example the 2014 April-June household dataset comprised 103,269 persons of whom 41,644 (40.3%) were ‘household reference persons (HRP)’^[5] representing therefore 41,644 households. Those are grossed up to 26 million households for analysis at the UK level. The number of ‘household reference persons’ is very similar to the number of occupied dwellings.

10. Data from successive QLFS show in successive years the relative number of households identified as having a ‘household reference person (HRP)’ born respectively in the UK, and born outside the UK (Here, the terms ‘immigrant’ and ‘born outside the UK’ are used synonymously). Recent QLFS show that the majority of new households in the UK in each year now have an immigrant ‘household reference person’ (Table 2)^[6]. From 1990 to 2014 the number of households in the UK increased by 4.1 million, for which information on country of birth is available for 4.0 million. Households with an immigrant reference person accounted for 2.1 million (53%) of that increase of four million households.

11. The immigrant share of household increase has grown further in more recent years following the upsurge of net migration from the late 1990s. Of the 2.7 million increase in all households from 1997 to 2014 (with information on country of birth), 1.8 million (65%) had an immigrant household reference person. Overall, in 2014 14% of UK households had an immigrant household reference person compared with 7% in 1990. The QLFS household dataset does not extend back before 1990. However the conventional person-level LFS before 1990 (which somewhat overstates the number of all households) shows that the proportion of households headed by immigrants had been roughly constant at 7-8 percent of all households during the 1980s. Note that these data from the Labour Force Surveys do not include the contribution of the children of immigrants born in the UK to household formation, only that of the immigrants themselves. The former information cannot be derived from QLFS data.

12. There is wide variation in the size of immigrant households but on average their average household size is greater and they are more likely to live in overcrowded conditions (see paragraph 17). So, person for person, immigrants have required less housing than the UK born. However, the data presented here relates directly to the number of households and thus completely takes that into account. For example, a house containing a large number of young Eastern Europeans is one household in the Labour Force Survey; as is one person living alone.

Table 2.

UK 1990-2014. Trend in the number of households where the household reference person was born in the UK, and born outside the UK. Source: QLFS household datasets (A-J)

HRP = Household Reference Person

Note: The figures for the total number o fhouseholds in column 2 differ slightly from the official figures given in the ONS Families and Households release of january 2015. In the latter the numbers are rounded to the nearest thousand and there are a small number of other minor discrepancies.
http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/family-demography/families-and-households/2014/rft-1-families-and -households-2014.xls

13. The table shows a relatively progressive but not perfectly smooth increase in the proportion of households headed by immigrants in successive years. If three-year averages are taken centered on 1992, 1997 and 2013 in order to smooth the variability, the headline figures cited above become 51 percent and 59 percent respectively. Data for the census years 2001 and 2011 are somewhat anomalous, each showing a big but transient increase in the apparent proportion of new households headed by immigrants. The reason for this is unknown, but those years both had an unusually large number of missing values for the variable ‘country of birth of the household reference person’: 1.4 million in 2001 and 3.2 million in 2011 (grossed up figures). In most years this would be about 100,000.

14. The data show a progressive increase, year by year, in the number of new households with household reference persons born outside the UK, and a diminution in the annual number of new households with a household reference person born in the UK. Numbers from one year to the next are rather irregular, in part because they are the differences between successive grossed-up samples. Table 3 below shows the annual averages for groups of five years (except 1990-1994), which smooths out much of the irregularity.

Table 3.

UK 1990-2014
Average annual increase in number of households according to the country of birth of the household reference person.

Source: QLFS household dataset as table 2.
Note: 1990-1994 includes only the differences between the years 1990, 1992 , 1993, 1994.

At the beginning of the period, the annual increase in new households with a household reference person born in the UK greatly exceeded the number with a household reference person born outside the UK. By the end of the period, the reverse was the case. 78 % of new households in the last five years had an overseas-born head while the number of new households with a UK born head had fallen to 22 % of the total.

Interpretation and caveats

15. The translation of household formation into housing demand and construction is complex. New dwellings are not just required for the additional households. They are also needed to replace old, inadequate, worn out or badly planned buildings, notably on local authority estates, or to provide for shifts in the geographical distribution of population, even in the absence of growth of populations or households. A single dwelling can accommodate two or more households, each with its own ‘occupied household space’. The 2011 census recorded that 21,000 dwellings (0.09 percent) contained two or more occupied household spaces. In England in 2012 there were estimated to be about 2.6 million ‘concealed households’ (Bramley et al. 2010); that is, families or persons living within an existing households who might be considered to be ‘households in waiting’, and about 3% of households were deemed to be overcrowded

16. The number of new dwellings completed has averaged 180,000 a year since 1996, although in recent years this has fallen to 140,000 a year (DCLG 2015). This compares with an average additional household growth of around 170,000 since 1996. Had the number of dwellings completed been higher then it is likely that household formation would also have been higher as those living as ‘concealed households’ would have been more able to form their own new household.

17. Household formation is not a uniform process. Some immigrants may take longer to set up independent households than average. Immigrants have a lower propensity to form separate households because they tend to live in larger households (That is, their household representative rate (headship rate) tends to be low^[7]; Holmans 2013, table A3 p. 25). Immigrants from some origins favour multi-adult and multi-family households, with a larger than average household size, and fertility rates are generally higher. Some of the fast-growing immigrant populations in London have adapted to shortage of housing by increasing their level of overcrowding (Gordon 2014, p.48) presumably including dwellings with more than one household^[8]. We do not know what proportion of households headed by immigrants share the same dwelling. The new immigrants from Eastern Europe, mostly young people (initially) without family come from societies accustomed to small family and household norms. However many, at least to begin with, have been living in shared accommodation and boarding houses and therefore also have low headship rates. Published data on household size according to the country of birth (as opposed to ethnic origin) of the household reference person is scarce. All this makes it difficult to know exactly how the growth in the number of households headed by immigrants translates into demand for housing (Simpson and McDonald 2015). But the LFS data presented here give unequivocal, direct information on the proportion of households headed by immigrants, irrespective of the size of the household.

18. The predominance of immigrant headed households in recent household formation does not imply that most new housing is occupied by immigrant heads. Many immigrant households move into existing urban housing vacated by UK born residents or other immigrants, expanding the numbers and proportions of the overseas-born in urban areas. In London, for example, the population born outside the UK increased by one million (54%), from 1.9 million in 2001 to 3.0 million in 2011 while the UK-born population, including the children of immigrants, diminished. In that decade London lost 72,000 people annually through net out-migration to the rest of the UK (Whitehead 2014, Figure 1). New housing has to be built for those who have departed, which would not otherwise have been required. The UK-born are not dying out; they are moving out, and not being replaced by native incomers to the same extent as in the past (Kaufman and Harris 2014. See Gordon 2014, Whitehead 2014 and

http://www.migrationwatchuk.org/briefing-paper/7.17 for a discussion of the impact of immigration on London’s population).

Other evidence

19. In response to a parliamentary question (HL610) the ONS has calculated that 66 percent of the 1.96 million increase in households from the 2001 census to the 2011 census had a foreign-born household reference person and 34% had a UK-born household reference person (ONS letter March 2015). It was noted earlier that the 2001 and 2011 LFS data on country of birth were anomalous and give an implausibly high percent of foreign-born HRP. Instead, for comparison we have chosen the average of the LFS data from the neighbouring pair of years of 2000 -2010 and 2002-2012. That calculation gives 63% of household growth over the decade from households with an immigrant HRP and 37% from households with a UK-born HRP. That is a reasonable fit with the census data.

Household Projections

20. This paper does not deal with projections of future household creation arising from migration. We do not have enough information about household formation rates for immigrant populations to enable accurate projections to be made about its impact on housing demand. The latest household projections for England (DCLG 2015, discussed by Simpson and McDonald 2015] are disappointing in this regard. The ten- page report lacks detail and omits the variant projections presented in earlier projection volumes. Those used to include a zero-migration variant, which enabled an estimate to be made of the effect of future migration on household formation from the start date of the projection. The last report to do so, the interim projections based on 2008 (DCLG 2010, table 6), published in November 2010, estimated that 36% of housing demand up to 2033 would arise from net migration. But that assumed that net migration would only be 157,000 annually, whereas the actual average inflow from 2001 have been over 200,000 annually. It also estimated that household formation rate would run at 232,000 a year, rather than the 170,000 that has far occurred. Furthermore, that projection assumed that only 72 percent of household growth would come from population factors, not almost all of it according to the later projections and other work (DCLG 2015, Holmans 2014). For the same reasons, the projections given in a recent House of Commons paper (Heath 2014, p. 14) suggest that a rather modest 27.8% of additional households up to 2021/22 could be explained by net migration. But this projection also uses the 2011 interim household projection with the assumptions noted above, and furthermore a net annual migration to England of about 145,000, whereas the average over the last decade has been well over 200,000. The DCLG high migration scenario with net migration at 217,000 gave an estimate of 115,000 new households a year due to future migration. As it happens, the actual average annual increase in households with a household reference person born outside the UK had already reached 115,000 in 2010 – 2014 (Table 3, this paper).

21. In a report for the Town and Country Planning Association, Alan Holmans (2013) estimated that 240,000 to 245,000 additional homes would be required each year to meet newly arising demand and need, a similar estimate to that made by the DCLG (2007) in ‘Homes for the Future’ and by other analyses (e.g Jefferys et al. 2015). About 25 per cent of housing requirements would be concentrated in London, and 60 per cent in the four southern regions.

22. Projections that meet ‘demand and need’ must take into account ‘backlog need’ arising from inadequate levels of housing availability, of which the major component is the ‘concealed households’ mentioned earlier. ‘Backlog need’ was estimated to be two million in England in 2009 by Bramley (2010) and likely to diminish only slowly. The policy changes that promoted immigration from the late 1990s were never matched by increased housebuilding to meet the inevitable additional demand. New completions of housing have been in long-term decline for many years (Heath 2014). From about 200,000 around 1990, housing completions in England fell to about 130,000 in 2000-2001, rising to a transient peak of 170,000 in 2007-8 before falling to fewer than 120,000 in 2014 (140,000 for the UK as a whole). That is wholly inadequate to the demand driven by population growth. In the most recent period 2010-2014 new household formation with UK-born heads has been about 32,000. That is well within the level of recent housing construction, however low, although allowances must be made for ‘backlog need’ and replacement of demolished buildings.

Conclusion

23. The trends up to the present that have been demonstrated above show that there is a close connection between immigration and new household formation, and therefore demand for housing. In all the fierce controversies about how many dwellings to build, and where to build them, this crucial connection is rarely made. Commentators almost invariably insist that housing supply must be expanded to meet the needs of an expanding population. For the time being that is obviously true. But moderation of that expansion in the future through policies to reduce migration is rarely discussed. For example the possibility of moderating demand through restrictions on immigration features nowhere in the extensive recommendations made by KPMG for Shelter (Jefferys et al. 2015) in order to alleviate housing shortages. Unless there is a radical change in immigration polices and their effectiveness, or other unforeseen events, population growth, driven largely by immigration, will continue to be the driving force behind most new demand for housebuilding.

Acknowledgement

The Labour Force Surveys used in this analysis were downloaded by kind permission of the UK Data Service. Valuable advice on the distinctions between the person and household level weighting, and other matters, is gratefully acknowledged. The UK Data Service has no responsibility whatever for the analysis and opinions expressed in this paper.

References

Bramley, Glen, et al. (2010). Estimating housing need. London, Department for Communities and Local Government. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/6338/1776873.pdf

Department for Communities and Local Government (2015), Live tables on housebuilding https://www.gov.uk/government/statistical-data-sets/live-tables-on-house-building

Department for Communities and Local Government (2007). Homes for the future: more affordable, more sustainable. Cm. 7191. London, The Stationery Office. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/243191/7191.pdf

Department for Communities and Local Government (2010). Household Projections, 2008 to 2033, England. London, Department of Communities and Local Government.

Department for Communities and Local Government (2015). 2012-based Household Projections: England, 2012-2037. Statistical Release 27 February 2015. London, Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG). https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/407556/Household_Projections_-_2012-2037.pdf

Heath, Sarah (2014). Housing demand and need (England). Standard Note: SN06921. London, House of Commons Library.

Holmans, Alan E. (2013). New estimates of housing demand and need in England, 2011 to 2031. Town & Country Planning Tomorrow Series Paper 16. London, Town and Country Planning Association. http://www.cchpr.landecon.cam.ac.uk/Downloads/HousingDemandNeed_TCPA2013.pdf

Holmans, Alan E. (2014). Housing need and effective demand in England. A look at “the big picture”. Cambridge, Cambridge Centre for Housing and Planning Research. http://www.cchpr.landecon.cam.ac.uk/news/Housing-need-and-effective-demand-in-England-the-big-picture

Jefferys, P., et al. (2015). Building the homes we need . A programme for the 2015 government. London, KPMG for Shelter. http://www.shelter.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0019/802270/Building_the_homes_we_need_-_a_programme_for_the_2015_government.pdf

Gordon, Ian. (2014). Fitting a quart in a pint pot? Development, displacement and/or densification in the London region. Migration and London’s Growth. Ed. Ben Kochan. London, LSE London: 41 – 55.

Kaufmann, Eric and Gareth Harris (2014). Changing places. Mapping the white British response to ethnic change. London, Demos.

Labour Force Surveys and Quarterly Labour Force Surveys. Available from the UK Data Service. http://ukdataservice.ac.uk/

ONS (2011). Households and Families. Social Trends 41, 2011 edition. J. Beaumont. London, Office for National Statistics: 1 – 16. http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/social-trends-rd/social-trends/social-trends-41/index.html

ONS (2012). 2011 Census – Population and Household Estimates for England and Wales, March 2011. http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171778_270487.pdf

ONS (2013). Population and Household Estimates for the United Kingdom, March 2011. Statistical Bulletin 21 March 2013. London, Office for National Statistics. http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171778_304116.pdf

ONS (2013). Families and Households in England and Wales 2013. London, Office for National Statistics. http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/family-demography/families-and-households/2013/stb-families.html?format=print

ONS (2014). Households and Household Composition in England and Wales, 2001-11. 29 May 2014. London, Office for National Statistics.

ONS (2015). Families and Households 2014. 28 January 2015. London, Office for National Statistics. http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171778_393133.pdf

Schmuecker, Katie (2011). The good, the bad and the ugly. Housing demand 2025

London, IPPR. http://www.ippr.org/assets/media/images/media/files/publication/2011/05/Good%20bad%20and%20ugly%20-%20Housing%20demand%202025_1829.pdf

Simpson, Ludi and Neil McDonald (2015). “Making sense of the new English household projections.” Town and Country Planning (April 2015): 175 – 182.

Whitehead, Christine (2014). The impact of migration on London’s housing. Migration and London’s growth. ed. Ben Kochan. London, LSE London: 143 – 154.

Footnotes

1. For the 2011 census a household was defined as : ‘one person living alone; or a group of people (not necessarily related) living at the same address who share cooking facilities and share a living room or sitting room or dining area’.
2. Calculations of natural increase are easier for England and Wales, which comprises 89% of the population of the UK. The need to refer to data for England and Wales, or England alone, as a surrogate for UK-wide data reflects the weakness of our national statistics and will be a recurrent feature of this paper.
3. The relevant population here is the household population; that part of the population living in private households, not in communal establishments of various kinds. For example in 2011 the total population of England and Wales was 56.1 million while the household population was 55.1 million, the latter being almost 2 percent smaller than the total population.
4. Non-responders are not included in the person-level weighting. Accordingly a two-person household with a non-responder is treated as a single-person household. That gives such households a higher weight, changing the ratio between households and population and inflating the estimate of the overall number of households.
5. The Head of Household (HoH), or the Household Reference Person (HRP in more modern usage) is the individual that is taken to represent the household for statistical purposes in censuses and surveys. The definition of the household reference person has changed over time from being the eldest male within a household to the eldest person within a household.. The number of households recorded by the QLFS differs by up to 2% from the number recorded in the census of the same year.
6. Not all persons living in a household with a reference person born outside the UK will themselves have been born outside the UK. Many children will not be, and some adults. Likewise there will be persons born outside the UK who live in households with a UK-born reference person. The LFS cannot tell us how many. In 2014 13% of all UK (household) persons had been born outside the UK compared with 14% of all heads of household. That makes a ratio of 2.21 immigrants for every immigrant-headed household compared with an average ratio of 2.38.
7. The household representative (or headship) rate is the proportion of adult individuals living in households in any defined group who are heads of household or household representative persons. The lower the rate, the larger the average household size in that group.
8. In London, while new arrivals in 2001-11 from rich countries did not alter local densities of occupation, average occupation per room of new immigrants from poor countries was about 2.5 times that of established residents. London boroughs with a high proportion of immigrants such as Brent (55%), Newham (54%), Ealing (48%), Harrow (45%) Tower Hamlets (43%) all have the highest levels of household density, with between 5 and 10 percent of households containing six or more persons, along with other towns such as Luton, Slough, Bradford and Leicester with high concentrations of population of South Asian origin (ONS 2012, table 4; ONS 2014, table 6).

1. Immigration is a major political issue in the UK yet the Scottish White paper blithely assumes that a Scottish government could run an immigration policy in conflict wit that of the rest of the UK and still retain an open border. The reality is that, if Scotland does become independent and joins the EU, it may well be obliged to join the Schengen Free Travel Area. If so, it will be required by Schengen rules to establish immigration controls on the Scottish / English and Scottish / Irish borders.

2. Alternatively, if Scotland succeeds in staying out of Schengen, the declared immigration policy of the SNP will make the existing Common Travel Area with England and Ireland impossible to sustain. Unless a clear agreement is reached on immigration policy, including a joint process for the issue of visas, there will have to be controls on the borders between Scotland, England and Ireland. This must be a red line in any future negotiations on Scottish independence. The Scots would have to make their own arrangements for the issue of Scottish visas overseas – a change that would be bound to have implications for business and tourism in Scotland.

Introduction

3. If Scotland votes ‘Yes’ to independence on September 18th 2014 ^[1] the Scottish Executive plans to declare Scotland an independent state in March 2016.^[2] This paper will explore what immigration policies the SNP has proposed for an independent Scotland, whether Scotland would be forced to join the borderless Schengen Zone, if not whether their immigration policies would be compatible with a Common Travel Area, and the consequences for the rest of the United Kingdom.

SNP immigration policy

4. The Scottish Executive’s white paper on Scottish Independence includes a section on the kind of immigration policy an independent Scotland would pursue.^[3] This document reiterates the SNP’s long established view that the current Westminster government have adopted an attitude that is “aggressive to immigration, asylum seekers and refugees.” ^[4] The document also outlines the long held SNP view that the UK immigration system does not serve Scotland’s interests, which the SNP sees as increasing the country’s working age population in order to promote economic growth.^[5] It also commits the Scottish Government to matching “average European (EU-15) population growth over the period from 2007 to 2017” ^[6] and states that an independent Scotland would use immigration as one of the major levers to increase the country’s population. A post-independence Scotland governed by the SNP would pursue a points based immigration system that would ‘better meet Scotland’s needs’ potentially adding ‘new categories of skills’ and possibly incentivising movement to remote areas to help with ‘community sustainability.’ An SNP government would ‘lower the current financial maintenance thresholds and minimum salary levels for entry.’^[7] Though it is relatively short on detail, the ‘Scotland’s Future’ paper confirms that an SNP governed independent Scotland would seek a more liberal immigration policy.

Scottish Demography

5. Scotland’s population is not declining as is often claimed. It has been stable at about five million for the past 50 years and is projected to increase by 7% in the next 25 years on the assumption that net migration will be 24,000 a year until 2016/17 when it will decline to a net 17,500. In recent years 8,500 have been cross-border and 9000 from overseas. It is often said that Scotland has a markedly different demographic structure from the rest of the UK. In fact the difference is only slight. For example, as of 2012, 16.4% of the population were over 65^[8], virtually the same as the proportion in the rest of the United Kingdom, where 16.3% were over 65.^[9] The proportion of the population aged 25 or under is also very similar, at 30.4% compared to 31.9% of the rest of the UK. However, Scotland does have an aging population. Between 1999 and 2009 the number of people in Scotland under 16 fell by 8% and those aged over 75 increased by 14%.

6. The ONS forecasts that Scotland will have significantly lower levels of population growth than the rest of the United Kingdom over the next fifty years, predicting that Scotland will experience a lower level of net immigration, a lower fertility rate and a lower life expectancy than the rest of the United Kingdom.^[10] However, to keep the ratio of people aged from 15 to 64 to those older than 65 at its present level of 4, net immigration would need to increase from its present level of 24,000 a year to about 89,000 a year. This would increase the population of Scotland to 7.8 million by 2031 – an increase of 50% in 20 years.

The economy

7. In November 2013, the First Minister reiterated his commitment to solving Scotland’s population difficulties by increasing the level of immigration into Scotland.^[11] However, the notion that Scotland needs immigration for economic growth is a fallacy.^[12] Immigration brings about negligible benefits in terms of job creation. The House of Lords Economic Committee concluded that ‘immigration cannot be expected to be an effective policy tool to significantly reduce vacancies.”^[13] Nor is there any empirical evidence that migrants will inject ‘dynamism’ to the economy or will necessarily bring about economic growth.^[14] It is also worth noting that immigrants have traditionally not chosen to go to Scotland in large numbers. Despite having a population that is roughly 10% the size of England’s, Scotland has over the past ten years attracted just 5% of the number of migrants that chose England.^[15]

8. Immigration as a solution to the pension problem has been dismissed by all serious studies, including the House of Lords Select Committee on Economic Affairs, which concluded that “arguments in favour of high immigration to defuse the ‘pensions time bomb’ do not stand up to scrutiny as they are based on the unreasonable assumption of a static retirement age and ignore the fact that in time, immigrants too will grow old and draw pensions.”^[16]

Student Migration

9. In 2012 the SNP announced that it is opposed to any curbs on student migration^[17] noting that it believed any such restrictions would negatively affect Scotland’s economy. The SNP’s white paper on independence commits the SNP to restoring the post-study work visa abolished by the Westminster Government in 2012.

Asylum

10. Humza Yousaf has made clear that an independent Scotland would pursue a more liberal asylum policy than the UK does. Specifically, the SNP oppose removing entitlements from failed asylum seekers and restricting the ability of asylum seekers to work.^[18],^[19] In their white paper, the SNP criticize current government’s record on asylum saying that the Westminster government has “adopted an aggressive approach to asylum seekers and refugees”.^[20] The white paper goes onto to state that an independent Scotland governed by the SNP would close the Dungavel removal centre and ‘end the practice of dawn raids and inhumane treatment of those who have exercised their legitimate right to seek asylum.’^[21] The White Paper further states that independence “will also afford the opportunity to address asylum seekers’ access to employment, education and accommodation.”^[22] Such policies could see a very substantial movement of asylum seekers to Scotland from England and elsewhere.

EU, Independence and the Schengen Zone

11. According to the Foreign Affairs Select Committee, much of the debate around Scotland joining the Schengen Zone depends on whether Scotland or the remainder of the UK inherits the treaty rights, obligations and memberships of international organisations that the UK currently holds. They consider it impossible for politicians at either Holyrood or Westminster to make unilateral declarations with any certainty.^[23]

British Government’s view

12. It is the British Government’s opinion that an independent Scotland would be considered a new state and would thus have to re-apply for membership of the EU making it likely to lose the UK’s existing opt outs. This opinion is set out in the document “Scottish analysis: devolution and the implications of Scottish Independence.”^[24]

The Scottish Executive’s view

13. The white paper maintains that Scotland would not seek membership of the Schengen Area and reiterates the claim that a Scottish government would be able to maintain all of the UK’s existing treaty opt outs, including on Schengen.^[25]

EU View

14. The President of the European Commission, Jose Manuel Barroso, has gone on record as saying that Scotland will have to reapply for membership. “If one part of a country wants to become an independent state, of course as an independent state it has to apply to the European membership according to the rules – that is obvious.”^[26] Most individual EU states that have commented thus far have indicated that they believe Scotland will have to reapply. Ireland stated during its recent presidency of the EU that Scotland would have to apply ‘from scratch’. Spanish Foreign Minister José Manuel García-Margallo stated that an independent Scotland would have to go through the full negotiation process^[27] and win the support of all 27 members. The Czech Minister of Foreign Affairs Karel Schwartzenberg said: “Scotland would have to apply for membership.” ^[28] Latvian Foreign Minister Edgars Rinkevics said “the procedure of admitting a new member to the EU would have to be followed. All the chapters of negotiations have to be opened, duly negotiated and then closed.” Slovak Minister of Foreign Affairs Miroslav Laicak said: “It is a political decision made by all the member states.”^[29] Hungary’s ambassador János Csák, said: “There are different opinions on whether Scotland would inherit membership or re-file accession papers.”^[30] Accession Treaties require the unanimous agreement of member states.

Schengen

15. New EU member states are obliged to fulfil 35 criteria in order to join the Union. Criterion 24 makes clear that membership of the Schengen Area is obligatory for new members.^[31],^[32]

16. The SNP holds that it could negotiate an opt out from the Schengen Zone, though there is no precedent for this. The party rubbishes the notion of border controls after independence^[33], repeating this view in their independence white paper, in which they state that continued membership of the Common Travel Area (CTA) means “there will be no need for border checks between an independent Scotland and England.”^[34] The SNP believe that the CTA already allows for different systems and that their implementation of a more ‘flexible’ immigration system won’t mean any change to Scottish membership of the CTA.^[35]

UK Government’s position on Schengen and Border Controls

17. It is the UK Government’s view that Scotland would ‘almost certainly not’ be able to negotiate an opt out from Schengen.^[36] David Lidington, Minister of State for Europe, has claimed that negotiating an opt out from Schengen would require the unanimous consent of all other EU states^[37] a view supported by the Foreign Affairs Select Committee.^[38] It is the Select Committee’s view that they are unlikely to succeed.^[39] The Home Secretary, Theresa May has stated that an independent Scotland would be obliged to join Schengen which would “open Scotland’s borders up to mass immigration”^[40],^[41]. She strongly implied that this could lead to the imposition of English border controls on Scotland.^[42]

Scottish public opinion

18. Analysis shows the gulf between Scottish public opinion and that of the rest of the UK on immigration is not as wide as the SNP often present it as being. Examples are at Annex A

The Irish immigration system- an example

19. Ireland, as a sovereign state within the Common Travel Area has its own distinct immigration system. However, that system is broadly similar to the UK’s and Ireland doesn’t aggressively seek out immigration in the manner the SNP is proposing for Scotland.

20. Ireland has a green card permit scheme available to fill skills shortages.^[43] Ireland also issues work permits where a job cannot be filled by a native or EU worker.^[44] In 2012 there were 2,919 work permits granted and 1,088 renewals.^[45] Ireland also grants Intra Company Transfer visas to senior managers who have been working for a company for a minimum of 12 months. ICTs do not accrue residency rights.^[46] Ireland is currently reviewing its family permit policy.^[47] In 2012 Ireland granted 6,939 student visas but course fees must be paid in advance and the student must have access to a €3,000 registration fee as well as living expenses. All students must have private health insurance.

Canada and a regional immigration policy

21. Some have suggested that Canada’s regional immigration policy could be a useful model for Scotland. However, it has been strongly criticised because many migrants who move to Canada on regional visas fail to stay in the provinces to which their visas commit them. The Quebec Investor Visa has been particularly criticised in the Canadian national press and by Canadian politicians.^[48] This system clearly would not be suitable for the remaining United Kingdom, given the well-established tendency of immigrants to prefer London and the South East of England over Scotland. Indeed, the Liberal Democrats recently abandoned their policy of a regional immigration policy after acknowledging that it was unfeasible.^[49]

Conclusion

22. There appear to be two possible scenarios if Scotland votes for Independence. The first is that Scotland is compelled to join the Schengen zone. If so she will be obliged by the Schengen border code to establish border crossing points and border guards and to require documents of those crossing it.^[50]

23. The second scenario is that Scotland negotiates the continuation of the UK’s existing opt outs. If Scotland then seeks to remain in the Common Travel Area (CTA) with England and Ireland but chooses to pursue a markedly different immigration policy to the remaining UK (as advocated repeatedly by the SNP), this would bring Scotland and the remaining UK into conflict. It is not possible to have a common travel area without common, or at least compatible, immigration policies. Scotland would therefore have to be denied continued membership of the CTA. This would inevitably lead to border controls with England (and Ireland) and the Scots would have to make their own arrangements for the issue of Scottish visas overseas. This would be bound to have implications for business and tourism in Scotland. Some proponents of Scottish independence have suggested that membership of the CTA need not constrain Scotland from pursuing a more open door immigration policy^[51], making it all the more important that the UK government insist on border controls in negotiations with Scotland if there were to be “Yes” vote. This must be a red line in any future negotiations on independence that might take place.

Annex A

Scottish Public opinion

1. When polled on whether they approved of the current government’s policy of limiting the number of economic migrants from outside the EU, some 80% of Scots expressed support. Though slighter lower than the percentage of those in the South who supported the policy (84%), the North (82%) and Wales (84%), the proportion of Scots who supported the policy was higher than the percentage of Londoners (74%). ^[52]

2. A 2012 poll that asked whether respondents thought the present level of immigration to the UK had a positive or negative effect highlighted that Scots opinion was very similar to that of the rest of the UK. Just 8% of people in the UK overall, 13% of those in London, 7% of those in the South, 5% of those in the Midlands, 8% of those in the North and 7% of those in Scotland thought that the present level of immigration was positive.^[53]

3. The same poll asked respondents about their attitudes to illegal immigration. Asked whether they supported the statement that ‘illegal immigrants should be deported immediately, with no right to appeal to the courts’, 67% of UK respondents, 54% of those in London, 70% of those in the South, 68% of those in the Midlands and Wales and 70% of those in the North did so. This compares to 65% of Scots surveyed.^[54]

4. Another 2012 poll asked whether respondents agreed with the following statement: “A sharp reduction in immigration would be good for Britain’s economy because it would mean more jobs for British born workers”^[55]. 63% of UK respondents agreed with the statement, as did 54% of those in London, 63% of those in the South East, 63% of those in Wales and the Midlands and 68% of those in the North. 57% of Scots agreed with the statement.

5. Scottish public opinion on matters of integration and community relations are also broadly similar to that of the rest of the UK. When asked whether they agreed with the statement: “I believe that there are some minority communities in Britain that are not integrating with the British way of life and this worries me,” ,72% of Scots surveyed agreed with the statement, compared with 78% of all UK respondents, 79% of those in the South, 76% of those in the Midlands and Wales and 81% of those in the North. When asked whether migrants should have to learn English or not, Scottish opinion was virtually identical to wider UK opinion. When Asked “Do you think that someone coming to live permanently in England from another country should or should not be required to learn English?” 93% of those in London, 94% of those in the South, 92% of those in the Midlands and Wales, 94% of those in the North and 93% of those in Scotland agreed that they should.^[56]

Footnotes

1. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-21828424
2. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-21331302
3. Outlined in Chapter 8 of the “Scotland’s Future” white paper, found here: http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2013/11/9348/0
4. Ibid
5. Ibid
6. Ibid
7. Show -6 more…

1. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-21828424
2. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-21331302
3. Outlined in Chapter 8 of the “Scotland’s Future” white paper, found here: http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2013/11/9348/0
4. Ibid
5. Ibid
6. Ibid
7. Ibid
8. http://www.scotlandscensus.gov.uk/en/censusresults/bulletin.html
9. IFS report, http://www.ifs.org.uk/comms/r88.pdf, page 13
10. IFS report, http://www.ifs.org.uk/comms/r88.pdf, page 13
11. http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/parliamentarybusiness/28862.aspx?r=8644&mode=pdf, column 24727
12. http://www.migrationwatchuk.co.uk/briefingPaper/document/137
13. HL Paper 82-1 “The Economic Impact of Immigration”, para 158
14. HL Paper 82-1 “The Economic Impact of Immigration”, para 216
15. ONS: Long-Term International Migration time series, 1991-2011 (mid years)- Area of Destination or Origin within UK
16. HL Paper 82-1 “The Economic Impact of Immigration”, para 158
17. http://www.glasgowsnp.org/MSPs/Sandra_White_MSP/Westminster_one-size-fits-all_approach_to_immigration_has_failed_Scotland/
18. http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/parliamentarybusiness/28862.aspx?r=7553&mode=pdf
19. http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/parliamentarybusiness/28862.aspx?r=7553&mode=pdf
20. Outlined in Chapter 8 of the “Scotland’s Future” white paper, found here: http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2013/11/9348/0
21. Ibid
22. Ibid
23. http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmfaff/643/643.pdf,p.3
24. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/scotland-analysis-devolution-and-the-implications-of-scottish-independence
25. Argument set out in Chapter six ‘International Relations and Defence’, of “Scotland’s Future”, which can be found here: http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2013/11/9348/10
26. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-20664907
27. http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2012/oct/24/scotland-eu-membership-spain
28. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-21601242
29. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-21601242
30. Ibid
31. http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/conditions-membership/chapters-of-the-acquis/index_en.htm
32. http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmfaff/643/643.pdf, p.28 http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/free_movement_of_persons_asylum_immigration/l33020_en.htm
33. http://www.heraldscotland.com/politics/political-news/new-border-control-fears.15582640
34. Outlined in Chapter 8 of the “Scotland’s Future” white paper, found here: http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2013/11/9348/0
35. Ibid
36. http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2012/03/25/scottish-border-checks-could-follow-scottish-independence-theresa-may_n_1378032.html
37. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/9094402/Independent-Scotland-may-need-passport-controls-at-the-English-border.html
38. http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmfaff/643/643.pdf
39. http://www.scotsman.com/the-scotsman/politics/scottish-independence-spectre-of-border-controls-raised-by-top-tory-1-2128207
40. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-17498681
41. http://www.itv.com/news/update/2012-03-24/theresa-may-warns-of-mass-immigration-to-scotland/
42. http://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/376491/Scots-may-face-checks-at-English-border-says-Home-Secretary
43. http://www.djei.ie/labour/workpermits/greencardemploymentpermit.htm
44. http://www.djei.ie/labour/workpermits/workpermitemploymentpermit.htm
45. http://www.djei.ie/labour/workpermits/statistics.htm
46. http://www.djei.ie/labour/workpermits/ictemploymentpermit.htm
47. http://www.inis.gov.ie/en/INIS/Pages/Join%20Family
48. Martin Collacott “The Citizenship Fire Sale”, in National Post, 20TH August 2013 http://fullcomment.nationalpost.com/2013/08/20/martin-collacott-the-citizenship-fire-sale/
49. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-24109632
50. http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/free_movement_of_persons_asylum_immigration/l14514_en.htm
51. View of Professor Christina Boswell of the University of Edinburgh, “Contrary to some recent claims, neither membership of CTA or EU would significantly constrain Scottish policy.” http://www.royalsoced.org.uk/cms/files/events/programmes/2012 13/speaker_notes/ChristinaBoswell.pdf
52. YouGov/MW poll 8th-9th May 2011 http://www.google.co.uk/url?http%3A%2F%2Fwww.migrationwatchuk.com%2Fexcel%2FYouGov%2520on%2520Lib%2520Dems%2520May%25202011.xls
53. http://cdn.yougov.com/cumulus_uploads/document/d51j2t3jzl/YG-Archives-Pol-ST-results-06-080112.pdf, p.5.
54. http://cdn.yougov.com/cumulus_uploads/document/d51j2t3jzl/YG-Archives-Pol-ST-results-06-080112.pdf, p.6.
55. http://cdn.yougov.com/cumulus_uploads/document/vyh16v2yzx/YG-Archives-VoteUkOutEU-YouGov-260112.pdf, p.5
56. YouGov 14-15th April 2011, http://cdn.yougov.com/today_uk_import/yg-archives-pol-st-results-05-170411.pdf

2. It is likely that East European immigrants were undercounted at 65,000 – a figure which implies that only one in four East Europeans have stayed for more than a year. However, even if the true figure was twice this, they would still be only 40% of net foreign immigration. Net immigration from the EU 15 in 2005 was only 25,000.

3. This pattern demonstrates that the tripling of immigration in the past ten years has largely resulted from “managed migration” routes. It also underscores the need for firm action to limit immigration from non- EU countries which are the main source of net foreign immigration.

Detail
4. The latest set of international migration statistics, covering calendar 2005, were released by the Office for National Statistics on 2 November.

5. They showed that there was overall net migration to the UK (i.e. an excess of immigrants over emigrants) of 185,000. This was a reduction of 37,000 in comparison with 2004 but still the second highest level of net immigration on record.

6. The 185,000 was made up of a net inflow of 292,000 foreign citizens and a net outflow of 107,000 British citizens.

7. The following graph shows the net inflows of foreign citizens over the ten year period 1996-2005 by broad citizenship:

Notes:
A8 refers to the 8 countries (excluding Cyprus and Malta) which acceded to the EU in 2004. Immigrants from these countries would have been included in ‘other foreign’ totals before 2004. EU15 refers to the 15 countries which were members of the EU prior to 2004 (but excluding British citizens) Old Commonwealth is Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and Canada Malta and Cyprus are included in the New Commonwealth totals throughout.

8. As can be seen net foreign immigration has tripled over the last 10 years from levels of just over 100,000 a year to a peak of 342,000 in 2004 falling back just slightly to 292,000 in 2005.

9. In the middle years of the decade, between a quarter and a third of this was due to asylum claims. The ONS make an adjustment each year for new asylum claimants and their dependants less those who have been removed from the country. The following chart shows the ONS’s adjustment for asylum seekers and the net number of immigrants, excluding asylum seekers.

10. These graphs clearly demonstrate that the rise in immigration over the last 10 years has resulted from so-called managed migration routes, principally work-related migration and migration for family formation/family reunion purposes.

11. The upwards trend in non-asylum immigration has clearly been accentuated in the last two years by immigration from the Eastern European (A8) countries which joined the EU in May 2004. However, net foreign immigration excluding the A8 countries was still 227,000 in 2005. In the same year the ONS statistics show net immigration from the A8 countries was just 65,000. Net immigration from these countries therefore made up just over 1 in 5 (22%) of total net foreign immigration.

12. However, ONS statistics for net immigration from the A8 countries should be treated with some caution. Data from the workers registration scheme, set up by the government to manage access to benefits of employed workers from the A8 countries, show that a total of 447,000 workers from the A8 countries registered between 1 May 2004 and 30 June 2006. Self-employed workers do not have to register and some migrants from the A8 countries will be working without their employer registering them. Independent surveys would suggest that when these migrants are included it will increase the total number of migrants from the A8 countries by over 30% to 600,000 – a figure also mentioned by a Home Office Minister.

13. The number of workers who registered in 2005 was 204,905. This would point to a total inflow of about 260,000 A8 migrants in 2005 if self-employed and unregistered workers are included. Dependants are additional to these numbers and they would probably bring the total number of A8 migrants in 2005 up to 280,000.

14. By comparison, the international migration statistics show a net migration figure of just 65,000 for 2005 made up of an inflow of 80,000 immigrants and an outflow of 15,000 emigrants. The statistics record migrants who are entering/leaving the UK with the intention of staying for at least a year. The ONS figure of 80,000 immigrants would therefore suggest that only about 1 in 4 A8 immigrants enter the UK with the intention of staying here a year or more.

15. The Governor of the Bank of England, Mervyn King, has recently criticised the reliability of the international migration data. He suggests that it may be particularly unreliable for Eastern European migrants because the survey on which the data is based, the International Passenger Survey (IPS), concentrates on the three main international ports of entry – Heathrow, Gatwick and Manchester. Only 79 passenger interviews were conducted at other ports and airports. A8 migrants mainly use regional airports which operate budget flights from A8 countries. This would cause migrants from the A8 countries to be under-represented in the survey and hence under-counted, particularly as the number of arrivals from those countries has increased from bout half a million a year to two million.

16. We conclude that it is likely that net immigration from the A8 countries has been under-counted in the international migration statistics. We have no way of determining the correct figure (although we suspect that the government may be able to do so by examining NI payment records) but if just half of the 2005 estimated inflow of A8 migrants stayed in the UK for a year or more this would roughly double the net flow of A8 migrants from 65,000 to 130,000. It would also point to overall net foreign immigration into the UK of over 350,000 in 2005 – by far the highest ever.

17. Even at these levels migration from the expanded EU would still only account for just over 40% of net foreign immigration.

18. If, therefore, we are to get net migration down to manageable and realistic levels we need first to limit what we can limit, namely the levels of international migration from outside the EU. We also need to impose enforceable restrictions on immigration of citizens from any countries which may join the EU in future.