1. The government promised that its post-Brexit immigration system would reduce overall immigration levels and deliver ‘firmer’ border control. Yet the opposite has happened, as we show below with analysis of Home Office (HO) data. In 2021, there were over 800,000 longer-term entry grants to non-UK nationals for work, study, family and resettlement. Meanwhile, illegal arrivals have tripled since 2018. The public sense that something is wrong (7 in 10 say Ministers are failing on immigration, YouGov). Yet official transparency on immigration is inadequate (and worsening). Key statistics are being delayed, and the picture of what is happening is being occluded as non-UK arrivals rise.

Introduction

2. Entry clearance grants for longer-term stays for work, family, study and resettlement were more than 800,000 in 2021, with 95% from outside the EU. Just 50,000 entry clearances were to EU citizens – who since 2021 have required visas for longer stays. Longer-term non-EU entry grants stood at about 780,000. There has been no recent public estimate of outflows due to repeated delays in the publication of both 2021 immigration estimates and exit checks analysis.

Detail

3. 2021 was the post-Brexit visa system’s first year of operation. This – we were told by the government – would enable renewed control of immigration following the UK’s departure from the EU, and a reduction in overall numbers. Previously EU citizens could come to the UK to live without visas under free movement rules but they are now included in the visa system for the first time in recent history. As would be expected, this has led to an increase in the total number of visas granted compared with the pre-Brexit figures. Figure 1 below shows that there were more than 880,000 entry grants (EU/non-EU) for work, study, family or resettlement in 2021. When short-term study/temporary work visas are excluded, the total is about 830,000. Around 50,000 (5-6%) were from the EU. ^[1]

Figure 1: Entry grants, visas / resettlement (all non-UK)^[2].Entry grants, visas / resettlement (all non-UK)Entry clearance grants (all non-UK)Of which: WorkOf which: StudyOf which: FamilyOf which: Resettlement200520062007200820092010201120122013201420152016201720182019202020210200,000400,000600,000800,0001,000,0002010●

 Entry clearance grants (all non-UK): 584,601● Of which: Work: 160,737● Of which: Study: 334,735● Of which: Family: 88,412● Of which: Resettlement: 717

4. These HO figures include EU citizens for the first time. Therefore, when looking at historical trends, we consider data for non-EU nationals only (below).

5. There were 835,000 entry grants to non-EU nationals in 2021, of which about 780,000 were for long-term purposes.^[3] The 35,000 or so illegal arrivals that the UK experienced in 2021 (over 90% of whom claim asylum and the vast majority of whom are from outside the EU) will also add to total arrivals.

Figure 2: Entry grants for visas / resettlement (non-EU)Entry grants for visas / resettlement (non-EU)Entry clearance grants (non-EU only)Of which: WorkOf which: StudyOf which: FamilyOf which: Resettlement200520062007200820092010201120122013201420152016201720182019202020210200,000400,000600,000800,0002005●

 Entry clearance grants (non-EU only): 570,137● Of which: Work: 243,466● Of which: Study: 207,418● Of which: Family: 119,182● Of which: Resettlement: 71

Which routes witnessed significant increases in 2021?

6. An increase in non-EU entry grants was the chief driver of the increase in numbers overall. For example, there were: a) more non-EU study visas issued b) more direct resettlements of refugees than ever before c) more illegal immigration (driving a record number of asylum claims). Meanwhile, there were 210,000 entry grants to non-EU nationals for work visas in 2021 – much higher than the average of 160,000 per year for the period 2010-20. This will be partially linked to weaker work permit rules, the scrapping of the annual cap on work visas and the recent creation of a special route for health-care workers.. 2021 also saw the most family visa grants / permits for non-EU citizens (119,000) since 2007.

7. Grants to non-EU nationals for sponsored study rose to 411,800, outstripping both their 2019 level of 285,500 as well as the previous high seen in the 2009-2010 period. See Figure 3 below.

Figure 3: Sponsored-study visa grants since 2001 (non-EU citizens). HO.^[4]Sponsored-study visa grants since 2001 (non-EU citizens)HOVisa grants for sponsored study (non-EU citizens)2001/22002/32003/4200520062007200820092010201120122013201420152016201720182019202020210100,000200,000300,000400,000500,000

8. Another factor pushing the increase in non-EU immigration was the rise in resettlement grants / asylum claims to those escaping dangerous parts of the world – Table 1 below. There was a massive increase of about 95,000 compared with 2020, mainly due to arrivals of Hong Kongers but also Afghans.

Table 1: Entry grants to those resettled from places of danger or their relatives

9. The government has also confirmed that there was a major increase in illegal immigration in 2021, with 36,800 people arriving without prior permission by air, lorry and boat (about three times the total in 2018). This will have fed into the fact that there were a historically high number (56,000) of asylum applications by main applicants and dependants in 2021 – the most since 2003 when the number hit 60,000. See Figure 4 below.

Figure 4: Asylum claims relating to main applicants and dependants, 2005-21.Asylum claims relating to main applicants and dependants, 2005-212005200620072008200920102011201220132014201520162017201820192020202110,00020,00030,00040,00050,00060,000

Conclusion

10. Global entry clearance permissions for longer-term residence in the UK have reached record levels – with more than 800,000 people being allowed to come in 2021 (more people than live in the city of Leeds). This has partly been driven by a huge spike in study visa grants and a significantly larger amount of direct refugee resettlement (with around 80,000 Hong Kongers arriving in one year). Mounting illegal arrivals during 2021 (including by boat) have also fed into the highest number of asylum claims since 2003 (over 50,000 by main applicants and dependants). The government has failed to deliver on its pledges to restore border control in the wake of Brexit, and to reduce immigration.^[5]

Annex A

Delays and gaps in immigration statistics

Although until mid-2020 there was a time lag of only six months on immigration data, the government has repeatedly delayed the release of statistics that would provide a clearer picture of net immigration for 2021. Such information is vital for the public to be able to hold the government to account on an important national issue, for the purposes of transparency and democracy. But we have now had a delay of nearly a year in the release of figures for the year to mid-2021. There have been three recent cases of delays:

• Net migration estimates for the year to June 2021 were supposed to be released on 30 March but the Office for National Statistics (ONS) have now postponed release until late May 2022.^[6]
• National Insurance Number registration data for adult overseas nationals for the period after June 2021 was meant to be released by the DWP earlier this year but that was postponed.^[7]
• Exit Checks analysis for 2020/21 was due to be released in August 2021 but has not been released with no sign of whether or when it will be.^[8]

Because of this, members of the public who are keen to know the truth about what has happened to immigration in the first full year since major policy are forced to rely only on figures produced by the Home Office (visa grants, asylum claims and resettlements).

Footnotes

1. Home Office immigration statistics, released 24 February 2022. URL: https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/fifth-report-on-statisti… elating-to-exit-checks-2019-to-2020
2. The totals for 2005 to 2021 do not include short-term students. There was a very significant drop in the number of short-term students between 2019 and 202, falling from 120,000 to 21,502 – a near 100,000 fall.
3. The 2021 total is 840,000 if those given permission to enter on temporary work visas are excluded from the total. However, temporary workers are included here (making the headline figure 890,000) for reasons of comparability: the headline totals for 2005-2020 including ‘temporary workers’ who came under Tier 5, including some given permission to come to the UK for up to two years.
4. The 2001 to 2004 totals include both entry clearance grants as well as data relating to applications made within the UK for ‘leave to remain’. Data for 2005 to 2021 includes only entry clearance visa grants from outside the UK.
5. Home Office figures on irregular migration, released 24 February 2022.
6. The ONS statistics release calendar states that the statistics were originally scheduled to published on 30 March 2022. However, this was postponed to 19 April ‘to allow publication to go out alongside other related releases on the same day, in line with our revisions policy, and for further quality assurance of data’. Then this was postponed again to 24 May ‘to allow for further quality assurance against other available data sources, including provisional Census 2021 data, to have the highest confidence in the figures we publish.’ URL: https://www.ons.gov.uk/releases/longterminternationalmigrationprovisionalyearendingjune2021
7. See Parliamentary answer, 11 February 2022, URL: https://www.theyworkforyou.com/wrans/?id=2022-01-28.HL5761.h&s=speaker%3A25254#gHL5761.q0
8. Exit Checks data provides results on the proportion of non-EEA nationals who departed before their visa expired, as well as updated data quality metrics for data collected under the Initial Status Analysis (ISA) system, which combines data from different administrative sources to link an individual’s travel in or out of the UK with their immigration history. The most recent Exit Checks analysis report was released in August 2020, covering the year 2019/20. URl: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/syste… -relating-to-exit-checks-201920.pdf

The report is the first to attempt to analyse the potential impact of the EU migrant crisis on the United Kingdom. Official Eurostat data shows that, in 2015 and the first quarter of 2016, 460,000 migrants have been granted asylum or humanitarian protection in EU countries and that there remain 876,000 applications that are yet to be decided. If the protection grant rate continues as it has, then an additional 508,000 people will be granted asylum, bringing the total number granted refugee status in EU countries to 968,000 for 2015 and the first quarter of 2016 alone.

According to leaked estimates from the German authorities, each person granted asylum is likely to be followed by between four and eight family members. Migration Watch took the lower estimate that only four family members would follow. This suggests that the total inflow to Europe could amount to 4.8 million over a period of years – without taking account of any future arrivals who might successfully claim asylum.

The paper notes the factors which could draw migrants from the EU to the UK. Low skilled entry-level work requiring little local knowledge is often easy to find. The English language, existing migrant communities and a reputation for tolerance and fairness are particular draws. Indeed, research has shown that between a third and half of the Somalis granted asylum in the Netherlands have relocated to the UK, demonstrating that migrants move even from wealthier EU nations where these other factors are at play.

If, in the light of these factors, between 5% and 10% of these 4.8 million refugees and their family members chose to come to the UK after acquiring the EU citizenship to which they will become entitled in due course, between 240,000 and 480,000 could arrive in the UK in the years following 2020. The UK has no control over these numbers.

The paper also notes that the migrant crisis is far from over. Europol and Interpol confirm that there are approximately 800,000 migrants waiting in Libya to cross into the European Union when the weather improves. Moreover, the EU/Turkey deal, whereby all migrants crossing the Aegean from Turkish shores are returned is under pressure. The deal is dependent on the EU granting Turkish nationals visa free travel to the Schengen zone but President Erdogan may not be willing to meet the requirements outlined in the EU’s ‘roadmap’.

Commenting, Lord Green of Deddington, Chairman of Migration Watch UK, said:

“The UK could well face a significant secondary flow of refugees from Europe in the coming years adding to the already huge strain being placed on housing and public services. While the UK has so far been largely shielded from the crisis in Southern Europe, this potential flow can only add to the impact of migration which is already seriously affecting communities across the country.“

To read the full paper, click here

Forced Marriage Protection Orders

2. The Forced Marriage (Civil Protection) Act 2007, which received Royal Assent on 26 July 2007 and was brought into force in November 2008, amends the Family Law Act 1996 by inserting a whole Part 4A, the sections of which empower the High Court and county courts to make forced marriage protection orders (FMPOs) for the purpose of providing legal means of protection for persons who are being or have been forced into marriage. A person is deemed to be forced into a marriage if he or she is forced by another person to enter into a marriage without his or her free and full consent. The courts are given wide powers to include in FMPOs such prohibitions, restrictions or requirements or such other terms as are considered appropriate and may relate to conduct outside the United Kingdom. Thus a court could for example issue an order prohibiting a family from taking an unwilling daughter abroad for the purpose of marriage or an order in the case of a daughter who has left home to take refuge from her family, forbidding other members of her family from trying to contact or molest her.

3. The Act deals with the problem of young people under pressure to marry who are afraid to seek help from authority against their own parents. An application to the court may be made by the person to be protected but may also be made by a relevant third party. “Relevant third party” means a person or body to be specified by order of the Lord Chancellor and could include e.g. other relatives, Social Services departments of local authorities. Any other person may make an application with the leave of the court. In certain circumstances the court may make an order even though no application has been made. In the normal way when an application is made to a court for an order against a particular person, notice of the proceedings must be given to the person concerned in accordance with rules of court. In the case of FMPOs however, the Act specifically provides that the court may, in any case where it considers that it is just and convenient to do so, make a FMPO even though the respondent, the person against whom the order is to be made, has not been given notice of the proceedings. In these various ways the Act gives maximum flexibility to the court to ensure that the FMPO regime has teeth.

Criminalisation

4. When the Bill which became the Forced Marriage Act 2007 was going through Parliament there was a public consultation as to whether it should create a new criminal offence of forcing a person into marriage, but this possibility was not favoured at the time by the majority of those consulted, so the Act did not create such an offence.

5. The government in 2011 committed itself to creating a new criminal offence of beaching an FMPO and Parliament has now enacted the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, which received Royal Assent on 13 March 2014. Part 10, sections 122 to 124 of the Act, honour the government’s commitment by creating a specific offence of breaching a FMPO. Breach of any order of a court is normally punishable as a contempt of court but section 120 specifically provides that a person who has been convicted of the offence of breaching an FMPO under that section may not also be punished for contempt of court on account of the same conduct. The offence is triable in magistrates’ and Crown courts and in the latter case the maximum penalty is imprisonment for five years, a fine or both.

6. New offences in relation to forced marriage are created by section 121 of the Act for England and Wales Section 122 makes identical provision for Scotland. Both sections are brought into force with effect from 16 June 2014. Subsection (1) of section 121 makes it an offence if a person:

1. uses violence, threats or any other form of coercion for the purpose of causing another person to enter into a marriage, and
2. believes or ought reasonably to believe that the conduct may cause the other person to enter into marriage without free and full consent.

Subsection (3) makes it an offence if a person:

1. practices any form of deception with the intention of causing another person to leave the United Kingdom, and
2. intends the other person to be subjected to conduct outside the United Kingdom that is an offence under subsection (1) or would be an offence under that subsection if the victim were in England or Wales.

In recent years there have been many cases reported of Pakistani parents in particular taking their children supposedly on holiday to Pakistan and forcing them into marriage locally while there. It is against such actions that this subsection is directed.

7. “Marriage” is defined in the section as “any religious or civil ceremony of marriage (whether or not legally binding)”. This would include e.g. marriages purported to be made under sharia law in the United Kingdom which are not recognised by law. Offences under section 121 are triable in the magistrates’ and Crown courts and in the latter case carry the maximum penalty of imprisonment for a term not exceeding seven years.

9. This paper replaces the previous paper 8.60, “Forced marriage – a Consultation Paper” which is now deleted. The reader’s attention is drawn to the contents of Legal Legal Paper MW 240 and Legal Paper MW 241, based on the Supreme Court decision in the case of Quila, in which the question of regulating and seeking to prevent forced marriage was a material issue.

Harry Mitchell QC
Honorary Legal Adviser
Migration Watch

1. The UK, Germany, France and the Netherlands are the four major countries opening their labour markets in January 2014. All four are likely to be financially attractive destinations for those wishing to migrate from Romania and Bulgaria but high unemployment might make France less attractive. There will also be a strong financial incentive for those Romanians and Bulgarians now in Spain and Italy to migrate North.

January 1st 2014 – The end of Transitional Controls

2. During a seven year transition period free movement could be confined to students, self employed and self sufficient persons in those countries that wished to protect their labour markets. From the beginning of next year transitional controls must end for Romanian and Bulgarian citizens and they will have full access to all the labour markets of the European Union. Some countries chose to grant Romanian and Bulgarian nationals full and immediate access in 2007- including the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia, Finland and Sweden. However, Denmark, Greece, Spain, Hungary and Portugal chose to lift transitional controls after two years (although Spain has since reimposed controls for Romanian nationals utilising their safeguard clause by agreement with the European Commission). Ireland and Italy lifted controls in 2012 although the sharp inflow to Italy appears to have begun in 2007 (Annex C). The UK has continued to impose transitional controls along with Germany, France, Malta, the Netherlands and Austria; these will end on the 1st January 2014.^[1]

Wages in Romania and Bulgaria compared to the UK and other EU countries – Single person on half the average wage

3. A single person in Romania on half of the average would have a take home income of £3,200 per annum once the cost of living has been accounted for. The same person in Bulgaria would earn slightly less – £3,000. (See Annex A)

4. If workers were to move from Romania or Bulgaria to Spain or Italy and were to earn half the average wage they would be able to earn three times more. Moving to France, Germany, Ireland or the Netherlands would increase their wage by a factor of four. In the UK on half the average wage (£7.14) they would receive nearly five times as much as they had earned at home. Take home pay (after including benefits) in the UK therefore offers Romanians and Bulgarians a somewhat greater financial incentive than in the other major EU countries.

5. There are nearly 900,000 Romanians in Spain and over a million in Italy. There are also around 250,000 Bulgarians in these two countries^[2]. They are attracted by language similarities and, no doubt, amnesties granted over the years. High unemployment could encourage these people to move elsewhere in Europe. Single Romanians in Spain could increase their wage by 40% by moving to the UK, and by almost 50% by moving from Italy to the UK if they earned half the average wage in both countries.

Wages in Romania and Bulgaria compared to the UK and other EU countries – Individual with spouse and two children on half the average wage

6. An individual with spouse and two children on half the average wage in Romania will have a post-tax income of £4,000; in Bulgaria he would receive £3,800.

7. If such a family were to move from Romania to Spain or Italy they would be three times better off. In France they would be four times better off and five times in the Netherlands and Germany. In the UK they would be six times better off and seven times better off in Ireland. The economic gains in moving to the UK and Ireland are therefore double those of moving to Spain and Italy. The outcome for a Bulgarian family would be similar. (See Annex B)

Other Factors that could influence Migration Patterns

a) Unemployment

8. The unemployment rate in the UK is higher than in Germany and similar to that of the Netherlands but lower than France, Italy and Ireland. Given the extremely high level of unemployment in Spain it is unlikely that A2 nationals will choose to move to Spain for work – most of those who so wished will already have done so. It is possible that Romanians who are currently in Spain will choose to migrate to Northern Europe where unemployment is lower but there is little evidence that this has happened thus far. (See Annex C) Despite the economic incentives, migration to Ireland may be limited by the higher unemployment rate in that country.

Figure 1. General Unemployment Rates in Selected EU Countries – August 2013

9. Youth unemployment in the UK, at 21%, is lower than Spain, Italy and Ireland and similar to France. However, it remains considerably higher than in the Netherlands and Germany where youth unemployment is only 10% and 8% respectively:

Figure 2. Youth Unemployment Rate in Selected EU Countries – 2012

b) Employment Opportunities

10. Unfortunately, data from EUROSTAT on the number of job vacancies is incomplete as France, Ireland and Italy have not submitted data. The data that is available shows there to be 928,000 vacancies in Germany and 535,000 in the UK. This is compared to 95,000 in the Netherlands and 114,000 in Spain. Obviously the number of job vacancies is bound to be larger in larger economies but this may still be a pull factor.

Figure 3. Number of Job Vacancies in Selected EU Countries – Quarter 2, 2013

Conclusion

11. Germany remains the most attractive destination in terms of its low unemployment rate and a large number of vacancies. The UK has a higher youth unemployment rate than the Netherlands and Germany but general unemployment is not much higher and the English language may be an incentive. There are economic gains to be had for those who choose to migrate to France or Ireland but their unemployment rates, and in particular youth unemployment rates, may deter some migrants.

12. Romanian and Bulgarian migrants in Spain and Italy may choose to move to the North of Europe where employment opportunities are considerably greater as are financial rewards.

13. In light of this analysis we stand by our central estimate that 50,000 people from Romania and Bulgaria will move to the UK each year for five years.^[3]

Annex A – Income of Single Individual on 50% of Average Wage in various countries, converted to £ to take account of cost of living

Annex B – Income of Individual with Spouse and Two Children on 50% of Average Wage (Partner not working), converted to £ to take account of cost of living

Annex C

Footnotes

1. European Commission Table on restrictions imposed on Workers from Bulgaria and Romania by Member States, as at 30 July 2012, URL: Summary table of Member States’ policies – Workers from Bulgaria and Romania
2. Eurostat, Populaton by citizenship
3. Migration Watch UK, Immigration from Romania and Bulgaria, January 2013, URL: http://www.migrationwatchuk.org/briefing-paper/4.17

1. There could be as many as one million migrants from the Commonwealth who have the right to vote in UK Parliamentary elections, despite not being British citizens. Voting rights for the whole Commonwealth are an anachronism from the days of the British Empire and should be brought to an end except for citizens from those few Commonwealth countries which grant British citizens reciprocal voting rights. Irish citizens should continue to have the vote on the same principle of reciprocity.

Introduction

2. Now that the Electoral register is updated monthly instead of annually, all Commonwealth citizens can vote in all British elections virtually on arrival. This paper assesses the arguments and the numbers.

The Right to Vote

3. Nearly all countries make an explicit link between citizenship and political franchise at the national level, giving citizenship much greater significance. Other rights accorded only to citizens include the right to consular protection when abroad and the right to a passport.

4. In the United States^[1] only citizens can vote in national or state elections and in Canada^[2] only citizens are entitled to vote in federal elections. In Australia, Commonwealth citizens had the right to vote in elections until 1984. However this was changed so that only Australian citizens and British subjects, (a term covering all Commonwealth citizens) resident in Australia before 1984 can now vote.^[3] In New Zealand only citizens and permanent residents can vote in elections.^[4] In Europe only citizens can vote in national elections in France, Germany, Spain and the Netherlands. In Ireland only Irish and British citizens can vote in national elections as a result of a Constitutional amendment granting British citizens reciprocal voting rights.

Voting Rights in the UK

5. By contrast, the UK extends parliamentary voting rights to significant numbers of non-citizens. Irish citizens can vote, a reciprocal right granted to the British in Ireland. So can Commonwealth citizens whose right to vote is not linked to length of residence or permanent residency but is granted on arrival. An address in the constituency is required but there are no checks on immigration status. Thus even a student visitor from a Commonwealth country who was planning to study for six months would be allowed to enrol on the Electoral Register and vote in a Parliamentary Election if one was held during the duration of his or her stay.

6. Foreign nationals who are settled residents (i.e. no longer subject to immigration control), but who are not Commonwealth citizens cannot vote in any elections, For example, a Tunisian national with indefinite leave to remain would not be allowed to vote until he acquired British citizenship. Resident EEA citizens can vote in local and European elections but not in a general election. British citizens resident in Europe have equivalent rights.

Table 1. Voting Rights by Nationality in UK

The Goldsmith Report

7. In 2007 the then Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, commissioned Lord Goldsmith to review British citizenship laws which are complex and incoherent. The terms of reference included a review of the role of citizens and residents in civil society as well as voting rights.

8. Lord Goldsmith concluded that current British citizenship laws were the result of a succession of changes introduced to deal with the former Empire as those countries gained independence after the Second World War. The result was a confusing set of citizenship laws with various anomalies. Goldsmith concluded that, in most other countries, citizenship was clear and conferred political participation on citizens in a way that distinguished them from non-citizens. This clarity was lacking in the UK and he proposed that it be rectified by phasing out the right of Commonwealth citizens to vote in general elections:

“…I do propose that the government gives consideration to making a clear connection between citizenship and the right to vote by limiting in principle the right to vote in Westminster elections to UK citizens. This would recognise that the right to vote is one of the hallmarks of the political status of citizens; it is not a means of expressing closeness between countries. Ultimately, it is right in principle not to give the right to citizens of other countries living in the UK until they become UK citizens.”

Lord Goldsmith, Citizenship: Our Common Bond, 2008^[5]

9. The government did not formally respond to Lord Goldsmith’s report which made various other recommendations to simplify Britain’s complex citizenship laws. In July 2008 the Home Office produced a document entitled ‘Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System’ which stated ‘We have carefully studied Lord Goldsmith’s report into citizenship’.^[6] However, the issue of voting has never been acted on.

10. One possible reason why Lord Goldsmith’s report was largely ignored by the Labour government of the day is that voters from BME (Black and Minority Ethnic) communities, some of whom will be Commonwealth citizens, are far more likely to vote Labour than Liberal Democrat or Conservative. A report for the Runnymede Trust which analysed the voting behaviour of different ethnic minority communities found that 68 percent of Black and Minority Ethnic people voted Labour in the 2010 election. For example, 60 percent of people who identified their ethnicity as Pakistani and who voted in the 2010 general election voted for Labour, for those who identified their ethnicity as Indian this was 61 percent, for Bangladeshis this figure was 72 percent and 78 percent amongst those who identified as Caribbean.^[7] Of course, many of these will be British citizens, though not all. Historically support for Labour amongst BME voters has been even higher: ‘as many as 8 or 9 out of 10 BME voters have supported Labour in the past.’^[8]

The Importance of Voting Rights for Non-Citizens

11. Lord Goldsmith pointed out that:

• most countries do not permit non citizens to vote in national or often even local elections
• the UK does not have the same clarity around citizenship as other countries
• it is right in principle not to give the right to vote to citizens of other countries living in the UK until they become citizens.

12. A further argument is reciprocity. There are many countries whose nationals are eligible to vote in UK elections which do not extend the same rights to British citizens living there. British citizens who move to Canada and Australia would not be allowed to exercise a right to vote until they became citizens of those countries. Nor can they vote in India, Pakistan and Nigeria, the three most populous members of the Commonwealth. There are, however, a few Commonwealth countries that do extend the right to vote to British citizens (by virtue of being Commonwealth citizens).^[9] In addition Jamaica lets British citizens who are ordinarily resident have the vote. A logical approach, therefore, would be to confine voting rights in general elections to citizens of those (few) countries which offer reciprocal rights.

The scale of the Commonwealth vote

13. Commonwealth citizens move to the UK in large numbers, some temporarily and some permanently, and could therefore have a considerable impact on the outcome of a general election. The 2011 census data shows that there are an estimated 960,000 Commonwealth citizens (who don’t have British citizenship) living in England and Wales who have the right to vote but are from countries that do not allow British citizens to vote (see Annex A). This total includes only those who, in 2011, were over the age of 15 and who therefore would be eligible to vote in 2015. Some may yet become British citizens but with continued immigration from these countries it is likely that by the next General Election this number will be over one million. Not all Commonwealth citizens will vote, of course, but if their turn out is close to the national average of around 60% they would amount to over half a million votes.

14. Such large numbers have the potential to make a significant impact on the outcome of elections in particular constituencies but analysis at this level will have to await publication of further data from the 2011 census.

15. At the national level, the Conservative Party won 10.7 million votes in the general election of 2010 compared to 8.6 million votes for the Labour Party – a difference of over two million. The Liberal Democrats received 6.8 million votes. In 2005 the results were far closer with Labour winning 9.55 million compared to 8.78 million votes for the Conservative Party – a difference of just over 750,000. Thus Commonwealth citizens voting can potentially have a significant impact on UK elections.

Conclusion

16. It is quite wrong that those who have not yet qualified to become British citizens, or have chosen not to apply, should be able to vote in general elections. This is an anachronism of which the general public are largely unaware. Reform is long overdue and should be put in hand immediately so that only citizens of those countries that grant reciprocal voting rights are permitted to vote in UK general elections. Similar considerations apply, of course, to voting in referenda.

Annex A

The 2011 Census table DC2110EWr gives a breakdown of the population by passport held by age of respondent for 72 different nationalities. The table counted each person once so where the census recorded respondents as having more than one passport, they were categorised in the following priority order: 1st UK passport, 2nd Irish passport, 3rd Other passport. The ONS have confirmed to us that this means that those who were counted as having foreign passports in this table only had foreign passports and were not British citizens. Thirteen of recorded 72 nationalities in the table are Commonwealth nations which do not grant British citizens the vote. They are listed in table 2 below.

Of those born in these countries, 35% on average remain foreign citizens and 85% are aged 15 or over (and will therefore be of voting age in 2015). These proportions are based on the proportions for the Commonwealth nationalities listed in table DC2110EWr. To obtain an estimate for the remaining countries not separately identified we applied the same proportions to their populations in England and Wales (census table QS213EW). The estimate came to 70,000 as shown in the table.

Table 2: Non-British Commonwealth Citizens aged 15+ on census day from countries that do not give the vote to British citizens:

Footnotes

1. See here for voting eligibility in the United States: http://www.usa.gov/Citizen/Topics/Voting/Register.shtml
2. See here for voting eligibility in Canada: http://www.elections.ca/content.aspx?section=vot&dir=faq&document=faqvoting&lang=e#a12
3. See here for voting eligibility in Australia: http://www.aec.gov.au/enrol/
4. See here for voting eligibility in New Zealand: http://www.parliament.nz/en-nz/about-parliament/get-involved/vote/00PlibHvYrSayVote1/vote-in-elections
5. Lord Goldsmith, Citizenship: Our Common Bond, 2008, URL: http://image.guardian.co.uk/sys-files/Politics/documents/2008/03/11/citizenship-report-full.pdf
6. Home Office, Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System, 2008, URL: http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100303145830/…/pathtocitizenship/governmentreponsetoconsultation
7. Show -6 more…

1. See here for voting eligibility in the United States: http://www.usa.gov/Citizen/Topics/Voting/Register.shtml
2. See here for voting eligibility in Canada: http://www.elections.ca/content.aspx?section=vot&dir=faq&document=faqvoting&lang=e#a12
3. See here for voting eligibility in Australia: http://www.aec.gov.au/enrol/
4. See here for voting eligibility in New Zealand: http://www.parliament.nz/en-nz/about-parliament/get-involved/vote/00PlibHvYrSayVote1/vote-in-elections
5. Lord Goldsmith, Citizenship: Our Common Bond, 2008, URL: http://image.guardian.co.uk/sys-files/Politics/documents/2008/03/11/citizenship-report-full.pdf
6. Home Office, Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System, 2008, URL: http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100303145830/…/pathtocitizenship/governmentreponsetoconsultation
7. Runnymede Trust, ‘Ethnic Minority British Election Study – Key Findings’, February 2012, URL: http://www.runnymedetrust.org/uploads/EMBESbriefingFINALx.pdf, p. 3.
8. Runnymede Trust, ‘Ethnic Minority British Election Study – Key Findings’, February 2012, URL: http://www.runnymedetrust.org/uploads/EMBESbriefingFINALx.pdf, p. 12.
9. British nationals can vote in Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Mauritius, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago. New Zealand gives the right to vote to foreign citizens only if they are granted permanent residence status while Malawi lets foreign citizens who have been resident for seven years vote.
10. Other includes Cyprus, Malta, Cameroon, The Gambia, Botswana, Malawi, Namibia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Seychelles, Swaziland, Tanzania, Brunei, Belize and the Bahamas. Estimate based on 35% of foreign born remain foreign citizens and 85% are 15 years old or greater

1. The vast majority of family visas – 77% – were granted to the partners/spouses of British citizens or settled migrants. The largest number of grants is to Pakistani and Indian applicants. Some family migrants are more permanent than others – data suggests that the majority of people who enter on partner visas from the Indian Subcontinent have gained settlement after five years, compared to Australians and Americans who have far lower levels of settlement.

Family Visa Policy

2. As part of the government’s reforms to the immigration system family visa policy has been tightened. These include two major changes which came into force in July 2012:

1. Any British citizen or settled person wishing to sponsor a spouse must earn a minimum of £18,600, increasing to £22,400 for the first child and an additional £2,400 for each subsequent child. Only permitted sources can be included.
2. Any British citizen or settled person wishing to bring in adult dependants such as elderly parents or grandparents must demonstrate that the individual requires every day care and support and that this cannot be provided in their home country. They must also demonstrate that they have the sufficient funds to care for the individual.

3. The previous salary threshold for an individual to sponsor a spouse was just £5,500 per year (excluding housing costs).The salary threshold of £18,600 was introduced based on one of the recommendations of the independent Migration Advisory Committee, who concluded that this threshold is ‘at the point at which the family is not entitled to receive any income-related benefits (including Tax Credits).’^[1] The alternative was to introduce a minimum salary of £25,700 based pay ‘set equal to mean household income, to capture the point at which a household might reasonably be expected to make a neutral net fiscal contribution.’^[2]

Family Visas

4. There are various types of visa available to people wishing to come to the UK under the family category by way of their relationship with a British citizen or settled migrant. The largest number of visas is issued to partners such as husbands, wives, civil partners etc. The remaining numbers are made up of children and elderly parents and grandparents.

5. The number of visas for non-EU family members reached a peak of 70,000 in 2006. It has since declined and is at its lowest levels for many years.^[3]

Figure 1. Total Family Visa Grants, 2005-2012

6. The top country for all family visas in 2012 was Pakistan at around 7,500. This was followed by India at 3,300 with other significant countries being Bangladesh, Nepal and the United States (all between 2,000 and 3,000 visas).

Partner Visas

7. The vast majority of visas issued under the family category are partner visas. In 2006 over 53,000 visas were issued to partners to enter the UK, some gaining immediate settlement. It has since declined to 35,000 in 2011. There was a further decline to 31,000 in 2012 that may reflect the impact of the new salary threshold for overseas spouses (the fall was predominantly in the last quarter of 2012).

Figure 2. Total Partner Visa Grants (including for Immediate Settlement), 2005-2012

8. The top country for partner visas in 2012 was Pakistan (almost 7,000 grants) followed by India (2,900 grants), Bangladesh (2,000 grants) and the United States (1,800 grants). Between 2005 and 2012 over 62,000 partner visas were issued to Pakistani nationals. Over half as many (33,000) were issued to Indian nationals.

Figure 3. Partner Visa Grants, Top Ten 2005-2012

EEA Family Permits

9. EEA nationals living in the UK can bring in non-EEA partners, children and other dependant relatives on what is called an ‘EEA Family Permit’.^[4] The numbers are significant with around 20,000 having been issued to spouses and other dependants each year for the past few years. A non-EEA national on an EEA family permit has a route to permanent settlement in the UK.

10. There is no income threshold to sponsor a spouse on a non-EEA family permit. This is contrast to a British citizen or settled person who must now meet the minimum income threshold of £18,600 to sponsor a non-EU spouse.

The Permanence of Family Migrants in the UK

11. The Home Office has conducted cohort analysis of inflows to better understand the nature of different types of migration. In its Migrant Journey, Second Report, it found that, of those family migrants admitted in 2004, 55% had been granted settlement by 2009 and a further 8% continued to have a legal right to remain.^[5] However, within this there were variations by nationality. For example, after five years the report found that 81% of Pakistani nationals who came in 2004 under the family route had gained settlement, as had 70% of Indians. However just 10% of Australians had gained settlement, (with three quarters having no valid leave to remain) and 30% of Americans. Therefore family migration is more permanent depending upon nationality, with family migration from the Indian Subcontinent being largely permanent in nature.

Future Inflow from Family Migration

12. The new income threshold of £18,600 to sponsor a non-EU spouse appears to be impacting on the number of spouse visas granted. The government will also begin interviewing more spouses to ensure that the relationship is genuine and that no element of pressure has been exerted on either partner. The Migration Advisory Committee examined a sample of partner applications and found that 40% did not meet the minimum income threshold required to sponsor a spouse.^[6] However, assuming a 40% reduction in partner visas would be to overstate the effect since people naturally will adapt to changes. We anticipate, therefore that in 2013 and beyond partner visas will fall to between 20,000 and 25,000. Other family may account for around 5,000.

13. The Migrant Journey showed that around two thirds of migrants granted family visas remained in the UK legally after five years, over half of whom had gained settlement. This broadly means that around two thirds of family migrants will contribute towards net migration in the longer term. However, the new minimum income threshold of £18,600 is likely to disproportionately affect migrants from countries such as Pakistan and India. As these migrants show a greater propensity to remain in the UK – 81% of Pakistani and 70% of Indian family migrants were granted settlement within five years according to the Migrant Journey report – it is likely that the proportion of migrants who settle will fall from two thirds to perhaps a half as the number from Pakistan and India falls. Net migration of family members is therefore likely to be around half of the 20,000-25,000 visas issued annually in the medium term or around 15,000 as an upper limit. This is less than the current number of EEA Family Permits (paragraphs 9 and 10 above) and underlines the need to negotiate an opt out from the relevant EU Directives. The level of the minimum salary should also be kept under review.

Footnotes

1. Migration Advisory Committee, Review of the minimum income requirement for sponsorship under the family migration route, November 2011, URL: http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/…c/family-migration-route/family-migration-route.pdf p. 72.
2. Ibid, p. 72-73.
3. Home Office Immigration Statistics January to March 2013, Entry Clearance Visas Volume 2, Table be_06_q_f.
4. For more on EEA Family Permits, see UK Border Agency Guidance here: http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/policyandlaw/guidance/ecg/eun/eun2/#header1
5. Home Office, The Migrant Journey Second Report, Research Report 57, August 2011, URL: https://www.gov.uk/government/…/116031/horr57-report.pdf
6. Migration Advisory Committee, Review of the Minimum Income Requirement for Sponsorship under the Family Migration Route, November 2011.
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1. Migration Advisory Committee, Review of the minimum income requirement for sponsorship under the family migration route, November 2011, URL: http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/…c/family-migration-route/family-migration-route.pdf p. 72.
2. Ibid, p. 72-73.
3. Home Office Immigration Statistics January to March 2013, Entry Clearance Visas Volume 2, Table be_06_q_f.
4. For more on EEA Family Permits, see UK Border Agency Guidance here: http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/policyandlaw/guidance/ecg/eun/eun2/#header1
5. Home Office, The Migrant Journey Second Report, Research Report 57, August 2011, URL: https://www.gov.uk/government/…/116031/horr57-report.pdf
6. Migration Advisory Committee, Review of the Minimum Income Requirement for Sponsorship under the Family Migration Route, November 2011.

2 The amending provisions in paragraph 281 were contested by judicial review in the recent Court of Appeal case of Bibi v. Secretary of State for the Home Department ^[1] EWCA 322. The case was brought by two British married women, each of whom wished to bring in a husband who was a foreign national who did not speak English. The Court of Appeal considered whether the amending provisions, clearly interfering with the rights to marry and to enter the United Kingdom for the purpose of joining a spouse already here, were compatible with Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) on the right to family life, for a general discussion of which see Legal Paper MW 270. In undertaking this assessment the Court had to take into account the decision of the Supreme Court in the recent case of Quila v. Secretary of State for the Home Department ^[2] 1AC 621, discussed in Legal Paper MW 240 and Legal Paper MW 241. In that case the Supreme Court had to consider an amendment to the Immigration Rules which denied a spouse visa to an applicant under 21, as opposed to the previous age requirement of 18. The publicly stated purpose of the amendment was to deter forced marriages. The majority of the Supreme Court found that having regard to the relatively small number of forced marriages which might be prevented, this was, to quote Lord Wilson “a colossal interference with the rights of the claimants to respect for their family life, however exiguous that might be”. In the case here being considered, the declared objective of the amendments imposing more strenuous English language requirements was to encourage integration of immigrants into the host society, protect public services and save costs. On this the Court of Appeal quoted with approval the following statement by Beatson J, the

judge who had heard the case at first instance:

“In the present case the categories of protection of “economic wellbeing” (in view of the evidence about the impact on job prospects), “health” (in view of the evidence about accessing health services) and possibly “public safety” of “the protection of the rights and freedoms of others” (in view of the evidence about the protection of women from domestic violence) mean that the new requirement ^[3] does pursue a legitimate public aim.”

3 The Court then had to consider whether the effect of the amendment to the Immigration Rules, the interference with family life, was proportionate to the legitimate aim as defined in the above quotation. After considering the matter at some length, Lord Justice Maurice Kay, delivering the majority judgment, concluded at paragraph 92:

“…the Secretary of State identified a social problem…considered an ameliorating solution; she assessed the implications of introducing it; she provided for exempt and exceptional cases; and in the event, the effect on applications and grants was not numerically significant.”

The conclusion of the majority was that introduction of a pre-entry requirement of proficiency in the English language, pitched at a rudimentary level, was proportionate. One member of the Court of appeal dissented, but the majority judgment was that the amending Immigration Rule was compatible with Article 8 of the ECHR. By contrast with the decision of the Supreme court in Quila the Court of Appeal in the case of Bibi did not find any ground for upsetting the decision of the Home Secretary to amend the Immigration Rules in a way which interfered with the right to marry.

A FURTHER COMMENT

4 Somewhat unusually neither of the applicants for judicial review had actually applied for entry clearance because they had been advised that they would not be able to meet the amended requirements. Instead they started judicial review proceedings on the ground that the amendments to Paragraph 281 were incompatible with Articles 8 (right to family life), 12 (right to marry) and 14 (prohibition of discrimination) of the ECHR. In the normal way judicial review is a way of contesting a decision taken by a particular authority on the ground of failure to comply with the relevant law. In this case there were no decisions to be thus contested and as a general principle of common law judges may not adjudicate on legal problems in the abstract, unrelated to particular facts or events. However, both the judge at first instance and the justices of the Court of Appeal decided to go ahead. These decisions, taken together with the fact that the judgment of the court was not unanimous, may give ground for appeal to the Supreme Court.

Harry Mitchell QC
Honorary Legal Adviser
Migration Watch

Footnotes

1. 2013
2. 2012
3. ie the amending provision on standard of attainment of English language proficiency

The government’s reform of the Immigration Rules require British citizens to be earning £18,600 before they can bring in a spouse from outside the EU so as to avoid any cost to the taxpayer.   However, under EU law, they are obliged to provide favourable treatment to EU citizens including those who may never have been resident here prior to moving with their non-EU family.

Commenting, Sir Andrew Green, Chairman of Migration Watch UK, said “This is a loophole that must be closed and soon.   It is absurd that EU citizens should be in a more favourable position than our own citizens.  Furthermore, 20,000 per year is a very large number to admit unconditionally, especially compared to the government’s target of tens of thousands for annual net migration.

Notes to Editors:
1 More precisely, this applies to EEA nationals.
2 Example: French or Polish citizens living in the UK can marry someone from anywhere in the world and can bring him or her to the UK even if they do not have a job and cannot support their spouse whereas a British citizen must now be earning £18,600 a year.
3 Examples of Abuse – An Indian national from Goa can obtain Portuguese citizenship if their parents were Portuguese citizens prior to 1961. They can then move straight to the UK with their family using an EEA family permit.  On arrival they can avail themselves, immediately, of all the benefits available to UK citizens. There is anecdotal evidence that this has been happening quite extensively. Many settle in Swindon, where around 9,000 Goans now live.

1. Recent reforms to family migration for British citizens are undermined by EU law that allows EU citizens living in the UK to bypass British Immigration Rules and bring in their non-EU partners and family members with no salary or other conditions. They gain immediate and full access to benefits. 20,000 took advantage of this route in 2012.

Family Immigration Rules

2. In 2012 there were around 40,000 family visas issued under the Immigration Rules of which about 30,000 were for partners, 5,000 for children and 5,000 to other relatives such as parents and grandparents^[2].

3. British nationals living in the UK are now required to earn a minimum salary of £18,600 to sponsor a spouse from outside the European Union (technically the EEA). This is the salary level that the government considers necessary so that the spouse will not be a burden on the taxpayer.

EU Rules

4. However, EU nationals living in the UK can bypass the UK immigration rules and bring in a non-EU partner and even their partner’s extended family members under the Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2006^[3].

5. A non-EU family member has to apply for an “EEA family permit” but, to qualify, the EU nationals only have to be exercising their treaty rights to be in the UK. All EU nationals have an initial right to reside in the UK for three months. Thereafter, they can extend their right of residence if they are a:

• Jobseeker
• Worker
• Student
• self-employed person
• self-sufficient person

Therefore, there is no salary threshold required to sponsor a family member from outside the EU and there is not even a requirement to be in employment.

6. In 2012 there were over 20,000 EEA family permits issued to non-EU citizens to accompany or to join EU citizens living in the UK. The total over the past five years has been almost 100,000.^[4]

7. The holder of an EEA family permit has the same right to work and to access benefits as the EU national who has sponsored them. This means they can claim all the benefits available to a British citizen resident in the UK. These include Housing Benefit, Council Tax Benefit, Income Support, income-based Jobseeker’s Allowance, income-related Employment and Support Allowance, Child Benefit, Child Tax Credit, Working Tax Credit and State Pension Credit as well as social housing and homelessness assistance.

8. The EEA family permit is issued for an initial six months after which it can be extended. After five years the holder can apply for permanent residence in the UK and, if they wish, can then apply for British citizenship^[5].

Examples

9. There are two broad categories, one legitimate but which undermines UK immigration law, and the other effectively an abuse of the system.

a) A Polish or French person can marry someone from outside the EU, say Kenya or Vietnam, and can bring their spouse into the UK, even if they do not have a job earning a minimum of £18,600 or indeed any job. The couple would be entitled to full access to the welfare state. A British or non EU settled resident would not be allowed to bring in a spouse without this minimum income. This is also an incentive for sham marriages between, say, Eastern European women and African and Asian migrants, a number of which have been detected.

b) An Indian national from the former Portuguese territory of Goa can apply for Portuguese citizenship on the basis of their or their parents’ Portuguese heritage (Goa was part of the Portuguese Republic until 1961). They can then move directly to the UK, without even going to Portugal, and bring their family with them on EEA family permits. Again, they do not have to satisfy the minimum income threshold as British and settled residents do. They are immediately entitled to full access to the British welfare state. There is anecdotal evidence that this has been happening in the UK – many Goans have moved to the town of Swindon.

Footnotes

1. More precisely EEA citizens – that is EU plus Iceland, Lichtenstein and Norway.
2. Home Office Immigration Statistics Before Entry volume 2 be.04.q https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/data-tables-immigration-statistics-october-to-december-2012
3. http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/policyandlaw/guidance/ecg/eun/eun2/#header1
4. There were 97,914 EEA family permits issued between 2008 and 2012. Home Office, Immigration Statistics, Before Entry Quarter 4 2012, Table be.04.
5. http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/eucitizens/documents-family/