1. There is little doubt that the next set of official migration statistics to issue on 23rd May will confirm that the scale and pace of immigration has run out of control and that the post-Brexit immigration system must bear the bulk of the blame. The only effective way forward is now to impose a cap to ensure net migration is no more than 100,000 a year. This would have wide public support and might avoid the serious economic and social strains that are very likely to arise from the present chaos.

Introduction

2. Much press attention has been focussed on the asylum system, which is clearly in urgent need of reform, but the current scale of net migration is many times greater and about 20 times the rate of illegal Channel-crossers. Debates around the Rwanda Scheme should not be a distraction from reducing legal migration, which has been the main driver of mass migration over many years, and which will have a transformative impact on our society.

Graph 1: Net migration to the UK, 2000-2022^[1]

The consequences of uncapped migration

3. We now find that the nearly 8 million increase in the UK population in the 20 years preceding the last census in 2021 was 84% due to immigration. The latest ONS projections show a UK population increase of 6.6 million by 2036 of which 6.1 million (92%) will be due to immigration.^[2] Population increase on such a scale is unprecedented in our history and will have a major impact on the economy, society, and culture of the UK.

4. The impact on demand for housing and public services, especially the NHS, is already huge. Fifteen new Birminghams would be needed to accommodate immigration-driven population growth should uncapped migration continue at its current levels.^[3] This will mean building something like 6,700 schools, 2,600 GP surgeries, and 8,000 miles of road by 2046. We will also need to build over half a million new homes a year.^[4]

5. The social effects of millions of arrivals from different cultures are already considerable. Numbers matter. We find ourselves unable to assimilate migrants already here, let alone the accelerating rates of migration that are now being forecast. Challenges include multilingualism, reduced social trust, and sectarian conflict. We can see this clearly demonstrated by the current widespread antisemitism at extensive protests. Research has found that 46% of British Muslims sympathise with Hamas and 32% want Sharia law enforced in the UK. Too many new arrivals are not assimilating into British culture or accepting British values.^[5]

Public Opinion

6. Opinion polls now show that some 63% of the public believe immigration is too high.^[6] As much as 52% of the public want immigration reduced.^[7] But the public are simply not aware of the scale of the problem. Most people believe that 70,000 migrants entered the country last year, which is only about one tenth of the actual level. When asked, 80% of respondents want migration below 100,000 per year.^[8] They are certainly not aware that, if current levels of migration were allowed to continue, a child born today to an indigenous British couple would be in a minority in the country of his or her parents by the time they reached their forties.

Conclusion

7. British society is founded upon the shared heritage, values, rich history, and culture of the British people. Its future stability, economic wellbeing and cohesion are dependent on manageable levels of immigration which now drive unprecedented population growth. Massive levels of immigration from disparate parts of the world, if left unchecked, will result in a fractured society and increasing tensions between different religious and cultural groups, many from conflict-ridden parts of the world.

8. The way forward is a cap on overall numbers. Under the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition the UK introduced its own cap on higher-skill visas (20,700 p.a.) for non-EU nationals. It worked. The cap was never breached and played a significant part in non-EU migration falling to its lowest levels since the 1990s. Caps have also been used with varying degrees of success in the United States, Canada, and Australia.

9. At present there is no effective control of immigration. The system has, in effect, been deliberately delegated to employers and universities with no limit on the numbers they can bring. This has to change. The government must take back decision making and impose a cap on immigration to be determined at the start of each parliamentary term. This should be set at a level to ensure net migration is less than 100,000 a year. A cap is the simplest and most effective means of control. In short: no cap, no control.

Annex A – Conservative Manifesto Pledges

Conservative Manifesto 2010 (p.21)

we will take steps to take net migration back to the levels of the 1990s – tens of thousands a year, not hundreds of thousands.

Conservative Manifesto 2015 (p.29)

keep our ambition of delivering annual net migration in the tens of thousands, not the hundreds of thousands.

Conservative Manifesto 2017 (p.54)

But with annual net migration standing at 273,000, immigration to Britain is still too high. It is our objective to reduce immigration to sustainable levels, by which we mean annual net migration in the tens of thousands.

Conservative Manifesto 2019 (p.20)

overall numbers will come down.

Net migration for calendar 2022 was 745,000.

Footnotes

1. Migration Watch UK (2023). ‘Migration Statistics Over Time’. Accessed on 14 May. Available at: https://migrationwatchuk.org/migration-statistics-over-time
2. ONS (2024). ‘National population projections: 2021-based interim’. 30 January. Available at: https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationand… ulationprojections/2021basedinterim
3. Migration Watch UK (2023). ‘Fifteen new Birminghams’. 8 November. Available at: https://migrationwatchuk.org/briefing-paper/518/fifteen-new-birminghams
4. CPS (2023). ‘Net migration and Housing – A CPS Briefing’. 27 November. Available at: https://cps.org.uk/research/net-migration-and-housing-a-cps-briefing/
5. HJS (2024). ‘Only one in four British Muslims believe Hamas committed murder and rape in Israel on October 7th’. 8 April. Available at: https://henryjacksonsociety.org/2024/04/08/only-one-in-four-briti… -and-rape-in-israel-on-october-7th/
6. YouGov (2024). ‘Do Brits think that immigration has been too high or low in the last 10 years?’. 28 April. Available at: https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/trackers/do-brits-think-that… oo-high-or-low-in-the-last-10-years
7. British Future (2024). ‘Immigration and the election: Time to choose’. 25 March. Available at: https://www.britishfuture.org/publication/immigration-and-the-election-time-to-choose
8. Onward (2024). ‘Reality Check’. 14 January. Available at: https://www.ukonward.com/reports/reality-check/

1. To secure the passage of the Illegal Immigration Act 2023 through Parliament, the government committed to allowing an unspecified number of people to come to the UK via humanitarian routes each year, over and above the hundreds of thousands who have already made their way to the UK from Hong Kong and Ukraine in the past few years. This paper examines some of the likely practical difficulties. It finds that nearly half a million people have come via direct refugee immigration routes in just two and a half years. Meanwhile, Labour’s scheme to make provision for the resettlement in the UK of some asylum claimants in Europe – and even to open up the asylum system to claims at UK Embassies – risks plunging the immigration and asylum systems into further costly chaos from which it would be very hard to recover.

Introduction

2. The ongoing campaign for “Safe and Legal Routes” ignores the severe practical difficulties that would arise. For example:

1. Where would claims be lodged?
2. What would happen to those rejected?
3. What is the risk that those rejected will simply turn to existing illegal routes such as those across the channel?
4. What would be the costs involved?
5. Would public money be better spent easing conditions in countries of origin?

The present position

3. The net level of legal immigration stands at a record net inflow of 672,000 in the year to June 2023, but reached an all-time record high of 745,000 in 2022.^[1] The asylum lobby have been calling for what they describe as more “safe and legal routes” for those fleeing persecution, while often ignoring the substantial routes that already exist. They claim that opening such routes would lead to a reduction in the pressure of illegal entrants across the Channel. However, it is quite possible that the effect would be the opposite as those rejected turned to illegal alternative routes.

4. Meanwhile, the government have enacted legislation which provides for an annual number of arrivals by safe and legal routes will be set by Parliament in consultation with local authorities.^[2]

5. One point that often fails to be mentioned in media commentary about this policy is that the proposed cap does not include the Ukraine visa schemes, the Afghan Relocation and Assistance Policy (ARAP), the Hong Kong British National (overseas) route or the Mandate Scheme.^[3]

6. Annex A shows that 94% (about 468,000 out of 496,000 people) of those who were granted permission to stay during the period from January 2021 to September 2023 have come via the routes mentioned in paragraph 5 (above), which would not be included under the cap (58% from Ukraine). Therefore, it seems likely that any number brought in under a cap would be in addition to those coming via these routes –a number of which (those relating to Hong Kong and Ukraine) are uncapped, with the scale of those taking it up largely dependent on circumstances outside of the UK’s control.

7. The government says it aims to launch this extra system, following parliamentary approval, in January 2025.^[4] and probably, therefore, after the next election.

8. The cap would be amended each year, taking account of the ability of local areas to accommodate more refugees.

9. Meanwhile, at least one Labour politician has claimed that there are no safe routes for people to come to the UK. For example, Khalid Mahmood MP said in March 2023: “There are no safe routes for anybody to come through. Afghanistan has been closed. Hong Kong has been closed.”^[5] This is manifestly false.

10. Between 2015 and 2022, the government offered direct refuge in the UK to well over half a million people — the vast majority of whom came from Ukraine and Hong Kong. In addition, the UK provided a safe haven and permanent home for more than 20,000 people from Afghanistan in the run-up to and aftermath of the Taliban’s seizure of power in August 2021.^[6] See Annex A.

11. Currently there are no visa routes to enable people to claim asylum in the UK from overseas. The same applies to many other countries, such as Sweden or Germany. However, Labour have suggested that the UK’s asylum system effectively be opened up to overseas applications including to those who have illegally entered Europe.

12. Party sources have told the media that any scheme to take migrants from Europe would be capped and tightly managed, potentially through applications at UK embassies or consulates overseas. Those with family already in the UK would, it is suggested, be prioritised.^[7]

The EU is on course to receive more than a million asylum claims in 2023

13. There is a clear risk that such a scheme would lead to the UK taking a proportion of however many illegal migrants entered Europe each year. Illegal entries into the EU in the first nine months of 2023 stood at 220,000 (70% more than the equivalent period in 2022) and the highest since 2016, according to Frontex^[8]. And, in 2022, more than 880,000 people applied for asylum in the EU for the first time, a rise of 64% compared with 2021.

14. The number of asylum applications in 2023 appears to be rising further still – with an average of over 80,000 applications per month during the first eight months of this year.^[9] This marks a significant rise that has not been witnessed for a number of years. As the European Union Agency for Asylum has said: “In September 2023, this figure further increased to 108,000 applications, a level reminiscent of the refugee crisis of 2015-16. If the current trends continue, it is projected that the EU+ will receive more than a million asylum applications by the end of 2023.”

Figure 1: First-time and subsequent (repeat) asylum applicants in EU countries – (Source of graph: Eurostat).^[10]

Previous refugee routes

15. Under a variety of special schemes over the past half century, the UK has relocated and settled over half a million refugees and their family members. These included:

• 42,000 Ugandan Asians expelled from Uganda between 1972 and 1974.
• 22,500 Vietnamese displaced persons from 1979 to 1992.
• Over 2,500 Bosnians in the early 1990s.
• More than 4,000 Kosovars in 1994.
• 22,200 Syrians who came to the UK via two routes between 2014 and 2021.

16. The two schemes for Syrians involved a selection process under the United Nations Human Rights Commission. However, the two major schemes set up to provide humanitarian routes in recent years – and under which nearly 470,000 people have come since 2021 – have not involved the UNHCR. The first was the Hong Kong Pathway to Citizenship (2021 and still open) which has brought a total of 185,000 people, including dependants. Meanwhile, the Ukraine Family Scheme which has operated from 2022 has, so far, granted entry clearance or extensions to 270,000 Ukrainians. Further details of these schemes are set out in Annex A below.

Potential challenges of adding yet more ‘safe and legal’ routes

17. As detailed above and in the Annex below, approaching 600,000 people have now come to the UK under 13 different ‘safe and legal’ routes since 2005.

18. Additional direct refugee immigration numbers, under a new parliamentary-endorsed cap that would likely increase in size year-on-year, will raise a number of practical problems.

1. More direct refugee immigration could encourage yet more illegal journeys to the UK by sending out a clear message across the globe that the UK is a soft touch which does not prioritise the capacity of its own people and communities to absorb ever-increasing numbers from abroad . The UN estimate that there are approximately one hundred million refugees in the world. These numbers could be increased by climate change and high birth rates in some countries. More direct refugee immigration could even lead to more coming illegally if they are refused or, having applied, decide not to wait for the outcome and make their way to the dinghies.
2. The overall scale of refugee arrivals seems likely to continue to increase substantially. We have already noted that those from Hong Kong and Ukraine and some from Afghanistan would not be included in the cap. However, it is worth stating that there is no limit on the Hong Kong pathway which has already received 180,000 Hong Kong citizens. A further 3,000,000 could qualify if circumstances in Hong Kong were to become very difficult.
   
   Meanwhile, the Ukraine visa schemes have enabled entry of more than a quarter of a million Ukrainians to the UK, where they were either granted entry clearance or an extension of stay. There could be an increase in those numbers if the situation in Ukraine were to deteriorate further.
3. Some £4 billion in taxpayer money is already being spent every year on the overwhelmed and abused asylum system. That could increase substantially if thousands more refugees were to be accepted under the new scheme envisaged for an annual additional quota set by Parliament.
4. New arrivals would add to the existing pressure on communities, housing, services and infrastructure. The government say that they will work first with local Councils to understand their capacity.
5. Some refugees would bring an economic benefit to the UK but, overall, there is very unlikely to be any significant net boost to the UK economy. Indeed, that would not be the main purpose of the initiative proposed.
   
   We can be sure that modern communications and the presence of relatives already in Europe will add further to the draw, as will the growing inability (or unwillingness) of the government to remove anyone once here.

19. Meanwhile, Labour’s absurd scheme to open up UK embassies abroad to asylum claims poses an even greater threat to the integrity of the system and would undermine border control even more gravely. This is because any UK office overseas that was charged with considering applications would likely be flooded with them. Indeed, it is likely that foreign governments would refuse to agree to their establishment lest those who failed should remain on their territory. Furthermore, those declined at an overseas British office might well move on to France and try their luck crossing the Channel. The cost of opening and manning offices overseas would be much better spent helping far more people in greater difficulty.

Annex A: The Numerical Context

Over the years, 13 different resettlement or humanitarian pathways have been introduced for refugees or those fleeing persecution, or their family members. Table 1 below shows that over half a million people have been granted entry clearance under such routes since 2005, including just under 10,000 under the Gateway Protection route (Route 1).

Annex A below clearly illustrates the vast increase in direct refugee immigration in recent years from Hong Kong and Ukraine (Routes 11, 12 and 13 below). The addition and use of these routes has meant more than three-quarters of the total have come from just those two countries (more than 450,000 out of 585,000), while a 44,000 or so have come from two other countries – Syria and Afghanistan.

Meanwhile, more than 70,000 family members of refugees were granted entry via the ‘refugee family reunion’ visa (Route 3) since 2010 (the pre-2010 figures for this route – which opened in the mid-2000s -are not available). This entry scheme allows immediate family members to join a refugee. From 1 January 2019 to 31 March 2023, more than 90% of the people who came via this route were adult women and children. 57% of those granted entry between 2010 and 2021 were under 18.

Table 1: Total entry clearance grants for refugees and family, 2005 to September 2023.

Table 2: Total entry clearance grants via direct routes for refugees or their family members to come to the UK (Home Office).

Footnotes

1. ONS, Long-term international migration, provisional: year ending June 2023, November 2023, URL: https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationand… ationprovisional/yearendingjune2023
2. Government policy paper on safe and legal routes, 20 July 2023, URL: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/illegal-migration-bill-factsheets/safe-and-legal-routes
3. Government press release, October 2023, URL: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/government-consults-on-safe-and-legal-routes-for-refugees
4. Government press release, October 2023, URL: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/government-consults-on-safe-and-legal-routes-for-refugees
5. Full Fact, ‘Labour MP wrong to say “there are no safe routes” to enter UK’, March 2023, URL: https://fullfact.org/immigration/khalid-mahmood-safe-routes-refugees/
6. Ibid
7. Daily Telegraph, 13 September 2023, URL: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2023/09/13/labour-keir-starm… ccept-migrants-eu-deal-small-boats/
8. Frontex press statement, 13 October 2023, URL: https://www.frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news/news-release/eu-external-borders-in-september-vlgp1C
9. Eurostat, Asylum applications (annual and monthly statistics), URL: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Annual_asylum_statistics and https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?titl… m_applications_-_monthly_statistics
10. Eurostat, 21 November 2023, URL: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/w/ddn-20231121-3

1. During 2022, more than 880,000 first-time asylum seekers applied for international protection in the EU, up by an remarkable 64% compared with 2021.

2. ^[1]Meanwhile, more than 45,700 migrants crossed the English Channel to come to the UK by dinghy last year and, so far this year, more than 24,800 people have travelled here via this illegal route.^[2] A new ‘returns deal’ aimed with the European Union (EU) as envisaged by the Labour Party – said to be aimed at tackling Channel boat crossings – could well mean the UK having to take in far more irregular migrants from the Continent than would be removed back to EU states.

3. This conclusion is based upon analysis of earlier iterations of the bloc’s asylum policy – known as the Dublin Rules. Between 2015 and 2020, the UK took in than twice as many irregular non-EU migrants from European countries (nearly 4,000) as were removed to the Continent (just under 1,800). Given that this occurred when the UK was still a member of the EU, we are unlikely to be treated any more favourably as a non-EU state.

4. The Labour Party has indicated that those with family connections to the UK would be prioritised for transfer to the UK – a number that could run into many thousands. The party seems to be planning a scheme under which migrants could apply to come to the UK at our embassies overseas; this would be a recipe for chaos.

Context: Labour plans for a returns agreement

5. Illegal arrivals to the EU so far this year have topped 250,000 people, mostly from the Middle East, Africa and South Asia.^[3] Well over four million people have been recorded as illegally arriving in Europe since 2008, just under three million coming via different routes across the Mediterranean. The second most heavily used single route (after the Eastern Mediterranean) has been the Western Balkan route by which 1.2 million people have come.

6. The ongoing migration crisis in the EU is unfolding as the UK grapples with its own crisis of continuing large numbers of arrivals by small boat across the English Channel.

7. In addition to recent changes to immigration and asylum legislation here in the UK, one proposal made by the government for reducing the number of arrivals was a possible returns agreement with the EU. However, in August 2023, the EU rejected a proposed agreement which Ministers had hoped would allow the UK to return Channel boat migrants to European countries in which they had previously claimed asylum.^[4]

8. Meanwhile, Labour Party leader Sir Keir Starmer has also stated that he would seek an EU-wide returns agreement should his party win power in the upcoming General Election.

EU discussions on a bloc-wide migration deal

9. Contemporaneously, in the midst of the ongoing high numbers of people arriving by boat across the Mediterranean and via land borders in the Balkans, EU member states are negotiating a new bloc-wide migration policy that would decide how migrants could be redistributed across the bloc. This would include an effective quota on how many people that initial recipient states would take in before requesting EU assistance.

10. Under this so-called ‘solidarity mechanism’, states would be required to take in a total of asylum seekers per annum proportionate to their population and economic size. Each member state would be required to accept a share of a minimum annual quota of 30,000 people across the bloc as a whole or pay €20,000 (£17,200) for each person they do not accept.^[5]

11. The EU says the 30,000 minimum could rise in the future and would be reviewed on a regular basis. The agreement explicitly states ‘the Commission may identify a higher number for relocations’ if required. Therefore, it is entirely possible that considerably more than 30,000 migrants may be redistributed around the EU each year – with no clear indication of any upper ceiling.

12. Such a scheme could amount to something of an evolution of the previous Dublin Agreement that governed the allocation of irregular arrivals prior to the UK’s departure from the EU in 2020. Indeed, as the below paragraphs detail, the operation of this scheme during the five years following the height of the migration crisis in 2014/15 provides an instructive and perhaps best-case example of how the UK would be treated by the EU in the operation of a future returns deal.

Operation of the EU’s Dublin rules by the UK, 2015-2020

13. During the last years of the UK’s membership of the EU, the bloc experienced a migration crisis unprecedented in its scale as people from Africa, South Asia and the Middle East made their way to the continent by illegal boat and land journeys via the Mediterranean and Balkans. The peak of this crisis was in 2015 when the EU received more than a million asylum applications. Application numbers since 2017 have averaged 380,000 per year.

Figure 1: First time asylum applicants from non-EU countries in EU states – Eurostat.^[6]

First time asylum applicants from non-EU countries in EU states

2008200920102011201220132014201520162017201820192020202120220200K400K600K800K1M1.2M2014 Jan 1626,9602014 Jan 1626,960

First-time asylum applicants

Source: EurostatGet the dataDownload imageCreated with Datawrapper

14. Between 2015 and 2020, a period which also coincided with the final years of the UK’s EU membership, migrants who arrived illegally in the UK via boat or lorry and went onto claim asylum could be removed to another part of Europe under the Dublin regulation (EU No.604/2013 or ‘Dublin III’).^[7]

15. This agreement, the first version of which was agreed in the 1990s, established the criteria and mechanisms for determining which state was responsible for examining an application for international protection (an asylum claim). The Dublin III Regulation applied to all 28 EU member states when Britain was a member, as well as Iceland, Norway, Liechtenstein and Switzerland.

16. A key criterion for the removal of asylum claimants to what were then fellow EU member states was for it to be shown that the country to which the migrant was being sent was that of their first arrival in Europe. First arrival in a country was often verified by fingerprint via the Eurodac database, which the UK has now lost access to following Brexit.

17. However, the Dublin rules also meant that migrants from other parts of the EU could be sent to the UK from other European countries. This was because family rules contained in the regulation – allowing minor asylum seekers to come and join family here in the UK – took priority to those which mandated that asylum seekers should have their asylum claim processed in the first safe country of arrival.

18. Indeed, many Britons were shocked in 2016 when migrants camped in Calais who were clearly adults were brought to the UK under the auspices of the Dublin rules as ‘unaccompanied minors’^[8] Subsequent statistics released by the Home Office showed that as many as two in three people who claimed to be children and whose age was checked were found to be adults.^[9]

19. As Table 1 and Figure 2 below show, the Dublin rules were used to transfer more than twice as many migrants here than were removed during the final years of EU membership.

Table 1: Transfers of asylum seekers into and out of the UK under the EU’s Dublin rules following the height of the EU migration crisis.^[10]

Figure 2: Transfers of asylum seekers into and out of the UK under the EU’s Dublin rules following the height of the EU migration crisis.

Transfers of asylum seekers into and out of the UK under the EU’s Dublin rules following the height of the EU migration crisis

Jan15AprJulOctJan16AprJulOctJan17AprJulOctJan18AprJulOctJan19AprJulOctJan2002004006008001,0001,200Transfers of migrants FROM the UK to the rest of EU2017 Jan 1314Transfers of migrants FROM the UK to the rest of EU2017 Jan 1314

Transfers of migrants from rest of EU TO the UK

Transfers of migrants FROM the UK to the rest of EU

Get the dataDownload imageCreated with Datawrapper

20. Table 2 and Figure 3 below show that more than three times as many migrants were moved from France to the UK between 2017 and 2020 as were removed from the UK to France.

Table 2: Transfers of migrants to France from the UK and vice versa under Dublin Rules, 2017-20. Home Office statistics.

Figure 3: Transfers of migrants to France from the UK and vice versa under the Dublin Rules, 2017 to 2020.

Transfers of migrants to France from the UK and vice versa under the Dublin Rules, 2017 to 2020

Jan2017AprJulOctJan2018AprJulOctJan2019AprJulOctJan2020050100150200Transfers of migrants FROM the UK to France2018 Jan 151Transfers of migrants FROM the UK to France2018 Jan 151

Transfers of migrants from France TO the UK

Transfers of migrants FROM the UK to France

Get the dataDownload imageCreated with Datawrapper

21. The Dublin process was a complex procedure that came to be weighted against the UK following the EU referendum of 2016 after which relations with the EU became fraught. Labour’s plan to negotiate a returns agreement could well result in something very similar to the Dublin rules but updated and expanded to accommodate perhaps some of the backlog of hundreds of thousands of migrants who have claimed asylum in the EU. Given the record of the Dublin rules, especially in the post-Referendum context, it is highly likely that any new returns agreement would be used to send many more migrants here than are removed.

How might Labour’s returns agreement work?

22. The quota system that the EU is presently negotiating is something akin to a successor to the Dublin rules and represents a significant evolution of the bloc’s asylum policy in the face of hundreds of thousands of asylum applications by irregular migrants each year.

23. Labour has explicitly denied it would join an EU quota scheme, with Sir Keir telling Sky News on 17 September 2023: “There is obviously an EU quota system for EU members. Well, it’s obvious we are not an EU member… we will not be part of that.”^[11]

24. Meanwhile, the Conservatives have estimated that under EU rules Labour’s envisaged deal would require the UK to take a share of the bloc’s migrant quota.

25. The Conservatives calculate that since the UK’s population of approximately 67 million accounts for 12.9% of the combined population of the EU and the UK, Labour’s approach would mean that in 2022 the UK would have had to accept a “mandatory fair share” of 12.9% of the 966,000 asylum applications registered in 2022, or “124,600 illegal migrants”.^[12]

26. However, it should be noted that under the EU’s own solidarity mechanism it would not be compulsory for EU member states to take in migrants—they can choose between accepting arrivals or paying €20,000 per person that they choose not to take in.

27. Media reports have suggested that Labour envisages that any returns agreement would be “quid pro quo” meaning that the UK would accept people from the EU in return for sending back some people who have arrived illegally in the UK. Such a scheme could reportedly operate by means of applications at UK embassies in Europe, and prioritise migrants who have relatives in the UK.^[13]

28. If these were the arrangements, they would result in UK Embassies being deluged with queues of applicants. Such activities by UK Embassies have to be approved by their host countries, but this might not be forthcoming.

29. Labour’s envisaged returns deal appears to have strong similarities to the Dublin Rules outlined above. For example, on 17 September 2023, the party’s elections coordinator Pat McFadden was asked how many non-EU migrants Labour would envisage taking in from the EU. He would not specify a number, adding: “We’re talking about individual cases where a child may have strong family links here. It’s not ‘we will take this many, you take that many.’ That’s not the kind of negotiation we want to have.”

30. In another interview, pressed on the question of numbers he said: “I don’t think you can predict what the numbers will be when they’re growing the way they have been in recent years.”^[14] Elsewhere however, the party has confirmed it could accept a quota of migrants from the EU under a returns agreement.^[15] Statements by a Labour Party immigration adviser seem to confirm that the Dublin mechanism is the model that the party has in mind for a possible returns agreement.^[16]

31. Given the strong asymmetrical bargaining power that the 27-member EU would have vis-à-vis the UK, any returns agreement could well operate in a manner at least as detrimental to the UK’s interests as Dublin, if not worse.

An alternative way forward

32. Given our experience with the Dublin arrangements, it would be much better to avoid going down any road that mirrors them. Instead, a new Labour government should focus on the enforcement of UK laws that now exist. This policy approach could include:

• Tough penalties for illegal entrants
• Prohibition of employment unless and until asylum is granted
• Ending of all asylum hotel accommodation
• Stepping up action against document destruction
• Cancellation of fast stream asylum treatment for certain nationalities. This risks rapid increases in numbers from half a dozen countries
• Seeking stronger return arrangements with relatively safe countries of origin such as India, Tunisia, Morocco and Bangladesh.

33. Some of these measures could be controversial but firm action is needed lest a continuing and probably growing inflow undermines public confidence in the efficacy of the government concerned.

Footnotes

1. Eurostat, Asylum Statistics for 2022, URL: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?titl… ,humanitarian%20reasons%20(10%20%25).
2. For more information on the numbers crossing the Channel illegally, see our Channel Tracker, URL: https://migrationwatchuk.org/channel-crossings-tracker
3. Migratory Map, Frontex, URL: https://www.frontex.europa.eu/what-we-do/monitoring-and-risk-analysis/migratory-map/
4. The Times, 15 August 2023, URL: https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/eu-rejects-new-deal-for-return-of-migrants-7scbvsrw7
5. European Council press release, 8 June 2023, URL: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/06/0… t-on-key-asylum-and-migration-laws/
6. Eurostat, Annual Asylum Statistics, URL: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?titl… ,humanitarian%20reasons%20(10%20%25).
7. Also see our 2019 paper on the operation of the Dublin rules, URL: https://migrationwatchuk.org/briefing-paper/444/transfers-of-… from-the-uk-under-the-dublin-system
8. Daily Mail, October 2016, URL: https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3849646/Mature-years-fea… child-migrants-arriving-Calais.html
9. See our paper, ‘Asylum abuse by adults claiming to be children’, December 2021, URL: https://migrationwatchuk.org/briefing-paper/500/asylum-abuse-by-adults-claiming-to-be-children
10. Home Office statistics, 2015-2020, URL: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/syste… n-regulation-datasets-mar-2020.xlsx
11. Sky News, 17 September 2023, URL: https://news.sky.com/story/keir-starmer-rejects-nonsense-claims-t… ease-asylum-seeker-numbers-12962891
12. Full Fact, 20 September 2023, URL: https://fullfact.org/immigration/labour-forced-to-accept-100000-migrants/
13. The Guardian, 13 September 2023, URL; https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2023/sep/13/starmer-on-tour-solutions-migration-crisis
14. The Guardian, 17 September 2023, URL: https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#inbox/QgrcJHsHkxJtHLcsPstpfrhBwTNDKZVwNDB
15. Sky News, 14 September, 2023, URL: https://news.sky.com/story/labour-confirms-it-would-seek-eu-retur… el-sparking-tory-criticism-12960740
16. The Guardian, 27 September 2023, URL: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/sep/27/starmer-pla… e-boats-why-labour-policy-will-work

• In the first half of 2022, over half of all small boat modern slavery (SBMS) referrals came from Albania. This is five times more than the second largest group (Eritreans).
• In the first half of 2022, already 59 per cent of the total amount of the previous year’s total SBMS referrals had been made.
• The previous record for the most SBMS referrals for a single nationality was the 74 per cent of referrals relating to Iranians in 2019. However, the number of Albanian SBMS referrals in 2022 is five times the Iranian total from 2019.
• It is estimated, based upon data published as part of a Freedom of Information release, that less than half (22-45 per cent) of SBMS referrals ultimately receive a positive decision.

Introduction

1.Since 2018, England’s southern coast has experienced frequent, often daily, crossing of immigrants arriving in the United Kingdom illegally via small boats holding anything from five to fifty or more people. This year, it has emerged that a significant number of these individuals have been making claims of modern slavery. In 2021, there were 8,388 referrals for foreign nationals, of which 23 per cent came via small boat. According to former immigration minister Chris Philp MP, this is done because a low burden of proof makes it difficult for caseworkers to dismiss false claims.^[1]

2.In previous work by Migration Watch UK, it was shown that a certain group, Albanians, coming from a safe country had become the single largest nationality being referred for modern slavery under the National Referral Mechanism.^[2] This paper follows on from that to show the link between those claims and illegal small boat crossings using Freedom of Information data.

Analysis

Table 1: Number of SBMS referrals, 2018-End of June 2022 (Source: Freedom of Information release, December 2022)

3.Table 1 above shows the number of individuals for each year since Channel crossings began in their current form that are identified as potential victims of modern slavery, whether immediately or at a later date (including, for example, if their presence in the UK is not detected upon making landfall).

4.As Table 1 above shows, the number of small boat arrivals to be referred as a potential modern slavery has grown significantly since 2018, although peaking as a proportion of the total in 2020 at 14 per cent of the total crossings that year.

5.By June 2022, the number of SBMS claimants had already reached near-parity with 2020, and is likely to have surpassed the 1,946 of 2021 by the end of the year.

Table 2: Top nationalities among SBMS referrals 2019-End of June 2022 (%)

6.Above, Table 2 shows the national groups being referred the most in each year by percentage (the full list is available in Annex A). 2019 shows only three nationalities due to a low number of SBMS referrals that year.

7.In the first half of 2022 (which had around seven times more crossings than 2019), over half of the SBMS referrals concerned Albanians, a NATO member and aspiring European Union member state. This amounted to 591 referrals for Albanians in the first half of 2022.

8.Over the three and a half years covered by Table 2, Iranian is the only nationality to have been consistently represented in the top five. There were about 613 referrals by Iranians over the period, with the highest number in 2021 when there were 222 referrals.

9.Overall, the 74.2 per cent of referrals by Iranians in 2019, when there were 118 such referrals, is the largest proportion recorded for a single nationality. Although, this occurred in a year when illegal Channel crossings remained relatively low.

Table 3: Number of SBMS referrals to have received Positive Conclusive Grounds

10.Table 3 above shows the number of SBMS referrals arriving in each year to have subsequently received Positive Conclusive Grounds for their claims. That is to say, those who have been acknowledged as victims of modern slavery, including those who may have appealed an initial rejection.

11.2020 was the year in which the most, so far, have received positive conclusions when a high number of Sudanese made the crossings.

12.These figures may not be representative of the final SBMS grant rate because the data do not show the number of cases yet to receive a conclusive grounds decision. However, by balancing out the claims against the overall number of asylum claimants to have had their claims settled, we are able to create an approximate estimate of the total SBMS claimants to have their claims approved in each year as shown in the final row of Table 3 (see the methodology section below for a full explanation of how this estimate has been reached).

13.This indicates that over half of SBMS referrals are rejected or withdrawn, growing to over 75 per cent from the 2020 cohort.

Methodology

14.All the data within this briefing, unless otherwise referenced, comes from a Freedom of Information request submitted on the 17th of August 2022, and fulfilled on the 8th of December 2022. The full data from that request as provided is available in Annex A.

15.The estimate of final Positive Conclusive Ground referrals accompanying Table 3 is reached according to the following. As the asylum application backlog has passed 100,000 and includes applications going back several years,^[3] the data provided is an insufficient hallmark of final approved claims unless it is re-balanced to account for this. As such, the proportion of asylum claims from each year still outstanding as of June 2022 is identified. That proportion is then deducted from the total number of SBMS referrals made that year. This leaves those known to have received a positive conclusion, and those that will have been rejected or withdrawn while excluding completely those which may still be awaiting a final conclusion.

16.Below are the percentages of total asylum claims from each year still awaiting a final grounds decision and the equivalent number of claims to be deducted from the annual totals in line with the above explanation.

Annex A

Freedom of Information Request reference: 71409

1. Amongst migrants arriving in the UK via small boat crossings, what number claimed^[5] to be victims of modern slavery?

2. Please break down the number of migrants coming to the UK via small boat crossings by birth country who have claimed to be victims of modern slavery.

3. Of those migrants arriving in the UK via small boat crossings from 2017 onwards claiming to be victims of modern slavery, how many were judged to be genuine victims of modern slavery.

The figures in table 3 only show cases which have received a Positive Conclusive Grounds decision as of 30th June 2022. It does not show the number of cases yet to receive a Conclusive Grounds decision.

Notes

1. These statistics have been taken from a live operational database. As such, numbers may change as information on that system is updated.
2. Data extracted on 20/10/2022.
3. Data relates to people arriving by small boat crossing who were identified as potential victims of modern slavery.
4. Modern Slavery can happen or be reported at any time, so likely that numbers will increase over time.
5. Small Boat data extracted from the latest publication period as of 30th June 2022.
6. Small Boats data only started being recorded on 1st January 2018.

Footnotes

1. Philp, Chris., End the scourge of bogus modern slavery claims, 16 August 2022, The Daily Telegraph, available at: telegraph.co.uk/news/2022/08/16/end-scourge-bogus-modern-slavery-claims/ (last accessed 13 December 2022).
2. Migration Watch UK., The Abuse Of Modern Slavery Laws By Asylum Seekers, 22 September 2022, available at: migrationwatchuk.org/news/2022/09/20/the-abuse-of-modern-slavery-laws-by-asylum-seekers (last accessed 13 December 2022).
3. Home Office., How many people do we grant protection to?, 24 November 2022, available at: gov.uk/government/statistics/immigration-statistics-year-ending-september-2022/how-many-people-do-we-grant-protection-to#outcomes-of-asylum-applications (last accessed 13 December 2022).
4. Ibid
5. In a subsequent clarification it was made clear that claims/claimants are synonymous with referrals to the National Referral Mechanism.

1. The UK’s asylum grant rate at the initial decision stage was nearly three times that of France (72% compared with 25%) in 2021, a year during which 28,500 people came to the UK from France in boats. The UK grant rate is now a permissive outlier compared with most of Europe and, by September 2022, had risen by more than 40 percentage points since 2016, when just a third of applications were approved at first instance. In contrast, France’s grant rate fell from a third in 2016 to a quarter in 2021. The recent rise in the UK grant rate may be motivating a rising number of boat crossings from France. 94% of arrivals then claim asylum. A sensitive, internal Home Office study found that the decision to come here ‘may reflect an unsuccessful asylum application in France’ and secondary movement from Europe -including from Greece and Germany – is an increasingly important factor^[1]. The Home Office research also noted that social networks and diaspora populations are likely to spur migrants to reach certain destinations. This suggests that if a claimant is rejected in one place, and another (adjacent) country has a higher grant rate then anecdotal information to this effect may spread via social / familial networks, helping to drive illegal immigration.

Figure 1: UK initial asylum / protection grant rate compared with France, 2012-2021. Sources: UK (Home Office asylum data^[2]), France (Eurostat)^[3].Asylum Grants at Initial DecisionUKFrance20122013201420152016201720182019202020210204060802017●

 UK: 32● France: 29

More detail

2. There has been much speculation as to why the number of migrants travelling to the UK in small boats has increased significantly in recent years. A record 45,100 people have been recorded crossing the English Channel illegally in over 1,000 boats since the start of the year to 15 December 2022. This is 1.6 times the 2021’s then-record total (of 28,501) and 151 times the number of people who crossed in 2018.^[4]

3. One reason for the rise in arrivals has clearly been the failure of the government to take early decisive action that would have deterred deadly crossings. This was noted by the former Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration in a damning report on the government’s small boat response published in 2020.^[5]

4. However, a recently revealed sensitive, internal Home Office document has also admitted that ‘secondary movement of those who have already applied for asylum elsewhere in Europe is an important aspect of the UK’s asylum intake’^[6]. It adds that, in terms of hits on the European Union’s Eurodac fingerprint database showing prior asylum applications in other European countries, the UK ranked 5th only behind Germany, France, Italy and Greece. In 2019, for example, there were around 13,000 Eurodac hits for UK asylum applications linked to previous claims in other European countries. In 2019, UK applications linked to prior claims in Europe included 55% of Eritreans, 44% of Afghans, 38% of Sudanese nationals and 27% of Iraqis.^[7]

5. The report also suggests that a decision by small boat migrants to come here ‘may reflect an unsuccessful asylum application in France’. Of particular interest, in light of the fact that more than 11,000 Albanians have crossed by boat to the UK in the past year, the document says that France was ’the top destination country for Albanians’ between 2017 and 2020 (averaging 11,000 per year) despite having a relatively low grant rate (9%). The document adds that Albanians, as well as Sudanese and Afghan nationals (who also account for major small boat nationalities) ‘apply for asylum in France in large numbers’. This surely suggests Albanians are choosing to travel in boats to the UK after being rejected in France.

6. Finally, the document notes that ‘Eurodac data suggests an important portion of Sudanese and Afghan applicants to the UK have previously applied for asylum in France: of the 2019 UK asylum intake, at least a quarter (24%) of Sudanese asylum applicants had previously applied in France as had at least 1 in 10 (9%) Afghan nationals’ ^[8]

How many people have been recorded illegally entering Europe since 2008?

7. In 2016, Migration Watch UK said that the illegal migration crisis which engulfed the EU from 2014-15 onwards would lead to significant secondary movement to the UK should the UK remain part of the EU. Indeed, we suggested that large numbers of irregular migrants to Europe could subsequently arrive in the UK in the years following 2020 should we remain subject to free movement rules^[9]. Now, even despite the UK’s departure of the EU and the end of free movement, it appears that major secondary movement is occurring. The government’s own data suggests that 80,000 people have come here by boat or lorry since the end of the Brexit transition period.^[10]

8. Meanwhile, Frontex data suggest that more than four million people have been recorded entering the EU without permission since 2008. Such arrivals are now at a five-year high, with more than 300,000 such entries during the first 11 months of 2022 – 68% higher than in 2021 when the total was just over 180,000. However, this is much lower than in 2015 when more than a million people entered illegally, an event unprecedented in European history (see Figure 2 below).

Figure 2: Illegal arrivals at the Schengen frontier (Source: Frontex^[11]).Illegal arrivals at the Schengen frontierFrontexTotal200820092010201120122013201420152016201720182019202020212022 (January – November)0500,0001,000,0001,500,0002,000,0002016●

 Total: 505,352

9. The most heavily used route since 2018 has been in the Eastern Mediterranean, between Greece and Turkey. This route was particularly prominent in 2015/16. However, use of that route has fallen from 885,000 in 2015 to just 40,000 this year. In contrast, the most heavily used route in the past year has been the Western Balkan route, with migrants attempting to cross the southern common borders with Greece and Bulgaria before heading north and trying to exit the region largely at the northern common borders of Hungary, Romania, Croatia or with Serbia. 140,000 people have used the route in 2022.

10. The chart shows that, since 2008, the Eastern Mediterranean route represented 39% of arrivals, the Western Balkan route 29% of arrivals. Use of the Central Mediterranean route – between Libya and Italy – has also expanded in recent years, from 24,000 in 2017 to 94,000 in 2022. The latter figure included 50,800 people from Egypt, Tunisia and Bangladesh – all major sources of economic migration.

Figure 3: Use of different illegal routes into the EU, 2008 to 2022.Recorded illegal arrivals into Schengen area (2008 – Nov. 2022): 4.2 millionWest Africa – 1: 61,735Central Mediterranean – 25: 1,031,788Western Mediterranean – 5: 216,289Eastern Mediterranean – 39: 1,646,586Western Balkans – 29: 1,229,196Eastern Borders – 1: 26,921Western Mediterranean – 51646586:216,289

How many people have made asylum claims in Europe since 2008?

11. Eight million people have made asylum applications in the EU since 2008. This compares with around 4 million recorded illegal arrivals. One reason why the asylum figure is so much higher than recorded illegal arrivals is that a number of arrivals may go undetected, while many people also claim asylum after coming to Europe via legal routes e.g. on work or study visas, or Albanians on visa-free travel etc.

Figure 4: Asylum applications in the EU, Eurostat, 2008-2021.Asylum applications in the EUEurostat, 2008-2021200820092010201120122013201420152016201720182019202020210250,000500,000750,0001,000,0001,250,0001,500,000

12. The EU+ recognition rate (for initial applications) was 37% in September 2022,^[12] compared with 77% in the UK^[13]. Recognition rates at the EU level were especially high for Ukrainians, Syrians, Yemenis, Eritreans, Belarusians and Malians. This compared with 77% in the UK in the year to September 2022.

Onward movement to the UK by illegal migrants in the EU

13. Nearly three million asylum applications have been rejected in the EU since 2012. One factor is the scale of illegal economic immigration which the continent is facing. It was Ylva Johansson, the EU home affairs commissioner, who said: “The huge majority applying for asylum are not refugees”. She echoed Frans Timmermans, a vice-president of the European Commission, who said something similar in 2016. A portion of those rejected will have made the onward journey to the UK, with those rejected in France now likely forming a significant share of these. The increase in travel by Albanians to the UK (who claim asylum in France in large numbers according to the government) suggests this is a growing phenomenon. In contrast Home Office data shows that those who previously applied in Germany and Greece accounted for thousands of those subsequently claiming asylum here in 2018/19.

14. The UK’s grant rate of 72% in 2021 at the initial stage was one of the highest in Europe. Meanwhile, France’s was fifth lowest. Why has the UK rate risen so much recently? The government has said that the grant rate ‘increased following changes in the Asylum system service standards. This has led to changes in the way cases are prioritised to help reduce support costs. As a result, more decisions are being made on cases with a higher chance of success.’^[14]

Figure 5: Distribution of first-instance asylum decisions (from non-EU citizens) by outcome, 2021. Source: Migration Watch UK adaptation of Eurostat graphic^[15]

British and French asylum decisions compared

15. A country’s acceptance rate for asylum claims depends upon how it interprets and implements the wording of the Refugee Convention. France interprets it more stringently than the UK as, for instance, does Japan, which takes less than 100 refugees per year (but both are signed up to the Convention)^[16]. Of around three million rejections in the EU between 2012 and 2021, 1.9 million were in just France, Germany and Greece (the three top countries of prior residence for those subsequently coming to the UK).^[17] It is unknown how many rejected asylum claimants in these countries have subsequently travelled to the UK but they are likely to form a large portion of the 84,000 who have come in boats since January 2018.

16. In 2021, France received 120,685 asylum applications, of which 103,790 were applying for the first time. In the same time, France made a total of 137,015 decisions on outstanding asylum applications. As detailed below, of those 137,015 decisions, 33,875 ended in grants of asylum or some other form of leave. This equates to 24 per cent being granted asylum and 76 per cent being refused at initial decision.

17. In contrast, of the 14,532 asylum applications processed in the UK in the same year, 10,468 of them were granted asylum or another form of leave. In contrast to France, this equates to 72 per cent being granted asylum and 28 per cent being refused.

Figure 6: Initial asylum decisions compared in France and UK, 2021

18. Taking the total appeals decisions from 2021, in France of 46,540 appeals, 14,990 resulted in a grant of asylum or other leave equating to 32 per cent of the total. In the UK, of 3,332 appeals made (excluding 564 withdrawn appeals), 1,633 resulted in a grant of asylum or other leave, equating to 49 per cent.

Figure 7: Asylum appeal outcomes compared in France and UK (excluding withdrawn appeals), 2021

19. It may be that the most recent data from the UK is unreliable thanks to a backlog of well over 100,000 applications. With that in mind, in 2019, 52 per cent of applications were approved alongside 44 per cent of appeals. In that year, 25 per cent of applications were initially approved in France alongside 21 per cent of appeals.

Table 1: Grants at initial and appeal stage, UK and France.

20. Despite these differences between 2019 and 2021 grant rates, it is clear that a far greater proportion of asylum claims are being approved in the United Kingdom. This begs the question, why are two countries, both signatories to the 1951 Refugee Convention, accepting such significantly divergent proportions of those applying for asylum in their countries?

21. Is it the case that, rather than the UK being particularly lenient, that France is instead especially strict? Such a suggestion is easily rebutted. The grant rate in Germany in 2021 was 45 per cent, in Italy 42 per cent and in Spain and Sweden it was 29 per cent. Regardless of minor differences that may be symptoms of the UK backlog, the country still approves far more asylum claims than many other countries.

How do the UK and French asylum systems differ?

22. There are a few clear differences between the asylum systems in France and the UK, some relatively minor and others more pronounced.The process by which asylum interview recordings are handled differ significantly. In the UK, recordings are provided as soon as possible. In contrast, in France audio recordings generally are not provided until a claim is rejected and an appeal lodged, and even then can only be listened to in a specific government office in Fontenay-Sous-Blois. While minor might on the face of it, this means asylum seekers cannot check their wording in the interview which could later make the difference between a grant or a rejection.

23. In the UK, it is the applicant who has the burden of establishing the veracity of his/her claim and the accuracy of the facts on which the refugee claim is based. The burden of proving the asylum claim lies on the person seeking asylum, but the standard of proof is relatively low. The Home Office is meant to assess whether there is a “reasonable degree of likelihood” the person seeking asylum is telling the truth, also described as a “real possibility” or “real risk”. ‘Reasonable degree of likelihood’ is less than the civil standard of ‘the balance of probabilities’ (i.e. ‘more likely than not’).’^[18] Indeed, as the government admitted in 2021, ‘under current case law the standard to which a claim must be assessed is low’.

24. The Nationality and Borders Act 2022 raises the standard of proof for which an asylum seeker must satisfy for certain elements of the test of whether they face a ‘well founded fear of persecution’ in their place of origin.^[19] However, only the first part of the new 2-limb test (the characteristic test) is assessed to the higher balance of probabilities standard, while the vital second stage (the likelihood of persecution element) is still assessed to the lower ‘reasonable degree of likelihood’ standard.^[20]

25. Decision-makers are required to take into account a claimant’s conduct when applying the benefit of the doubt to unsubstantiated material facts. ^[21] However, lying is common in asylum applications and Home Office staff are even told that, if an applicant tells untruths, it does not mean that their claim for protection should be rejected. As Home Office asylum guidance has stated: “A claimant’s testimony may include lies or exaggerations for a variety of reasons, not all of which need reflect adversely on other areas.. Falsehoods… do not mean that everything the claimant has said must be dismissed as unreliable.”

26. In contrast, the French Office for the Protection of refugees and stateless persons (Ofpra) and the National Court of Asylum (CNDA – the specialised administrative court handling appeals on asylum decisions) interpret the Geneva Convention more restrictively than the UK. A 2018 bill in France shortened asylum application deadlines – shortening the time asylum seekers have to submit an application after entering France from 120 to 90 days, and made changes to speed up the processing of claims.^[22]

27. This more rigorous fast-track procedure expedites claims by asylum seekers under a number of certain other conditions which are listed below:

• Automatic fast-tracking if the asylum seeker originates from a safe country or a prior application is not inadmissible (having, for example, withdrawn a claim in the past).
• Refusal to be fingerprinted
• The presentation of false identity documents
• Not having made a claim within 90 days of entering France
• Made a claim in order to prevent or obstruct a removal order
• The claimant presents serious threat to public order, safety or national security.

28. The UK did have a Detained Fast Track procedure whereby it was decided the claim could be decided quickly, but this has been suspended since 2015. Although the Nationality and Borders Act does provide for an expedited detailed appeals procedure, the present UK fast-track arrangements do not compare with France’s in their effectiveness at dealing with bogus claims.

29. There are also Non-Suspensive Appeals in the UK, whereby, the appellant can be returned to their country while an appeal takes place. This can happen when the claim is clearly unfounded, or their home country is considered safe. Generally speaking, however, very few UK claims are non-suspensive. In contrast, in France appeals that have resulted from an inadmissibility decision (such as making their claim after 90 days in-country) or ones made from detention are not suspensive and mean the appellant can be issued an expulsion order immediately with the appeal decision continuing despite their potential deportation.

30. The advantage of this accelerated procedure is that it allows French authorities to expedite cases that are likely to be unfounded and expel those with no right to refuge much more quickly than would otherwise be the case. This makes France a less appealing destination for those who would try to gain refuge illegitimately as their expulsion is likely to happen sooner. It also means that taxpayers’ money is not being spent on those with frivolous applications any longer than necessary.

31. Furthermore, the 90 day window in France, mentioned at paragraph 26 and 27 above, has the duel effect of encouraging claims to be made quickly while ensuring any who apply for asylum after that period are penalised for failing to do so.

Asylum handouts

32. The UK is presently spending more than £2 billion per year on asylum support including accommodation in more than 400 hotels, some of which are four-star establishments. The UK and France offer seemingly similar packages of support to asylum seekers who are awaiting the processing of their claim, although there are distinct differences. However, those on section 95 support (the main form of UK support for pending and failed claimants with children) are given cash cards (called ASPEN cards) with which to withdraw money (about £40 per week per person). The most recently available information shows that the number of Aspen Cards in use in the UK had risen from 23,800 in Q2 2017 to 41,274 in Q1 2021. However, the rules regarding cash withdrawals by people awaiting an asylum decision are also stricter in France – claimants in France also get about £40 per week to support themselves (as here) but cannot withdraw it as cash as people can here using Aspen Cards.

33. The UK government also suggested that the differential rates by which the UK and France provide accommodation to asylum seekers may be one of the root causes of people choosing to leave the safe country of France and cross the Channel to claim asylum here. In the sensitive internal document referred to above, the Home Office noted that only 52% of eligible asylum seekers were accommodated in housing at the end of 2019: “Many asylum seekers are forced to live in informal makeshift camps in the absence of access to official accommodation.”^[23]

Summary

• In 2022, just 47 per cent of UK-based medicine applicants were accepted, in contrast to 80 per cent of students across all courses.
• In 2022, for the first time, the number of overseas doctors joining NHS England outnumbered the number of British medical students enrolled.
• About half of all doctors to join the NHS in 2022 were foreign nationals, while 63 per cent of new doctor registrations gained their qualification abroad.
• At least 1,500 more people per year could be trained as doctors if the Government funded medical places in line with the total 2021 intake levels.
• Healthcare visas, issued for all medical and care occupations and including dependents, represented almost 90 per cent of all long-term sponsored work visas granted in 2022, and over half of all work visas when not considering dependants.^[24]

Introduction

1. Medicine is amongst the UK’s most popular higher education course categories attracting tens of thousands of applicants every year who compete for 7,500 limited places in England and around 1,500 places in the rest of the UK.

2. However, the number of places has not kept up with the increasing demand for doctors within the NHS. As a result, the government have stepped up recruitment of doctors from abroad which has led to a significant increase in the proportion of overseas-trained doctors working for the NHS.

3. This briefing will consider: the number of UK and foreign medicine graduates; what impact this has on the NHS; and what can be done to increase the number of UK-trained doctors and reduce the increasing reliance on recruiting overseas.

Analysis

4. Between 2016 and 2022, an average of 37 per cent of Hospital and Community Health Services (HCHS^[25]) doctors have come from overseas each year. In 2021 and 2022, this figure rose to 44 per cent.

Table 1: HCHS doctors by nationality joining the NHS, year ending December 2020-2022, year ending June 2016-2019^[26]

5. This increase in overseas doctors joining the NHS was clearly deliberate. Skilled workers, including doctors from outside the EU/EEA, used to be capped at 20,700 per year. In 2018, however, following lobbying from various groups, including former Health and Social Care Secretary Jeremy Hunt and former Home Secretary Sajid Javid^[27], doctors were removed from the work permit cap of that time.^[28] Since then the number of doctors coming from outside the UK or EU/EEA has increased by X per cent, from 4,186 in 2018 to June to X,XXX in 2022 to December.

6. An alternative set of figures, however, indicates the proportion of new doctors who trained overseas is higher still. Looking at the number of first registration doctor applications granted by the General Medical Council in 2022, for instance, shows that 63 per cent of applications to register were granted to individuals who gained their Primary Medical Qualification outside of the United Kingdom.^[29] Unlike NHS joining figures as detailed in Table 1, this includes local General Practitioners (GPs), doctors working for private healthcare companies and those potentially not currently practicing at all. It will also involve UK nationals who gained their accreditation abroad.

7. Comparison of the number of overseas doctors recruited each year (see Figure 1 below) alongside the number of students enrolling onto medical training shows that in almost any given year a higher number of overseas doctors are being recruited than UK students are being accepted for training. Although not strictly comparable, due to student data being for the year ending August while the recruitment data is for the year ending June, this is nonetheless highly indicative of the trend of overseas recruitment outstripping domestic education.

Figure 1: Comparison of England-domiciled medical students enrolled^[30] and overseas HCHS doctors joining the NHS in England, 2016-2022.^[31]Comparison of England-domiciled medical students enrolled and overseas HCHS doctorsjoining the NHS in England, 2016-2022.English students enrolled, year ending AugustOverseas doctors joining, year ending JuneOverseas doctors joining, year ending December201620172018201920202021202202,5005,0007,50010,00012,50015,0002019●

 English students enrolled, year ending August: 6,885● Overseas doctors joining, year ending June: 8,125

8. The growing tendency to recruit overseas largely stems from a failure both to train a sufficient number of doctors in the UK and to anticipate the increased demand resulting from a burgeoning population driven by immigration. According to the British Medical Association (BMA) the UK is short of 46,300 doctors in England alone.^[32] Other analyses have identified a need for between 5,000 and 11,000 extra medical trainees per year to close the shortfall.^[33],^[34]

Figure 2: Outcomes for UK-based applicants of medicine courses 2019-2022 – UCAS^[35]Percentage (%)Outcomes for UK-based applicants of medicine courses 2019-2022UCASApplicationsAcceptancesProportion of accepted medicine applicantsProportion of accepted applicants (all courses)201920202021202205,00010,00015,00020,00002550751002021●

 Applications: 19,000● Acceptances: 10,095● Proportion of accepted medicine applicants: 53.1● Proportion of accepted applicants (all courses): 81.5

9. Notwithstanding the greater need, large numbers of would-be medical students are being turned away every year from medical courses for which they may be qualified, yet for whom limited capacity allows no space. In 2022, there were 19,235 UK applicants to study general medicine, a 25 per cent increase on 2020. Of these, 9,050 were accepted onto courses while 10,185 were turned away.

10. This has seen the acceptance rate plunge from 63 to 47 per cent in the space of just two years.

11. The high rejection rate is the result of the funding cap on government-funded medical training places which, in 2017, the government said cost £165,000 each (excluding student loans).^[36] The official position is that numbers are capped to maintain high standards within funding constraints.^[37] This policy leaves high numbers of students without a place at a medical school. As Consultant Surgeon J Meirion Thomas has said: “Tens of thousands of students with the required A-level grades and aptitude have failed to gain entry to our medical schools because places are strictly limited by cost.”^[38]

12. One Member of Parliament, Anthony Browne MP, recently remarked that the majority of Bulgarian-trained doctors in Britain are not actually Bulgarian, but British graduates who had no option but to get training abroad thanks to the low training capacity.^[39]

13. Table 2 below shows the total number of medical and dental students enrolled by domicile over the past decade. It shows how gradually the number of students paying ‘Home’ fees (including EU students prior to 2017-18), who are subsidised by the government, have increased very slowly over time with a temporary uplift from 2020-21 to 2021-22. It also indicates the upper limit of how many medical students can be trained in current facilities. Figure 2 below, displays the total of students paying Home fees.

Table 2: Total medical students enrolled by fee status and domicile, 2012-2022^[40]

14. Between 2018 and 2020, the cap in England permanently rose by 25 per cent from 6,000 to 7,500.^[41] However, this was partly due to a fall in students from Europe after the UK’s departure from the EU (who were previously treated the same as British students). In 2020 and 2021 the cap was temporarily increased further to over 9,000, only to be re-imposed at 7,500 in in 2022. Commenting, the then-Education Secretary James Cleverly initially blamed the difficulty of increasing capacity before later admitting that funding was the main issue.^[42]

Figure 3: Total no. of UK-domiciled medical students enrolled in English medical schools 2012-23^[43]Total no. of UK-domiciled medical students enrolled in English medical schools 2012-23England2012-132013-142014-152015-162016-172017-182018-192019-202020-212021-222022-234,0005,0006,0007,0008,0002018-19●

 England: 6,120

15. As may be inferred from what happened in 2020-21 and 2021-22 when 800-1,000 more places were funded each year than 2019-20, it turned out that training capacity was actually higher than funding had previously allowed. In 2021-22, for example, the cap on the number of British students was raised and medical schools ran at (what appears to be) capacity. That medical schools were able to take on 1,000 more students without apparent difficulty indicates that real capacity was and is greater than funded capacity. In 2021-22, across the UK, there were a total of 9,535 British students enrolled on medical courses, as well as 965 overseas students. If the cap were to be permanently raised to this level of capacity, that would result in 590 more British students enrolled this year.

16. If, in addition, places allotted to overseas students were allocated instead to British students, that would mean approximately a total of 1,500 more places for ‘Home’ students per year. This is a low-end estimate as there may yet be further unidentified excess capacity, such as at the new Chester University Medical School whose 50-100 places, all designated to overseas students,^[44] are not included in Office for Students targets for 2022-23.^[45]

17. The same is true for similar new establishments at Worcester and Brunel universities, the latter of which will train over a hundred international medical students.^[46] A notable irony exists in the case of Three Counties Medical School at the University of Worcester in having been founded with the explicit intention of addressing local medical needs.^[47] Despite this, like many universities they have been strictly ordered by government not to train more/any UK-born medical students.^[48]

18. Such an approach would be entirely in line with the consensus reached outside government. Raising the cap and trying to train an adequate number of UK-based doctors is agreed with by the Royal College of Physicians,^[49] the British Medical Association^[50] and the Migration Advisory Committee,^[51] the latter having said: “[We have] consistently emphasised the need to raise British human capital and thereby lessen employer dependence on immigration.”

Other areas impacting the amount of doctors

19. A further policy change that would increase the supply of doctors, thus reducing the need for additional doctors from overseas, would be to end the ‘pension tax trap’ for doctors.^[52] At present, because the pensions lifetime allowance has been frozen, many doctors are hitting the annual cap on pension contributions and finding that their tax bill is increased as a result, in some cases to the extent that they are effectively not paid for overtime shifts. This penalises certain levels of work and so has led to doctors working fewer hours or retiring altogether.

20. The government has sought to address this in the Spring Budget, which is scrapping the lifetime allowance, to encourage workers, particularly doctors, to work up to the retirement age.

21. An additional area of contention is whether workforce management is being hampered by the differing work preferences of male and female doctors. The proportion of female doctors to male doctors have reversed in recent decades. For example, just 27 per cent of registered doctors aged over 60 are women, while in the 25-29 age group it is 56 per cent.^[53] According to one surgeon, this creates problems in the workforce as female doctors are less likely to specialise and prefer roles with a better work-life balance.^[54] Data from the Office for Students shows that 62 per cent of medical students enrolled in 2022-23 are female.^[55]Conclusion

19. This paper shows that despite tens of thousands of UK medical applicants being turned away every year and widespread agreement that the UK has a significant doctors’ shortage, Britain has failed to adequately increase funding for medical places. This has left the NHS with little immediate option but to attract doctors from poorer countries with greater health needs. At the same time, harmful taxation policies unintentionally encouraged some doctors to reduce their working hours and others to retire early. By scrapping these tax measures and funding medical training places to capacity, the UK could make significant progress towards addressing the doctors’ shortage.

Dublin Regulation

34. Being a member of the European Union and a signatory to the Dublin Regulation, France has the right to transfer asylum seekers to the EU member state found responsible for relevant asylum seekers. Although occasional landings by boat have been made in France, these are rare (compared with Italy and Greece). This may contribute to the fact that France typically is a net transferer of asylum seekers under the Dublin Regulation.

35. In 2021, for instance, of the 4,157 total inbound and outbound transfers to/from France, 75 per cent of them were outbound.^[56] It is common to blame absence from the Dublin Regulation since leaving the European Union for the UK’s failure to return rejected asylum seekers and illegal immigrants. However, as data shows^[57], the UK’s use of the Dublin Regulation to remove asylum claimants to the first country of entry was never as effective as France’s. In the latter years of Britain’s EU membership, the UK generally accepted more transfers inwards than it sent outwards.

Conclusion

36. France has one of the lowest asylum grant rates amongst EU member states while the UK has one of the highest grant rates in Europe. France’s rate at the initial decision stage has fallen since 2016 while the UK’s has risen significantly. The latter now stands at 77%, with the final grant rate after appeal being even higher.

37. Given the growing pressure of secondary migration by asylum seekers in Europe, including 2.9 million people asylum rejects in EU countries since 2012 (not including the UK) – of which there have been 680,000 in France since 2012 – there is a strong likelihood that the significant recent increase in asylum grant rates in the UK has added to the powerful magnetising effect of UK asylum and enforcement chaos, drawing more and more people across the English Channel. This factor may have boosted the likelihood of migrants being enticed to take dangerous and indeed deadly dinghy voyages, in the process paying criminal smugglers, risking the lives of children and breaking UK laws to get here. In the midst of overwhelmed services and an increasingly costly asylum system that is riddled with backlogs and abuse, the UK government must urgently address this worsening problem by toughening up UK asylum procedures to restore common sense and root out and deter more bogus claims, and align our rules more closely with the European norm.

Footnotes

1. Home Office, ‘International asylum comparisons report’, September 2020, URL: https://freemovement.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Annex-A-So… ct-on-asylum-migration-journeys.pdf
2. Home Office, Asylum Outcome Analysis, September 2022, URL: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/syste… applications-datasets-jun-2022.xlsx
3. Eurostat, 2012-2021. URL: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/migr_asydcfsta/default/table?lang=en
4. Migration Watch UK, Channel Tracking Station, URL: https://migrationwatchuk.org/news/2020/05/11/arrivals-via-dea… hannel-crossing-from-safe-countries
5. Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration, ‘An inspection of the Home Office’s response to in-country clandestine arrivals (‘lorry drops’) and to irregular migrants arriving via ‘small boats’, 2020, URL: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/syste… ants_arriving_via__small_boats_.pdf Also see our summary of the report here: https://migrationwatchuk.org/news/2020/12/10/the-type-of-report-after-which-heads-should-roll
6. Home Office, ‘International asylum comparisons’, 2020.
7. Home Office, ‘International asylum comparisons’, 2020.
8. Home Office, ‘International asylum comparisons’, 2020.
9. Migration Watch UK, ‘The Refugee and Migrant Crisis in the EU – The Potential Implications for the UK’, May 2016, URL: https://migrationwatchuk.org/briefing-paper/382
10. Data taken from Home Office, Irregular Migration in year to September 2022, in combination with Migration Watch UK Channel Tracker. URL: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/syste… bles-year-ending-september-2022.ods
11. Frontex data compiled from ‘migratory map’ and associated spreadsheet, URL: https://frontex.europa.eu/we-know/migratory-map/
12. European Union Agency for Asylum, September 2022, URL: https://euaa.europa.eu/latest-asylum-trends-asylum
13. Home Office asylum data, year to September 2022.
14. Home Office, ‘International asylum comparisons’, 2020.
15. Eurostat, URL: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?titl… itizens)_by_outcome,_2021_(%25).png
16. Japan granted refugee status to a record 74 individuals in 2021, nearly half of whom had fled the military coup in Myanmar that year. https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/14621141 In contrast, the UK offered protection, in the form of asylum, humanitarian protection, alternative forms of leave and resettlement, to 14,734 people (including dependants) in 2021, in addition to providing a direct immigration route to around 90,000 refugees fleeing Hong Kong and Afghanistan.
17. Eurostat, 2012-2021. URL: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/migr_asydcfsta/default/table?lang=en
18. Home Office guidance on testing asylum credibility, p. 2011, URL: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/syste… IBILITY_AND_REFUGEE_STATUS_V9_0.pdf
19. The relevant provision is at s.32 of the new legislation – Article 1(A)(2): well-founded fear.
20. Nationality and Borders Bill Explanatory Note, p.41. URL: https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/cbill/58-02/0141/en/210141en.pdf
21. There is a general requirement under section 8(1) of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc) Act 2004 (as specified in Paragraph 339N of the Immigration Rules) to take into account as damaging to the claimant’s credibility any behaviour that appears to have been intended to conceal information, mislead, or to obstruct the resolution of the claim. That applies to immigration-related conduct on the part of the claimant prior to making the asylum claim as well as during it. A person’s ‘general credibility’ is considered to be potentially damaged by behaviour that falls within the scope of s.8.
22. BBC News report, April 2018, URL: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-43860880
23. Home Office, ‘International asylum comparisons’, 2020.
24. Home Office, Why do people come to the UK? To work, 23 February 2023, https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/immigration-system-stati… hy-do-people-come-to-the-uk-to-work (last accessed 24 March 2023).
25. HCHS is the employment category used for doctors working for the NHS and thus excludes doctors who are not employed by the NHS, such as those working in private healthcare or as contractors like local GPs.
26. 2022 data: NHS Digital, NHS Workforce Statistics – December 2022, 6 April 2023, https://digital.nhs.uk/data-and-information/publications/statisti… /nhs-workforce-statistics/june-2022 (last accessed 6 April 2023). 2021 data: NHS Digital, NHS Workforce Statistics – June 2021, 30 September 2021, https://digital.nhs.uk/data-and-information/publications/statisti… /nhs-workforce-statistics/june-2021 (last accessed 24 March 2023). 2016-2020 data: NHS Digital, Freedom of information request NIC-409137-W1S2H, 10 February 2022, https://digital.nhs.uk/about-nhs-digital/contact-us/freedom-of-in… nformation-request-nic-409137-w1s2h (last accessed 24 March 2023).
27. Campbell, Denis, The Guardian, Government to relax immigration rules on overseas doctors, 12 June 2018, https://theguardian.com/society/2018/jun/12/government-relax-immigration-rules-overseas-doctors (last accessed 12 September 2022).
28. UKVI; Home Office, Doctors and nurses to be taken out of Tier 2 visa cap, 15 June 2018, https://theguardian.com/society/2018/jun/12/government-relax-immigration-rules-overseas-doctors (last accessed 12 September 2022).
29. This data noted that in 2022, 7,819 first registration applications were granted to individuals whose qualification was gained in the UK, 2,033 in the EEA and 11,403 International Medical Graduates. General Medical Council, private email, 2023.
30. Office for Students, 2023, Health education funding, https://officeforstudents.org.uk/advice-and-guidance/funding-for-providers/health-education-funding/ (last accessed 1 February 2023).
31. NHS Digital
32. British Medical Association, NHS medical staffing data analysis, https://bma.org.uk/advice-and-support/nhs-delivery-and-workforce/… /nhs-medical-staffing-data-analysis (last accessed 12 September 2022).
33. British Medical Journal, England needs 11,000 more medical student places a year, say doctors’ leaders, 14 May 2022, https://bmj.com/content/377/bmj.o1210 (last accessed 12 September 2022).
34. Woolcock, Nicola, The Times, NHS ‘needs 5,000 more medical students’, 20 October 2021, https://thetimes.co.uk/article/nhs-in-need-of-5-000-more-medical-students-xg6h7psgr (last accessed 12 September 2022).
35. UCAS, UCAS undergraduate sector-level end of cycle data resources 2022, https://ucas.com/data-and-analysis/undergraduate-statistics-and-r… level-end-cycle-data-resources-2022 (last accessed 24 March 2023).
36. Department of Health, Expansion of Undergraduate Medical Education, March 2017, p.22.
37. Woolcock, Nicola., The Times, A-level results: Cap on medicine degrees may deny even A* candidates, https://thetimes.co.uk/article/a-level-results-cap-on-medicine-de… ay-deny-even-a-candidates-dvzs8prjx (last accessed 13 September 2022).
38. Thomas, J. Meirion, The Telegraph, We have become too reliant on foreign doctors, 2 January 2022, https://telegraph.co.uk/news/2022/01/02/have-become-reliant-foreign-doctors/ (last accessed 24 March 2023).
39. Hansard, Doctor training, 17 January 2023, hansard. https://parliament.uk/Commons/2023-01-17/debates/F6AFE6A8-00A8-4DAC-9A25-880C66969A87/DoctorTraining (last accessed 1 February 2023).
40. Office for Students, 2022.
41. Triggle, Nick, BBC, Student doctor numbers to rise by 25%, https://bbc.co.uk/news/health-37546360 (last accessed 12 September 2022)
42. Ibid
43. Office for Students, 2023.
44. Fazackerley, Anna, The Guardian, 2022 hardest year ‘in living memory’ to enter UK medical school, https://theguardian.com/education/2022/jun/22/2022-hardest-year-i… g-memory-to-enter-uk-medical-school (last accessed 30 September 2022).
45. Office for Students.
46. Griffiths, Sian; Yorke, Harry, British students locked out of new medical schools, The Times, 4 December 2022, https://thetimes.co.uk/article/british-students-locked-out-of-new-medical-schools-t86lh897v (last accessed 7 December 2022).
47. University of Worcester, Welcome to University of Worcester the Three Counties Medical School, p.8.
48. Smyth, Chris, Stop training so many doctors, universities told, The Times, 25 January 2023, https://thetimes.co.uk/article/stop-training-so-many-doctors-universities-told-xd3p3p37q (last accessed 2 February 2023).
49. Royal College of Physicians, Migration Advisory Committee: response to the call for evidence from the RCP, https://rcplondon.ac.uk/guidelines-policy/migration-advisory-committee-response-call-evidence-rcp (accessed 29 September 2022).
50. Migration Advisory Committee, Skilled Shortage Sensible, February 2013, p.58.
51. Migration Advisory Committee, Work Immigration and the Labour Market, July 2016, p.32.
52. British Medical Association, End the pension tax trap for doctors, https://www.bma.org.uk/pay-and-contracts/pensions/pensions-campai… nd-the-pension-tax-trap-for-doctors (last accessed 26 September 2022).
53. General Medical Council, Key stats from the medical register, https://data.gmc-uk.org/gmcdata/home/#/reports/The Register/Stats/report (last accessed 6 December 2022).
54. Thomas, J. Meirion, Why having so many women doctors is hurting the NHS, https://dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-2532461/Why-having-women-d… erful-argument-leading-surgeon.html (last accessed 6 December 2022).
55. Office for Students, 2023.
56. Statistics on countries responsible for asylum applications (Dublin Regulation) – Statistics Explained (europa.eu)
57. MW444 : Transfers of asylum seekers from the UK under the Dublin system | Migration Watch UK

1. Tens of thousands of asylum claimants are staying in approximately 200 hotels, alongside an unknown number in hostels. With asylum-related hotel provision rising amidst a mounting case backlog and record dinghy crossings, the cost of such hotel accommodation to taxpayers is nearly £1.3 billion per year – over a billion more than the forecast of up to £70 million that was issued by the government in March 2021. The result is that private sector providers are now being handed ever-ballooning amounts of taxpayer money – over and above even their substantial 2019 contracted amounts – to place asylum seekers into hotels, at an estimated cost of nearly £4,300 per asylum seeker per month. That is 1.5 times the average monthly pay for an NHS nurse (£2,782).

Details

2. As the arrival of cross-Channel dinghies has hit new record levels during the summer of 2022 (29,900 people had been reported crossing so far in 2022, as of 21st September) the UK’s asylum system faces unprecedented strain with a case backlog of 138,000, including nearly 40,000 failed claimants subject to removal.^[1] 94% of boat arrivals claim asylum.^[2] Conversely, six in ten asylum applicants enter the UK illegally.^[3] Meanwhile the number of people awaiting an initial decision on their claim has now climbed to more than 100,000 (101,426) – five times the number in the first quarter of 2017 – and more than 40,500 applicants have been waiting a year or more for their case to be heard.

Figure 1: Backlog of asylum claimants awaiting an initial decision – Home Office.Backlog of asylum claimants awaiting an initial decisionHome OfficeAsylum claimants waiting initial decisionOf which: Up to 12 monthsOf which: 12 months+2016 Q42017 Q12017 Q22017 Q32017 Q42018 Q12018 Q22018 Q32018 Q42019 Q12019 Q22019 Q32019 Q42020 Q12020 Q22020 Q32020 Q42021 Q12021 Q22021 Q32021 Q42022 Q12022 Q2025,00050,00075,000100,000125,0002017 Q3●

 Asylum claimants waiting initial decision: 21,327● Of which: Up to 12 months: 14,357● Of which: 12 months+: 6,970

3. This soaring asylum backlog – amidst rising boat crossings after which 94% of those arriving lodge an asylum claim^[4] – means an ever-expanding burden on the taxpayer both for processing cases and for cash payments / accommodation for asylum seekers while their applications are dealt with. Statistics released by the Home Office in August 2022 showed there to be a record of more than 116,000 people, including an estimated tens of thousands of failed asylum claimants^[5], who are receiving taxpayer-funded handouts. Of these, nearly 80,000 are understood to be housed in longer-term dispersal accommodation^[6] (with an estimated cost of more than £550 million per year), usually in flats around the country.^[7] This portion of accommodation provision is separate from and in addition to asylum hotel costs.

Figure 2: Asylum claimants receiving all taxpayer-funded support under Ss. 4, 95 and 98 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999.Asylum claimants receiving taxpayer-funded supportAsylum claimants receiving taxpayer-funded handouts30-Jun-1430-Jun-1530-Jun-1630-Jun-1730-Jun-1830-Jun-1930-Jun-2030-Jun-2130-Jun-22025,00050,00075,000100,000125,000

4. In 2019 (coincidentally the year that boat crossings started to reach significant numbers for the first time ever) the government signed seven regional contracts with private sector companies for asylum accommodation and transport. These contracts have a combined value of more than £4.5 billion over 10 years. However, the cost of providing hotel accommodation to asylum seekers goes well over and above these contracted costs.

5. A rapidly rising number of outstanding cases are still awaiting an initial decision – something that was initially linked to the Covid pandemic but which is increasingly connected with the rising number of illegal dinghy arrivals. In the midst of this (with the former Home Secretary stating last year that ‘we don’t have the infrastructure and accommodation’) an increasing number of people are being placed in hotels as a stop-gap until longer-term accommodation can be found.

6. Figure 3 shows that the number of asylum seekers in hotels has increased by 25-fold in the space of just two years, from 1,000 in late 2019/early 2020 to 25,000 in February 2022. According to a July 2022 report, 378 people had been in hotel rooms for a year and 2,826 for more than six months. In the last three months of 2021 the Home Office was using 207 hotels to house asylum seekers. In the last quarter of 2019 just 24 hotels were being used.^[8]

Figure 3. Number of people housed in hotels since the start of 2020 (Source: Home Office releases as well as information from the National Audit Office and Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration or ICIBINumber of people housed in hotels since the start of 2020Feb-20Aug-20Nov-20Jan-21May-21Jul-21Nov-21Feb-2205,00010,00015,00020,00025,00030,000Jan-21●

 Asylum claimants in hotels: 10,100

7. We stress that this is likely to have increased further since then, as more than 28,000 people have arrived in boats since just the end of February 2022. One sign of a potential rise is the number of people who the Home Office says were receiving Section 98 support as of June 2022. Provision of temporary support and accommodation to asylum seekers (that is before they are placed into longer-term dispersed accommodation) is stipulated in Section 98 of the Immigration Act 1999. The latest data, depicted in Figure 4, show there were 33,300 recipients in June 2022, although an unknown portion of these were in hotels.^[9] We call on the government to release clear and comprehensive data regarding asylum hotel costs.

Figure 4: Asylum claimants receiving Section 98 support under the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 – Home Office data, August 2022. Data for each year is as at end of June.Asylum claimants receiving Section 98 support under the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999Home Office30-Jun-1830-Jun-1930-Jun-2030-Jun-2130-Jun-22010,00020,00030,00040,00030-Jun-20●

 Asylum seekers receiving support under Section 98 Immigration and Asylum Act 1999: 5,444

Asylum hotel costs are ‘eye-watering’, say border watchdog and government officials

8. The government forecast in March 2021 that the cost of hotel provision in the year 2021-22 would be between £40 million and £70 million. ^[10]

9. Yet the costs seem to have exploded since then as reported illegal immigration by boat rose from 1,850 in 2019 to 8,500 in 2020 to 28,500 in 2021 and now 30,000 in 2022 so far. Just under 70,000 people have arrived illegally by small boat since the start of 2018.^[11] The Independent Borders Watchdog (also known as the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration or ICIBI) has said that the cost of putting up asylum-seekers in hotels is ‘eye-wateringly expensive’. He quoted a government official who noted that “hotels are costing £70,000 an hour 24 hours a day, over and above contract – well over budget”^[12].

10. If applied to 365 days in a year, this suggests a cost of hotel provision in late 2021 of £613 million per annum. Dividing the total by 21,000 people in hotels at the time, this leads to a calculation of the cost of hotel provision of £2,433 per asylum seeker per month.

11. However, more recently the government stated that hotel accommodation for asylum claimants was costing £3.5 million per day.^[13] This would total nearly £1.3 billion per year. As noted above, given the arrival of tens of thousands in boats since then, the costs are likely to have increased since then unless the government has improved its performance at moving people out of hotels and into dispersed accommodation – something we are not optimistic about given damning observations made on this topic by the ICIBI in a report issued earlier this year.^[14]

12. This £1.3 billion annual cost is over £1 billion more than the £70 million per year maximum that the government forecast in March 2021.

13. We can also calculate the most recent cost of hotel provision per asylum seeker per month.^[15] To derive this figure, we take the £1.3 billion total cost released by the government in February 2022 and divide it by 25,000 people receiving the provision at that time. The total is £51,100 per year. We then divided it by 12 months. This gives a total of £4,258 per asylum seeker per month, £1,825 more than in late 2021.

Limitations of the data

14. There are a number of limitations in the available statistics. The numbers in hotels are only released in inconsistent fashion by the government sporadically when they are faced with intermittent pressure from parliamentarians or the media. This is not an optimal situation. Indeed, the public have not been provided an official total for the number of asylum claimants housed in hotels for eight months. Thus, we are forced to rely on incomplete and unclear figures relating to section 98 provision. Such figures do not isolate the number in hotels, nor do they provide any indication of the current cost to taxpayers. We would welcome much more complete statistics on the number of asylum-seekers in hotels. Additionally, given the costs involved, such data – including numbers which transparently outline the cost impact – should be published by the government on a regular basis.

Conclusions

15. The government’s continued failure to stop the flow of illegal boats across the English Channel means that more and more taxpayer money is being handed to private accommodation providers that are being paid over and above contract to place migrants in hotels throughout the country, including in luxury, four-star resorts. The cost to taxpayers of providing such hotel accommodation is now around £1.3 billion per year, an astounding increase of more than £1 billion since a forecast made by the government in March 2021. It has likely increased by a substantial margin since then, although we await statistical confirmation of the cost from the government. 16. With the public facing a worsening cost of living crisis and exploding energy bills, it is unacceptable for such significant amounts of public funds to be diverted to providing hotel accommodation on this scale, especially given that this money is being diverted to deal with pressures resulting from a crisis of illegal immigration that was completely avoidable and, which the ICIBI has noted, would not have reached such a scale with more decisive action from the authorities earlier on. Both to save taxpayer money and to cut criminality, it is well past time for the borders to be secured and for the boats to be stopped.

Footnotes

1. Immigration protection data, Home Office, Q2, 2022, published August 2022, URL: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/immigration-and-protection-data-q2-2022
2. Home Office statistics on irregular migration published in August 2022, URL: https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/irregular-migration-to-t… ion-to-the-uk-year-ending-june-2022
3. In the year to September 2019, 62% of asylum claims were made by those entering the UK illegally. Home Office, ‘New Plan for Immigration’, March 2021, p. 8, URL: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/syste… overeign_Borders_Web_Accessible.pdf
4. Ibid.
5. Migration Watch UK analysis, ‘Estimated Cost Of Housing And Payments For Failed Asylum Claimants’, October 2020, URL: https://migrationwatchuk.org/news/2020/10/03/cost-of-housing-… s-estimated-at-130-million-per-year
6. The Home Office has a statutory obligation to provide eligible asylum seekers with accommodation and subsistence support whilst their application is being considered. This is in accordance with the immigration and Asylum Act 1999, the Asylum Support Regulations 2000, the Asylum Seekers (Reception Conditions) Regulations 2005, the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 and the Immigration Act 2016.
7. This figure included, as at June 2022, 72,564 people housed under s.95 and 5,386 people housed under s.4 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999. Home Office statistics published, August 2022.
8. Refugee Council, ‘Lives on Hold: The Experiences of People in Hotel Asylum Accommodation’. 2022. See media report. URL: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2022/jul/21/use-of-uk-hotels… trebles-despite-home-office-promise
9. The Home Office has not provided an update on the number of asylum seekers in hotels since stating it was 25,000 in February 2022. However, when it stated this there were about the same number of people on section 98 support, which is the legislative provision under which people who are housed in hotels are provided support. This suggests that the Section 98 figure tallies quite closely with the number of people in hotels.
10. See letter from Home Secretary to Chair of House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, March 2021, URL: https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/5348/documents/53233/default/
11. For more detail on the numbers who have come illegally by boat, see our innovative and highly-popular Boat Tracking Station which has been counting the daily numbers for more than two years. URL: https://migrationwatchuk.org/news/2020/05/11/arrivals-via-dea… hannel-crossing-from-safe-countries
12. Independent Chief Inspector of Borders, ‘Inspection of Contingency Accommodation’, May 2022, URL: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/syste… ontingency_asylum_accommodation.pdf
13. See BBC News, February 2022, URL: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-60249130 NB This is separate from hotel provision for resettled refugees from Afghanistan. We do not deal with cohort of hotel provision this paper. As of early August 2022, 9,667 Afghan refugees, around half of whom were children, were living in hotel accommodation – a fall from 12,000 in February 2022. The Home Office said that it had reduced the number of hotels in use from 84 in October 2021 to 66 in August 2022. See Home Office, ‘Afghan Resettlement Programme: operational data’, August 2022, URL: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/afghan-resettlement-pr… ttlement-programme-operational-data
14. Independent Chief Inspector of Borders, ‘Inspection of Contingency Accommodation’, May 2022, URL: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/syste… ontingency_asylum_accommodation.pdf
15. See BBC News, February 2022, URL: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-60249130

• Work visas: 277,000 (50% higher than pre-pandemic)
• Sponsored-study visas: 466,000 (58% more than pre-pandemic)
• Family visas and permits: 301,830 (63% more than pre-pandemic)
• Asylum claims: 55,146 (56% more than pre-pandemic).

The new visa statisticssuggest that about a million people were granted entry to live in the UK in the twelve months leading up to March 2022. This may indicate the highest level of immigration to the UK in one year ever (although further statistics are required before this can be confirmed).

A total of 1.6 million visas and permits were granted, of which just over 600,000 were visitor visas.

The total of a million includes record asylum grants and resettlement, as well as temporary workers.

Numbers below are compared with year to March 2020 (pre-pandemic).

Study

• There was a big rise in sponsored study visas, from 300,000 in year to March 2020 to 466,000

Dependants / relatives

• There was a huge rise in dependants of those on other visas, from 85,500 to 205,900, mostly accounted for by a massive increase in study dependants and also Hong Kong dependants. 

Resettlements

• Total direct resettlements / relocations to refugees from places such as Afghanistan, Hong Kong, Ukraine and other countries in the period since 31 January 2021 were approaching 150,000 (nearly 120k from Hong Kong and 30k+ from Ukraine, Afghanistan and elsewhere).  For comparison, there were only about 5,000 people directly resettled from places of danger in the year to March 2020 (mostly from Syria).

Asylum

• Asylum applications are at the highest level for two decades (55,100 applications by main claimants). There were nearly 11,000 grants of asylum.

Work visas

• Work visas are up on pre-pandemic (year to March 2020) from 195,000 to 277,000.
• The new total is 50% higher than in the year ending March 2020.
• Of the most recent total, about 30,000 grants were to seasonal workers.
• Skilled work, which accounted for two thirds (66%) of work-related visas granted, saw the largest increase in visa numbers from the year ending March 2020, up 72,208 or 66%

Illegal immigration

Separate Home Office datareleased on the same day confirmed that there were about 4,500 people detected arriving by small boats in January to March 2022. This is more than three times higher than the same three months in 2021 (1,363).

This is essentially what our own Boat Trackerhas said.

Other figures released on 26 May 2022:

The ONS has also released estimated figures on net migration for the year to June 2021. 

These suggest that net migration was running at nearly a quarter of a million in the 12 months to the middle of last year (239,000) – even as international travel was a fraction of pre-pandemic levels and most of us were forced into lockdowns.

It is also clear that non-EU immigration is driving by far the largest part of mass immigration.

26th May 2022 – Migration Trends, Policy, Visas/Work Permits

1. The government promised that its post-Brexit immigration system would reduce overall immigration levels and deliver ‘firmer’ border control. Yet the opposite has happened, as we show below with analysis of Home Office (HO) data. In 2021, there were over 800,000 longer-term entry grants to non-UK nationals for work, study, family and resettlement. Meanwhile, illegal arrivals have tripled since 2018. The public sense that something is wrong (7 in 10 say Ministers are failing on immigration, YouGov). Yet official transparency on immigration is inadequate (and worsening). Key statistics are being delayed, and the picture of what is happening is being occluded as non-UK arrivals rise.

Introduction

2. Entry clearance grants for longer-term stays for work, family, study and resettlement were more than 800,000 in 2021, with 95% from outside the EU. Just 50,000 entry clearances were to EU citizens – who since 2021 have required visas for longer stays. Longer-term non-EU entry grants stood at about 780,000. There has been no recent public estimate of outflows due to repeated delays in the publication of both 2021 immigration estimates and exit checks analysis.

Detail

3. 2021 was the post-Brexit visa system’s first year of operation. This – we were told by the government – would enable renewed control of immigration following the UK’s departure from the EU, and a reduction in overall numbers. Previously EU citizens could come to the UK to live without visas under free movement rules but they are now included in the visa system for the first time in recent history. As would be expected, this has led to an increase in the total number of visas granted compared with the pre-Brexit figures. Figure 1 below shows that there were more than 880,000 entry grants (EU/non-EU) for work, study, family or resettlement in 2021. When short-term study/temporary work visas are excluded, the total is about 830,000. Around 50,000 (5-6%) were from the EU. ^[1]

Figure 1: Entry grants, visas / resettlement (all non-UK)^[2].Entry grants, visas / resettlement (all non-UK)Entry clearance grants (all non-UK)Of which: WorkOf which: StudyOf which: FamilyOf which: Resettlement200520062007200820092010201120122013201420152016201720182019202020210200,000400,000600,000800,0001,000,0002010●

 Entry clearance grants (all non-UK): 584,601● Of which: Work: 160,737● Of which: Study: 334,735● Of which: Family: 88,412● Of which: Resettlement: 717

4. These HO figures include EU citizens for the first time. Therefore, when looking at historical trends, we consider data for non-EU nationals only (below).

5. There were 835,000 entry grants to non-EU nationals in 2021, of which about 780,000 were for long-term purposes.^[3] The 35,000 or so illegal arrivals that the UK experienced in 2021 (over 90% of whom claim asylum and the vast majority of whom are from outside the EU) will also add to total arrivals.

Figure 2: Entry grants for visas / resettlement (non-EU)Entry grants for visas / resettlement (non-EU)Entry clearance grants (non-EU only)Of which: WorkOf which: StudyOf which: FamilyOf which: Resettlement200520062007200820092010201120122013201420152016201720182019202020210200,000400,000600,000800,0002005●

 Entry clearance grants (non-EU only): 570,137● Of which: Work: 243,466● Of which: Study: 207,418● Of which: Family: 119,182● Of which: Resettlement: 71

Which routes witnessed significant increases in 2021?

6. An increase in non-EU entry grants was the chief driver of the increase in numbers overall. For example, there were: a) more non-EU study visas issued b) more direct resettlements of refugees than ever before c) more illegal immigration (driving a record number of asylum claims). Meanwhile, there were 210,000 entry grants to non-EU nationals for work visas in 2021 – much higher than the average of 160,000 per year for the period 2010-20. This will be partially linked to weaker work permit rules, the scrapping of the annual cap on work visas and the recent creation of a special route for health-care workers.. 2021 also saw the most family visa grants / permits for non-EU citizens (119,000) since 2007.

7. Grants to non-EU nationals for sponsored study rose to 411,800, outstripping both their 2019 level of 285,500 as well as the previous high seen in the 2009-2010 period. See Figure 3 below.

Figure 3: Sponsored-study visa grants since 2001 (non-EU citizens). HO.^[4]Sponsored-study visa grants since 2001 (non-EU citizens)HOVisa grants for sponsored study (non-EU citizens)2001/22002/32003/4200520062007200820092010201120122013201420152016201720182019202020210100,000200,000300,000400,000500,000

8. Another factor pushing the increase in non-EU immigration was the rise in resettlement grants / asylum claims to those escaping dangerous parts of the world – Table 1 below. There was a massive increase of about 95,000 compared with 2020, mainly due to arrivals of Hong Kongers but also Afghans.

Table 1: Entry grants to those resettled from places of danger or their relatives

9. The government has also confirmed that there was a major increase in illegal immigration in 2021, with 36,800 people arriving without prior permission by air, lorry and boat (about three times the total in 2018). This will have fed into the fact that there were a historically high number (56,000) of asylum applications by main applicants and dependants in 2021 – the most since 2003 when the number hit 60,000. See Figure 4 below.

Figure 4: Asylum claims relating to main applicants and dependants, 2005-21.Asylum claims relating to main applicants and dependants, 2005-212005200620072008200920102011201220132014201520162017201820192020202110,00020,00030,00040,00050,00060,000

Conclusion

10. Global entry clearance permissions for longer-term residence in the UK have reached record levels – with more than 800,000 people being allowed to come in 2021 (more people than live in the city of Leeds). This has partly been driven by a huge spike in study visa grants and a significantly larger amount of direct refugee resettlement (with around 80,000 Hong Kongers arriving in one year). Mounting illegal arrivals during 2021 (including by boat) have also fed into the highest number of asylum claims since 2003 (over 50,000 by main applicants and dependants). The government has failed to deliver on its pledges to restore border control in the wake of Brexit, and to reduce immigration.^[5]

Annex A

Delays and gaps in immigration statistics

Although until mid-2020 there was a time lag of only six months on immigration data, the government has repeatedly delayed the release of statistics that would provide a clearer picture of net immigration for 2021. Such information is vital for the public to be able to hold the government to account on an important national issue, for the purposes of transparency and democracy. But we have now had a delay of nearly a year in the release of figures for the year to mid-2021. There have been three recent cases of delays:

• Net migration estimates for the year to June 2021 were supposed to be released on 30 March but the Office for National Statistics (ONS) have now postponed release until late May 2022.^[6]
• National Insurance Number registration data for adult overseas nationals for the period after June 2021 was meant to be released by the DWP earlier this year but that was postponed.^[7]
• Exit Checks analysis for 2020/21 was due to be released in August 2021 but has not been released with no sign of whether or when it will be.^[8]

Because of this, members of the public who are keen to know the truth about what has happened to immigration in the first full year since major policy are forced to rely only on figures produced by the Home Office (visa grants, asylum claims and resettlements).

Footnotes

1. Home Office immigration statistics, released 24 February 2022. URL: https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/fifth-report-on-statisti… elating-to-exit-checks-2019-to-2020
2. The totals for 2005 to 2021 do not include short-term students. There was a very significant drop in the number of short-term students between 2019 and 202, falling from 120,000 to 21,502 – a near 100,000 fall.
3. The 2021 total is 840,000 if those given permission to enter on temporary work visas are excluded from the total. However, temporary workers are included here (making the headline figure 890,000) for reasons of comparability: the headline totals for 2005-2020 including ‘temporary workers’ who came under Tier 5, including some given permission to come to the UK for up to two years.
4. The 2001 to 2004 totals include both entry clearance grants as well as data relating to applications made within the UK for ‘leave to remain’. Data for 2005 to 2021 includes only entry clearance visa grants from outside the UK.
5. Home Office figures on irregular migration, released 24 February 2022.
6. The ONS statistics release calendar states that the statistics were originally scheduled to published on 30 March 2022. However, this was postponed to 19 April ‘to allow publication to go out alongside other related releases on the same day, in line with our revisions policy, and for further quality assurance of data’. Then this was postponed again to 24 May ‘to allow for further quality assurance against other available data sources, including provisional Census 2021 data, to have the highest confidence in the figures we publish.’ URL: https://www.ons.gov.uk/releases/longterminternationalmigrationprovisionalyearendingjune2021
7. See Parliamentary answer, 11 February 2022, URL: https://www.theyworkforyou.com/wrans/?id=2022-01-28.HL5761.h&s=speaker%3A25254#gHL5761.q0
8. Exit Checks data provides results on the proportion of non-EEA nationals who departed before their visa expired, as well as updated data quality metrics for data collected under the Initial Status Analysis (ISA) system, which combines data from different administrative sources to link an individual’s travel in or out of the UK with their immigration history. The most recent Exit Checks analysis report was released in August 2020, covering the year 2019/20. URl: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/syste… -relating-to-exit-checks-201920.pdf

1. More than 75,600 people have reportedly arrived without prior permission by boat and lorry since 1 January 2018. Entries by boat in 2022 so far are triple the number reported by this point in 2021.^[1] The UK has now agreed asylum arrangements with Rwanda which mean that those making unauthorised journeys who then try to regularise their arrival by claiming asylum can be relocated to Rwanda. That country would then take responsibility for processing applications and supporting them.^[2] Australia’s experience with a similar plan suggests that, although the expense may be considerable, it should reduce attempts to come here illegally. If economic migrants and asylum shoppers (including the many asylum rejects from all over Europe and the large number who destroy identity documents) are sent abroad, the deterrent effect should be powerful. Crucially, such policies can prevent drownings and stem the evil trade of criminal traffickers. Yet the public must be given more details. The part of the agreement which commits the UK to resettling an unspecified number of 100,000 refugees currently in Rwanda has not received as much comment. The public should be informed about the numbers and the timeframe.

Introduction

2. The policy of third-country processing of asylum claimants who come to a country illegally or without prior permission has been taken up by a number of countries in the past. Now the UK has agreed a deal with the Rwandan government which bears similarities with such policies.

3. On 14 April 2022, both the UK and Rwandan governments published a five-year memorandum of understanding^[3] outlining new asylum partnership arrangements.

4. According to the UK government, ‘this will see migrants who make dangerous or illegal journeys, such as by small boat or hidden in lorries, have their asylum claim processed in Rwanda. Those whose claims are accepted will then be supported to build a new life in a fast-growing economy, recognised for its record on welcoming and integrating migrants.’ Rwandan Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation, Vincent Biruta said: “Rwanda welcomes this Partnership with the United Kingdom to host asylum seekers and migrants, and offer them legal pathways to residence.”^[4]

5. The exploration of such policies by the UK government is not new; they were proposed by Tony Blair when he was Prime Minister in 2003. In March of that year, in a letter to the EU presidency, he sent a document outlining the UK’s proposals to process asylum seekers in ‘processing centres’ outside Europe. Denmark and the Netherlands strongly supported the proposals, to establish ‘Transit Processing Centres’. The EU rejected Mr Blair’s proposals.

6. This paper looks at the instances where third-country processing has been tried elsewhere and considers the prospects of the UK’s new policy.

a) Summary of the UK agreement with Rwanda

7. A deal was announced between the UK and Rwanda on 14 April 2022 after nine months of negotiation. The initial agreement is to cost £120 million over five years – compared to an annual £1.5 billion bill for asylum seekers in the UK. Irregular cross-channel arrivals by boat and lorry will be assessed and those deemed inadmissible (as asylum shoppers or economic migrants) will then be sent to Rwanda.

8. It appears that only those asylum seekers who are deemed to be inadmissible to the asylum system (as under current asylum rules and under provisions of the new Nationality and Borders Bill, which has now passed through Parliament) will be considered for removal to Rwanda. Only 2 % of boat arrivals considered so far under the rules have been served with inadmissibility decisions.^[5]

9. The UK has committed to undertaking an “initial screening” of asylum seekers. People who cross the Channel in small boats will undergo initial checks at the Western Jet Foil facility in Dover. Further checks will be made at a processing site in Manston, Kent. Those whose claim is deemed inadmissible may be removed to a ‘third safe country’.

10. It is unclear how this will compare with the current asylum screening process. Opponents of the deal might bring legal challenges if there is no automatic right to such assistance for those facing removal to Rwanda. There may also be scope for interested parties to make judicial review applications, following on from human rights claims.

11. Rwanda has to approve all transfer requests prior to relocation and they can refuse to take people with criminal records. This could lead to complications.

12. Decisions about whether someone is fit to fly will be made (and will be challengeable) in the UK. The UK will be responsible for making and funding travel arrangements.

13. Those sent to Rwanda will initially be based at hostel in Kigali. They will not be detained but will be free to come and go from accommodation Those relocated should have access to legal assistance in Rwanda throughout their asylum claim.

14. Critics of the deal have pointed to concerns regarding the human rights record of the Rwandan government. In response, the UK government has said: “Rwanda is a State Party to the 1951 UN Refugee Convention and the seven core UN Human Rights Conventions… Under this agreement, they will process claims in accordance with the UN Refugee Convention, national and international human rights laws.”^[6] As journalist Dominic Lawson wrote recently: “Last year, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Filippo Grandi, praised the government of Rwanda, specifically for the way it had provided a safe haven: ‘Thanks to Rwanda, we can evacuate refugees from Libya and seek solutions for them.” The UN Refugee Agency has recommended the country as ‘a safe haven for refugees fleeing conflict and persecution’.^[7]

15. Critics also suggest the agreement breaches the principle of ‘non-refoulement’ which states that no migrant can be returned to a country where they would face irreparable harm. However, Australia’s senior diplomat in the UK George Brandis has said: “At no point do our arrangements, nor as I read them the UK arrangements, breach the ‘non-refoulement’ obligations in the UN Refugee Convention.”^[8] government have looked very carefully at this and ensured that Britain’s announced policy is consistent with its ‘non-refoulement’ obligations under the Refugee Convention, as is Australia’s.” The Times, May 2022. URL: https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/uks-rwanda-migrant-plan-does-not-break-law-australian-diplomat-says-7hl2chf2d ]

16. Those sent to Rwanda under the deal would have no ‘automatic right’ to come back to the UK but the Home Office anticipates the possibility of UK courts making ‘bring back’ orders. Rwanda can take reasonable steps to return people to the UK if it is determined that the UK authorities are obliged to do so.

17. Under paragraph 16 of the agreement, the UK has agreed to resettle a portion of Rwanda’s “most vulnerable refugees”. This raises questions as to how many people this would involve. There are presently 100,000 or so refugees in Rwanda, the majority of whom are Congolese.^[9]

18. As for whether the Rwanda deal will allow the government to save money, a government minister noted that it was anticipated ‘the amount [spent] would be comparable to processing costs incurred in the UK’.^[10] However, the deterrent effect on reining in rising crossings should be enough so as to greatly the huge strains on the UK’s overwhelmed and abused asylum system in the medium to long-term, as well as on housing, services, transport and communities. As the UK faces worsening housing, health and cost-of-living crises, this plan could help ease the huge backlogs and strains facing our overwhelmed and abused asylum system and NHS, while also protecting communities now faced with major change due to rocketing illegal immigration and asylum pressure.

What do the public think of the Rwanda deal?

19. The polling on this question has not been adequate since the various questions asked of respondents do not make clear the context of illegal boat crossings which provided the backdrop for formulation of the plan. Nevertheless it has been mixed. An April 2022 YouGov poll found that marginally more people opposed the deal than supported it (42% to 35%).^[11] However, a Savanta poll conducted the same month found that while 47 per cent of voters said they supported the idea, just 26 % said they were against. Labour voters were more supportive than against, while Conservative voters strongly backed the idea, by 67% to 15% and those who voted Leave in 2016 agreed with the scheme (65% to 15%).^[12]

b) International case studies of offshore asylum policies in action

Denmark

20. In 2021, a Danish law was passed which allowed for refugees to be sent to a third country and for their asylum applications to be processed there. The Social Democrat-led government has since held negotiations with a handful of African countries about hosting the centres in exchange for development aid, with Rwanda touted as a likely candidate after Denmark agreed to upgrade that country’s asylum system.

21. Immigration Minister Matthias Tesfaye visited Rwanda last year and a memorandum of understanding was signed, but there was nothing firm about a refugee-processing centre. However, in April 2022, Mr Tesfaye said: “We are in dialogue with Rwanda, and we have a good cooperation based on a broad partnership, but we do not have an agreement on transfer of asylum seekers. I share the view of the Rwandan and British governments that the current asylum system is unsustainable.”^[13] Denmark has not yet begun deporting the estimated 400 people in its return centres, but those who are housed there cannot work, study, or cook their own meals. While they can leave the centres, they are not allowed to remain in Denmark if they do so. It is estimated that hundreds have left the country to seek refuge elsewhere in Europe.

Israel

22. Faced with a major problem of illegal immigration, Israel reached deals with third countries to take an undisclosed number of people. These countries were reportedly Uganda and Rwanda. The scheme began in 2015. Those rejected for asylum were given the choice of returning to their country of origin, or accepting a payment of $3,500 and a plane ticket to one of other countries, or being put in jail if they stayed in Israel. By 2018, Israel said some 20,000 of about 65,000 who had arrived in the country illegally had departed.

Australia

25. Our study of the way in which Australia used offshore asylum arrangements to help tackle the sharp rise in illegal boat arrivals suggests that, although the policy may be initially expensive and controversial, it can have a powerful effect in stopping the boats, tackling the criminal people smugglers and preventing needless deaths. As the Refugee Studies Centre at the University of Oxford stated: “The harsh deterrence measures served to significantly reduce the number of people smuggled to the Australian continent”.^[14] For more detail on the Australian policy, please read Annex A below.

Conclusions

26. By stopping the boats, the Australians reduced the numbers going into the asylum system and prevented deaths. If (admittedly, a big if) we achieve a similar result, it will not only mean fewer people tragically dying but also stem asylum abuse, protect the UK public and save money. In the event that those coming via boat and lorry are swiftly and routinely sent to Rwanda, it could act as a powerful deterrent to those who are considering making the trip, while denying the criminal smugglers their huge profits. The most effective way of crippling the business model of the traffickers is to deny them their clients.

Annex A – A case study of Australia’s offshore processing policy

The main example of where such a policy has been tried relatively successfully is Australia. Boat people had been arriving in Australia since the 1980s when several thousand Indochinese arrived from Vietnam. In the 1990s, the origin of the flow switched to Central Asia and the Middle East. Between 1989 and 2001, a total of 259 boats arrived carrying 13,500 people.

It is also important to note that, in recent decades, there have been a number of deaths resulting from such crossings in the midst of several high-profile tragedies, including an explosion on a boat near Ashmore Reef in 2009.

From 2001, after the arrival of 433 boat people (who were rescued by the MS Tampa in August of that year) Australia implemented what was then known as its ‘Pacific Solution’ which involved offshore processing of several hundred asylum seekers in neighbouring Nauru and Papua New Guinea. Laws were passed to provide a new framework for these offshore policies. In 2001, agreements were reached with Nauru and PNG whereby those countries received multi-million dollar aid packages and coverage of the cost of processing asylum seekers. Only two boats reached Australia between September 2001 and 2006.

Australia’s former foreign minister, Alexander Downer, explained what happened when he implemented the policy of offshore processing:

”In 2001, more than 5,500 illegal migrants came to Australia by this perilous route. I realised the best way to stop it was to destroy the business model of this cruel and highly lucrative illicit trade. I established migrant centres in Manus Island in Papua New Guinea and Nauru, an island in the South Pacific, as part of a Pacific Solution initiative. Any illegal immigrant who arrived on an Australian beach was sent to one of these centres. Once word got out it worked brilliantly and by the following year, the number of illegal migrants arriving on boats had dropped to a solitary one individual.”^[15]

In another article he noted:

“The way we stopped them was targeting the people smugglers’ business model. You make sure they are not able to fulfil the contract they make with the people who are paying them. If they can’t get them to their destination, migrants will stop using the route.”^[16]

However, when the Labor government took power in 2008 it ended the offshore processing policy. This seemed to lead to the illegal boat crossings beginning again, and, with them, the deaths. Boat arrivals rose from 161 in 2008 to 20,587 in 2013. At the same time a large number of people died attempting to reach Australia in unseaworthy vessels. While between 2002 and 2008 there had been no deaths, between 2009 and 2013 there were 1,158 deaths of people trying to reach Australia.

In 2012, faced with an outcry over the deaths and illegal arrivals, Labor re-opened Manus and Nauru. Despite this, only a minority of boat people were transferred to the centres under the Labor government. However, following the election of a Liberal Government in 2013, the offshore processing policy resumed in earnest (as part of Operation Sovereign Borders), in tandem with an even more successful policy of boat pushbacks. This saw deaths plummet from 221 in 2013 to zero in the period 2014 to 2017.

Decline in boat crossings following introduction of policy

It is clear from the patterns of boat arrivals that the periods between 2001 and 2008 and from 2012 onwards, when offshore processing policies were implemented fully, there was a clear drop in the number of boats, with many years experiencing no boat arrivals. See Figure 1 below.

Figure 1: Boat arrivals to Australia, 1998 to 2020. Source: Migration Watch UK graph of data from European Stability Initiative.^[17]Boat Arrivals to Australia, 1998 to 2020Migration Watch UK graph of data from European Stability Initiative1998199920002001200220032004200520062007200820092010201120122013201420152016201720182019202005,00010,00015,00020,00025,0001999●

 Boat arrivals to Australia: 3,721

How many people were processed overseas?

Australia’s Border Force has said more than 4,000 people were relocated between 2012 and 2019. At the peak (2014), about 2,500 people were being processed in the centres in PNG and Nauru:

• 1,544 were accommodated at offshore units between September 2001 and 2003
• The Nauru and PNG centres were closed by the Labor government between 2008 and 2012.
• From 2012, the numbers housed at both centres rose from just under 500 at the end of 2012 to 2,500 in 2014, and then dropped to about 1,300 in 2016 (See Figure 1 below).^[18]
• No refugees and asylum seekers have been sent to Nauru since 2014.
• In May 2016, Australia held 1,193 people in Nauru, but by 2021 this had fallen to 107.
• Australia closed its Manus Island detention centre, after PNG’s Supreme Court decision ruled it was illegal. Regional processing arrangements there ended on 31 December 2021, with the PNG Government assuming full and independent management of the residual caseload from 1 January 2022.^[19] By the time of the arrangement ending, there were 120 asylum seekers and refugees remaining in PNG. They were given the option of resettling there or moving to Nauru.
• By 2022, the number of what the Australian government called ‘transitory persons’ in Nauru was 112 (83 of whom were recognised to be refugees).^[20]

Figure 2: Asylum seekers processed in Nauru / PNG. Australian Government.

What happened to those who went to these centres?

Policies such as these can offer those being processed the choice of a safe alternative destination to the one for which asylum seekers set out. Over the years, those who ended up in PNG and Nauru had the option of departing for another safe country. For example, in 2014, 210 people left the centres for Iran, 38 for Iraq, 22 for Lebanon, 9 for India, 4 for Bangladesh, 4 for Pakistan and 4 for Sri Lanka. There is no record of whether any of these countries were ones from which those who had claimed asylum had fled.

In addition, in 2016, Australia and the United States agreed a resettlement arrangement. It provided resettlement opportunities in the United States for up to 1250 refugees under regional processing arrangements. As of 28 February 2022, the United States resettlement arrangement has enabled 998 individuals (401 from Nauru, 426 from PNG and 171 from Australia) to resettle in the United States. Many refugees have had their resettlement applications approved and are at various stages of pre-departure activity, while many others have applications in train. Meanwhile, four refugees agreed to depart Nauru in June 2015 to be settled in Cambodia.

In March 2022, a three-year deal was announced for up to 450 refugees from Australia’s regional processing centres to be resettled in New Zealand.

Controversy

To be sure, Australia’s offshore processing policy has been controversial. During Australia’s eight-year presence in Papua New Guinea there have been major incidents of violence, including hunger strikes, riots and the murder of an Iranian asylum seeker by guards.

Meanwhile, a number of non-governmental organisations and the UN have criticised Australia’s centres in PNG and Nauru for substandard conditions. However, despite some suggesting that the policy is inhumane, it cannot be denied that Nauru and PNG are safe countries and that Australia and those nations were within their rights to agree bilateral arrangements to deal with an illegal immigration scourge that was leading to scores of deaths and profiting criminal people traffickers.

Cost

The government has said that the UK’s agreement with Rwanda will cost £120 million over five years. This in contrast with the current cost of the asylum system which is £1.5 billion per year. £1.2 billion per year is also currently being spent on hotel accommodation for 25,000 asylum claimants, including in four-star establishments.

By contrast, the arrangements in Nauru appeared to have cost just over half a billion dollars per year between 2017 and 2021 (£283 million). Responses to Senate questions show that from November 2017 to January 2021, the Australian government spent more than $1.67bn on “garrison and welfare” for those held on the island – averaging out at about $481 million per year, or £272 million)

The cost of running the Nauru arrangements in 2016 were reported to be about $534 million per year. By 2021, estimates for the cost to accommodate a far smaller number of people (107 compared with 1,193 in 2016) were just under $600 million per year.

By the Australian government’s own projections it will spend $811.8m (£460m) on offshore processing in 2021-22.

In 2017 Australia was reported to be paying $70 million (£37 million) in settlement money to more than 1,900 people who had sued for harm.

Although the cost of the Australian scheme has been significant, this must be balanced against what the projected cost would have been were boat arrivals to continue at 20,000 per year (the number they reached in 2013). This figure has already been reached for the UK (in 2021, there were 28,500 arrivals). The deterrent effect of this policy should have the effect of reining in in the medium to longer-term, what would otherwise be steadily rising costs and knock-on impacts (unquantified negative externalities) such as housing pressure, overcrowding, traffic gridlock, loss of green space and strains on services.

Stopping deaths at sea

As government minister Tom Pursglove put it in late April 2022: “We believe this is an important policy intervention that will shift the dynamic and help to preserve lives. That is a fundamental imperative and we cannot put a cost on it.”^[21] Despite both the controversy and the expense, offshore processing appears to be one of a range of sub-optimal solutions. By helping deter people from setting off on dangerous sea voyages, it can clearly prevent deaths. The graph below shows deaths at sea between 2000 and 2017. The data suggests that the number of deaths fell off when offshore processing policies (among others from 2013 onwards) were in place. From reaching a peak of 411 in 2012 after Labour closed the offshore processing centres in PNG and Nauru, the number of deaths dropped dramatically to zero from 2014 onwards. Figure 3: Deaths at sea of those attempting to reach Australia. Migration Watch UK graph of data from the European Stability Initiative. ^[22]Deaths at sea of those attempting to reach AustraliaMigration Watch UK graph of data from the European Stability Initiative20002001200220032004200520062007200820092010201120122013201420152016201701002003004005002006●

 Death at sea of those trying to reach Australia: 0

Footnotes

1. View our very popular and regularly updated Boat Tracking Station, URL: https://migrationwatchuk.org/news/2020/05/11/arrivals-via-dea… hannel-crossing-from-safe-countries
2. See Home Office press release, 14 April 2022, URL: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/world-first-partnership-to-tackle-global-migration-crisis
3. Memorandum of Understanding, 14 April 2022, URL: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/memorandum-of-understa… the-government-of-the-republic-of-r
4. Home Office press statement, 14 April 2022.
5. The Times, April 2022, URL: https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/just-2-of-migrants-will-be-sen… anda-under-existing-rules-g9q707f5p
6. Hansard, 14 April 2022, URL: https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-questions/detail/2022-04-14/%31%35%34%34%38%31
7. Mail Online, April 2022, URL: https://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-10749621/DOMINIC-LAWSO… callous-scheme-Libyan-migrants.html
8. Mr Brandis added: “It is not the obligation of a state, to which an application for asylum is made, to settle in that state those applicants if they are successful. It is the obligation of the state not to refer them to a nation from which they have a justified fear of persecution — under the formula of the Refugee Convention — and to facilitate their settlement in a nation in which they will not face those threats, either onshore or offshore… I will be absolutely confident that the lawyers who advise the [UK
9. UNHCR, early 2022, URL: https://reporting.unhcr.org/rwanda
10. Hansard, 19 April 2022, URL: https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-questions/detail/2022-04-19/%31%35%35%36%30%30
11. YouGov poll, April 2022, URL: https://yougov.co.uk/topics/travel/survey-results/daily/2022/04/14/8bb29/1
12. MailPlus, April 2022, URL: https://www.mailplus.co.uk/edition/news/172099/exclusive-voters-huge-backing-for-rwanda-plan
13. BBC News, April 2022, URL: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-61106231
14. Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford, October 2006, URL: https://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/files/files-1/wp36-politics-extraterritorial-processing-2006.pdf
15. Daily Mail, URL: https://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-8796535/Former-Austral… rew-Downer-advises-UK-migrants.html
16. The Times, URL: https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/albanian-airlift-for-illegal-migrants-p0mmkfz6f
17. European Stability Initiative, June 2021, URL: https://esiweb.org/sites/default/files/newsletter/pdf/ESI%20-%20T… Australia%20-%207%20June%202021.pdf
18. Australian government, ‘Australia’s offshore processing of asylum seekers in Nauru and PNG: a quick guide to statistics and resources’, URL: https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments… ck_Guides/Offshore#_Total_number_of
19. Australian Ministry of Home Affairs, URL: https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/about-us/what-we-do/border-protect… egional-processing-and-resettlement
20. Australian Ministry of Home Affairs, URL: https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/about-us-subsite/files/population_… esettled_as_at_28_february_2022.pdf
21. Hansard, 25 April 2022, URL: https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2022-04-25/debates/C707BE6C-A96A-40E5-AF8A-D04B7CA010A0/web
22. European Stability Initiative, June 2021, URL: https://esiweb.org/sites/default/files/newsletter/pdf/ESI%20-%20T… Australia%20-%207%20June%202021.pdf

Summary

1. The system for checking the age of asylum claimants is so loose that it gives the benefit of the doubt to those saying without proof that they are minors. In the midst of this, there has been a major rise in asylum fraud by adults pretending to be children, with two in three (66%) concluded disputes in the year to September 2021 revealing that the person was 18 or over (1,118 people). This is the largest numerical total since published records begin in 2006, and is 3.5 times the number for the previous year (320 – Annex A below). The substantial rise is linked to rocketing illegal Channel crossings by boat this year^[1]. Quarter 3 of 2021 – when dinghy arrivals surged – saw the highest quarterly number of age disputes recorded (904), well above the previous 2006 high (679). Many arrivals destroy documents, making it harder for age and identity to be verified. There are grave safety concerns since adults who falsely claim to be minors are placed alongside vulnerable young people in schools and housing. However, the government has remarkably conceded that bogus ‘children’ could continue to be placed with minors for an initial period even if ‘doubt still remains as to their claim to be a child’. For the sake of child safety, the government must ensure no one is placed among children if those conducting initial assessments have doubts about the person’s age.

Introduction

2. Under the present rules, there are incentives for adult asylum seekers to be treated as children. Those deemed to be minors can benefit in various ways, including the housing and support they receive, the treatment of their asylum or immigration claim by the authorities, the arrangements that would need to be made to secure their removal from the UK (where they do not establish a lawful basis to stay) and rules regarding the use of immigration detention for children. We have seen a great deal of abuse of these provisions. There is a worrying degree of scope for people who are not children to be treated as minors – and placed alongside vulnerable young people – until a further Merton test^[2] (by social workers) attempts to establish the veracity of their claimed age.

3. One of the key problems with the laxity of the system as it stands is that it provides too much scope for abuse especially at an early stage. Current Home Office guidance^[3] states that a decision should only be made to treat the claimant as an adult if two officers – one at least with the grade of Chief Immigration Officer, Higher Executive Officer or Higher Officer – have independently assessed that the claimant is an adult because their physical appearance and demeanour very strongly suggest they are 25 or over. If this test is not met but the immigration officials do not accept the claimed age, the individual will be given the benefit of the doubt and provisionally treated as a child while being referred to a local authority for the Merton assessment to be carried out.

4. As the government has said, this means that even where an immigration official believes that an individual who is claiming to be a child is as old as 24, they must still treat them as a child, which in practice will mean that the individual can be placed alongside children, pending the outcome of a subsequent assessment. Even then the later Merton test conducted by social workers is far from fool proof (as it is based upon a subjective judgement) although we require more data to establish the degree to which it is or is not being exploited.

5. The age of a person arriving in the UK is normally established from identity documentation. However, as the Channel Threat Commander Dan O’Mahoney told the Home Affairs Select Committee in September 2020, the standard practice among those crossing in boats from Northern France, for example, is to destroy documentation en route^[4]. This is often done by migrants in order to obstruct attempts by to identify them upon arrival. In fact, a specific law was passed in 2004 to penalise those who make a claim after destroying documentation i.e. the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants Act) 2004. Despite this the government increasingly refuses to prosecute those who do this (see blog).

6. This lax system is also open to be exploited by terrorists. For example, a judge said the Parson’s Green bomber, who injured scores of people in September 2017 when he exploded a bucket bomb on the London Underground, lied about his age when claiming asylum.

7. Finally, there are major financial and fairness implications. On average, taxpayers provide £46,000 each year to local councils to look after each unaccompanied asylum-seeking child.^[5] As well as the obvious safety risks, this form of abuse also takes away from support that would otherwise be available to help genuine children.

What does the data tell us?

8. In 2019, the UK received more asylum claims from unaccompanied minors than any other European country, including Greece and Italy. Since 2015, the UK has received, on average, more than 3,000 unaccompanied asylum-seeking children per year. Where age was disputed and resolved from 2016-2020, 54% were found to be adults, according to Home Office statistics. There are indications that this situation is worsening. Home Office statistics (depicted in Figure 1 in Annex A on p. 5 below) show that 66% (1,118 out of 1,696) of those who claimed to be a minor, but whose stated age was subject to dispute and conclusively assessed, were found to be 18 or over during the year ending Q3 2021. Meanwhile, the total number of people found to be adults (1,110) is the highest since available records began in 2006, with the third quarter of 2021 being the largest total in any quarter since the mid-2000s.^[6]

9. The rise is likely linked to surging Channel crossings in boats. Quarter 3 2021 saw the highest quarterly totals of both age disputes (904) and those found to be 18+ after assessment (546) since 2006, at the same time as 11,178 people were reported to arrive by dinghy.

10. In contrast to about two-thirds of resolved disputed claims being ruled as adults in the year to September 2021, the corresponding share for the previous year was 47% (320 out of 685) and the annual average from 2006 to 2020 has been half. In total, 7,996 asylum claimants claiming to be children were found to be adults after assessment (2006 to Q3 2021).^[7]

Other reports and incidents

11. Concerns about exploitation of child migrant rules have particularly grown since 2016 when the UK witnessed the admission of a number of applicants from Calais refugee camps who claimed to be children but appeared to be much older and arrivals hidden in lorries shot up. In 2017 ex-Border Force boss Tony Smith said: “Some would’ve sworn on their mums’ lives they were 16 despite having a beard and balding.” The danger of mature adults having free access to groups of children is obvious. Even more shocking is the thought that those judged to be 18 or more are given the benefit of the doubt. It is also notable that legal claims from migrants accused of not being honest about their age are costing taxpayers hundreds of thousands of pounds. The cases have arisen when lawyers challenge age checks by social workers. Cases can drag on for as long as three years. A freedom of information release last October (reported in the media) revealed that Kent County Council alone has paid out over £300,000 on 25 cases in the past four years.

12. In one case, a pupil was said to ‘look about 40’ with a receding hairline and was enrolled in a class of 15-year-olds. The asylum seeker was said to have travelled alone to the UK without paperwork, before being placed in a school in Coventry. A girl at the school shared his picture on social networking app Snapchat and questioned his age. The picture was eventually seen by the girl’s mother who raised concerns with the school.

13. The Independent Chief Inspector of Borders recently found that immigration removal centres – e.g. Yarl’s Wood and Brook House – saw an increasing number of age dispute cases from October 2020 (in the midst of a rise in the number of people entering the UK in dinghies via cross-Channel trips), with concerns raised by Home Office and supplier staff, and by the Independent Monitoring Board, about the quality of initial screening at the Kent Intake Unit.^[8]

14. There is also a major threat to public security. The current lax system is open to be exploited by terrorists. Parson’s Green bomber Ahmed Hassan said he was a 16-year-old orphan when he entered the UK illegally in 2015 and claimed asylum. Yet the judge who jailed him for life in 2018 said he was certain Hassan lied about being a child to stay here.^[9]

The need to tighten up the initial age assessment

15. Although the Nationality and Borders Bill, currently before the House of Lords, makes some welcome improvements – such as formalising the scope for use of scientific evidence and the creation of a new body to assess age – the government appears to have backed off its earlier intention to put tighter initial assessment rules in primary law. The current position means that even where an immigration official believes that an individual who is claiming to be a child to be as old as 24, they must still treat them as a child, which in practice will mean that individual will be placed alongside children for a period of days or weeks.

16. The government had indicated its intention to put in place a more appropriate threshold for initial age assessments. Former Home Office minister Chris Philp told a parliamentary committee in December 2020: “You… have questions around the screening that happens at an earlier stage before you can do a full Merton-compliant assessment, but it does get litigated. The Home Office has social workers who assist local authorities with that process in some cases, particularly in Kent, to try and get it right first time. The gold standard is currently the Merton assessment… One area we are looking at closely is whether we can legislate to clarify better in statute how these age assessment processes work so that we remove some of the ambiguity that currently exists.” ^[10] And in March 2021, the Home Office stated: “Currently, an individual will be treated as an adult where their physical appearance and demeanour strongly suggests they are ‘over 25 years of age’. We are exploring changing this to ‘significantly over 18 years of age’. Social workers will be able to make straightforward under/over 18 decisions with additional safeguards.”^[11]

17. What would the bill do? Part 4 would introduce new processes for age assessment for those who require leave to enter/remain and for whom there is ‘insufficient evidence’ to be sure of their age. The legislation outlines powers and responsibilities on the Secretary of State, local authorities, and ‘designated persons’ to carry out checks, and would formalise permission for “scientific methods” to be used in conducting such assessments (they are reportedly already used by some local authorities). The bill also specifies rights of appeal against such assessments and the use of legal aid for appeals. It provides scope for further age checks if new evidence becomes available. More detailed provisions about the conduct of age assessments are to be set out in regulations subject to the affirmative procedure (see House of Lords Library briefing on the legislation). ^[12]

18. Although the bill provides scope for further changes to be made via secondary legislation, the government did previously say that it was their ‘intention’ for a provision specifying ‘a more appropriate threshold for initial age assessments’ to be put into primary legislation. However, the present bill includes no such ‘more appropriate provision’^[13].

19. The government has pointed to the fact that, in August 2021, the Supreme Court upheld the Home Office’s previous policy of treating asylum seekers who claim to be children as adults if two Home Office officials think that the person looks significantly over 18 (see R (BF (Eritrea) ) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2021] UKSC 38). This policy was subsequently amended in 2019 to the ‘over 25’ rule noted above on the back of a previous Court of Appeal decision. Because of the later 2021 Supreme Court ruling, the government says that it no longer needs to place tougher initial assessment rules in primary law, while adding that it still intends to tighten initial assessment rules. Our view is that, Supreme Court decision or not, the government should put the change into primary legislation in order to make the will of Parliament as abundantly clear on this matter as possible.

20. We were also concerned to read in a July 2021 Home Office statementthat ‘it remains the Government’s intention that where the individual’s physical appearance and demeanour does not meet that threshold and doubt still remains as to their claim to be a child, it must be assumed that the individual is under 18 unless and until a more comprehensive age assessment is carried out….’^[14] Indeed, there no adequate measures in the bill currently before Parliament that would tighten initial assessments in a manner that would close this loophole. This does not appear to take the safety of vulnerable children seriously enough since it still appears to mean that adults falsely claiming to be children may be placed alongside them until assessments later prove they are actually 18 or older. The government must bring forward reform to tighten initial assessments so child safety is put first and not side-lined.

Proposed introduction of scientific methods to age assessment procedures

21. We welcome the government’s intention to create a robust approach to age assessment to ensure that authorities can act as swiftly as possible to safeguard against adults claiming to be children and to use new scientific methods to improve the ability to accurately assess age. It is notable that the UK is one of the only countries in Europe not to use scientific age assessment methods to help determine a person’s age when they arrive into the country. Various scientific methods are used to assess age in Sweden, Norway, France, Germany and the Netherlands (as well as other countries):

• For instance, in Sweden the National Board of Forensic Medicine (Rättsmedicinalverket) conducts a medical age assessment – a procedure which the person is free to refuse. The result of the assessment is communicated to the Swedish Migration Agency who makes their decision based on the assessment and other evidence presented in the case.^[15]
• In Italy medical examinations are used for assessment although the person is free to refuse to participate.
• In Cyprus, an age assessment interview is carried out before referring the person to medical examinations.
• In France, an interview is conducted with a person whose age is unclear and who does not possess identity documents. The interview aims to assess the age and the circumstances of the person concerned. It is carried out by the local authority in the administrative département in which the person is based, or by delegated associate services. If a doubt about the person’s age remains, the individual can be referred to medical examinations, with the person’s consent.

22. We also support the creation of a National Age Assessment Board (NAAB) which we understand will primarily consist of expert social workers dedicated to conducting age assessments. We believe that there is scope for this change to improve the consistency and quality of age tests and minimise the incentive for claimants to be dishonest about their age.

Conclusion

23. We agree with the government’s assessment that the current age assessment process is ‘highly subjective and often subject to prolonged and expensive legal disputes [in which] adult claimants can take advantage of a fragmented system to pass themselves off as children, benefitting from additional protections properly reserved for the most vulnerable’. The proposed reforms will deliver some improvement as they provide scope for rationalising, simplifying and formalising more objective checks against this form of asylum abuse. However, they do not yet sufficiently address the huge loophole in initial assessments which currently risk placing adults alongside vulnerable children for an initial period. In the government’s words: “Many adults claim to be children…we have examples of adults freely entering the UK care and school system, being accommodated and educated with vulnerable children.”^[16] Yet the government made a crucial concession in July 2021 when it stated: “Where… doubt still remains as to their claim to be a child, it must be assumed that the individual is under 18 unless and until a more comprehensive age assessment is carried out”.

This is deeply unsatisfactory as it suggests a threat to children posed by this form of abuse will continue. The government must ensure that no one is placed among children if those conducting initial assessments have doubts about the person’s age. Placing tighter initial assessments in primary law would also make the will of Parliament on the matter as abundantly clear as possible. The safety of children, and public security, is at stake.

Annex A

Table 1: Asylum age disputes, Year to September, 2007 to 2021(Home Office figures).

Figure 1: Total resolved age disputes / of which those assessed to be 18+. Home Office data.Total resolved age disputes / of which those assessed to be 18+Home Office DataAge disputes resolvedOf which: Found to be 18 or olderYear to Sept 2007Year to Sept 2008Year to Sept 2009Year to Sept 2010Year to Sept 2011Year to Sept 2012Year to Sept 2013Year to Sept 2014Year to Sept 2015Year to Sept 2016Year to Sept 2017Year to Sept 2018Year to Sept 2019Year to Sept 2020Year to Sept 202105001,0001,5002,0002,500

Footnotes

1. Regularly visit the hugely popular Migration Watch UK Channel Tracking Station for illegal arrivals by boat, URL: https://migrationwatchuk.org/news/2020/05/11/arrivals-via-dea… hannel-crossing-from-safe-countries
2. This is a social worker led age assessment – named after the leading case of B v London Borough of Merton [2003] EWHC 1689 (Admin]. The test must adhere to procedures set out in that case and developed in subsequent case law, usually including a number of interviews which explore the person’s background and also consider information obtained from others who have contact with the individual.
3. See current Home Office guidance, ‘Assessing age’, December 2020, URL: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/syste… -age-asylum-instruction-v4.0ext.pdf
4. Evidence to Home Affairs Committee, 3 September 2020, URL: https://committees.parliament.uk/oralevidence/793/default/
5. Home Office Internal Finance Information [unpublished], cited in HO, New Plan for Immigration, March 2021, URL: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/syste… overeign_Borders_Web_Accessible.pdf
6. HO, New Plan for Immigration, March 2021, URL: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/syste… overeign_Borders_Web_Accessible.pdf
7. Home Office age dispute statistics, URL: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/syste… age-disputes-datasets-sep-2021.xlsx
8. ICIBI, ‘Second annual inspection of “Adults at risk in immigration detention”, July 2020 – March 2021’, URL: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/syste… ts_at_Risk_Detention_Accessible.pdf
9. See media reports, 24 March 2018.
10. Philp, Home Affairs Select Committee, House of Commons, December 2020, see Q606, URL: https://committees.parliament.uk/oralevidence/1310/html
11. Home Office, New Plan for Immigration, March 2021, URL: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/syste… overeign_Borders_Web_Accessible.pdf
12. House of Lords Briefing on Nationality and Borders Bill, December 2021, URL: https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/LLN-2021-0038/LLN-2021-0038.pdf
13. Government explanatory note for the Nationality and Borders Bill, July 2021, URL: https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/cbill/58-02/0141/en/210141en.pdf
14. Ibid.
15. Swedish Government website, URL: https://www.rmv.se/medical-age-assessment/
16. HO, New Plan for Immigration, March 2021.